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Chapter 1
Introduction
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are often referred to as the backbone of the
European economy. In 2016, SMEs account for 99.8 % of all the enterprises in the non-ﬁnancial
business sector within the European Union. These SMEs provide approximately 93 million
jobs and represent 67 % of the total employment in this sector (Muller et al., 2017). However,
SMEs often face difﬁculties in satisfying their ﬁnancing needs. Therefore, this dissertation
empirically analyzes different sources of ﬁnancing which represent alternatives to traditional
ﬁnancing systems for SMEs.
The European Commission (2003) deﬁnes SMEs as enterprises with a workforce of less than
250 employees, a turnover of less than 50 million EUR and / or a balance sheet total of less
than 43 million EUR. Despite the importance of SMEs for the European and the worldwide
economy, ﬁnancial markets often fail to provide SMEs sufﬁcient ﬁnancing. Previous literature
examines several reasons for this ﬁnancing gap. Berger and Udell (1998) and Gregory et al.
(2005) highlight the role of information asymmetries. Due to informational opacity it is often
difﬁcult to assess the creditworthiness of SMEs. Small businesses frequently lack a great deal of
relevant data such as audited ﬁnancial statements or credit histories. This results in high cost for
the screening and monitoring of SMEs (Ang, 1992) and can also lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981; Berger and Udell, 1998). Besides, many SMEs cannot provide sufﬁcient
collateral in the early stages of their development (Berger and Udell, 1998; Avery et al., 1998).
SMEs within in the European Union often rely on bank-related products to cover their ﬁnancing
needs (ECB, 2017). Since the implementation of the Basel II and III regulations, loan conditions
have worsened for many SMEs. Nowadays, all ﬁrms applying for a loan have to provide a
mandatory rating. In particular for poorly or non-rated SMEs this has resulted in higher costs of
borrowing as banks face increased equity requirements for such loans (Schindele and Szczesny,
2015; Mu¨ller et al., 2011). Hence, many SMEs are in need of a remedy to overcome this
ﬁnancing gap.
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In recent years, several alternative forms of ﬁnance have been introduced and many new players
have entered the market. The need for ﬁnancing on the one hand, and opportunities due
to technical innovations on the other hand have boosted the growth of these new ﬁnancing
instruments. Providers of alternative sources of ﬁnance are able to mitigate some of the ﬁnancing
obstacles for SMEs described above by utilizing new technologies (Block et al., 2018b). For
example, many new ﬁnancing instruments take advantage of big data or the wisdom of the crowd
in order to reduce agency problems.
With the increasing use of alternative ﬁnance the opportunity and the need for further research
arises. It is important to analyze the new ﬁnancing instruments in order to understand the market
implications as well as the opportunities and the challenges for SMEs and investors. Furthermore,
the increased data availability for many of these new ﬁnancing forms allows drawing conclusions
about both investor and entrepreneurial behavior.
This thesis focuses on several forms of alternative ﬁnance for SMEs. In particular, different
forms of crowdfunding as well as Mittelstand bonds are examined. In this context, crowdfunding
represents an external source of ﬁnancing in which a relatively large number of individuals
collectively raises capital (Belleﬂamme et al., 2014; Mollick, 2014). Different forms of crowd-
funding can be distinguished depending on what the entrepreneurs promise the investors in return
for their contributions (Bradford, 2012). In peer-to-peer (P2P) lending and peer-to-business
lending the crowd grants a loan to individuals or businesses in order to receive a pre-determined
interest rate and the repayment of the loan. By contrast, in equity crowdfunding investors are
offered a share of the equity, debt, or mezzanine capital. In general, the contracts in equity
crowdfunding include an equity-like proﬁt participation for the investors (Klo¨hn et al., 2016).
The two other forms of crowdfunding, namely donation-based and reward-based crowdfunding,
are not examined in detail in this dissertation. While investors do not receive any consideration
in donation-based crowdfunding, they receive some form of non-monetary compensation in
return for their investments in reward-based crowdfunding (Bradford, 2012).
Academic research in crowdfunding has extensively investigated investors’ behavior. Several
factors signal quality to investors and thereby increase the likelihood of a successful funding
of a crowdfunding campaign. In particular project characteristics such as the share of equity
offered (see, e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016; Bernstein et al., 2017) as well as borrower
characteristics (see, e.g., Duarte et al., 2012; Herzenstein et al., 2011; Pope and Sydnor, 2011)
and the amount of voluntary information throughout the campaign (see, e.g., Mollick, 2014;
Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017; Block et al., 2018a) can help to explain the funding success
of a crowdfunding campaign. Furthermore, literature highlights the importance of media use
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
(Courtney et al., 2017) and social capital (Colombo et al., 2015). Other streams of literature deal
with follow-up fundings, exits and insolvencies of successfully funded crowdfunding projects
(see, e.g., Signori and Vismara, 2018; Hornuf et al., 2018), market mechanisms (see, e.g., Wei
and Lin, 2016; Chen et al., 2014) or regulation (see, e.g., Klo¨hn et al., 2016).
Online invoice trading, another form of alternative ﬁnance, is also closely related to crowdfund-
ing. SMEs pre-ﬁnance their outstanding invoices through a relatively large number of individual
and institutional investors. The investors do not assume the default risk of the invoice bought,
hence, online invoice trading represents a form of recourse factoring.
In addition, this dissertation investigates Mittelstand bonds as an alternative source of ﬁnance
for SMEs. Since 2010, SMEs in Germany have had the opportunity to directly access the capital
markets by issuing small bonds. These Mittelstand bonds have a volume of less than 100 million
EUR and have been issued at ﬁve German stock exchanges. However, due to several defaults
two stock exchanges had already shut down their segments by 2016. Several research papers
examine Mittelstand bonds. Kammler and Ro¨der (2013) investigate the returns of Mittelstand
bonds and reveal a negative internal rate of return. Scho¨ning (2014) shows that the coupons of
many Mittelstand bonds are well below the risk-adjusted value.
This thesis contributes to the growing literature on alternative sources of ﬁnancing in manifold
ways. In crowdfunding, the dissertation reveals several predictors of the funding success and the
probability of default. Particularly the interest rate is important for explaining both the funding
success and defaults in P2P lending as well as the probability of default in online invoice trading.
Further determinants such as soft factors derived from the description text and the pricing regime
are highlighted as well. Using data from crowdfunding platforms, this thesis also contributes
to a better understanding of the behavior of both entrepreneurs and investors. With respect to
Mittelstand bonds, the dissertations sheds light on the existence and the size of the liquidity
premium investors demand for holding these bonds.
This thesis consists of ﬁve independent research papers with several co-authors. In the remainder
of the introduction, the articles are brieﬂy summarized with respect to the research question, the
data, the statistical method, and the contribution. Chapters 2 to 6 of the dissertation present the
research papers. The last chapter provides a conclusion.
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Description-text related soft information in peer-to-peer lending – Evidence from
two leading European platforms
In this article, we analyze the role of soft factors in predicting both the funding success and
the probability of default in P2P lending. We use data from two leading European platforms,
namely Auxmoney and Smava, and derive several soft factors from the description text of the
loan applications. Even though both platforms serve the same market, they have implemented
different platform designs. Auxmoney requests only few pieces of mandatory information and
does not demand the applicants include a solvency score. By contrast, Smava is more restrictive
and only allows loan applications with a minimum credit score.
We use simultaneous IV probit regression to overcome endogeneity concerns and ﬁnd that
the effect of soft factors depends on the platform design. On Auxmoney, the less restrictive
platform, orthography, text length, and the mentioning of positive emotion evoking keywords
are signiﬁcantly related to the funding success. On Smava, however, only two keywords
are associated with the funding probability. Hard factors appear to be more important in
explaining the funding success on the latter platform. Interestingly, our results indicate a
negative relationship between the funding success and the interest rate on both platforms.
Investors appear to mistrust borrowers who are willing to pay extremely high interest rates.
Analyzing the loans which were closed and granted on both platforms, we ﬁnd that soft factors
are hardly related to the probability of default on either platform. Again hard information, in
particular the interest rate, strongly predict the probability of default. Turning to proﬁtability, we
ﬁnd that Auxmoney shows the better risk-return-proﬁle for investors. Overall, our results suggest
that soft factors help investors to effectively identify creditworthy borrowers in the absence of
hard factors. If hard factors are provided, investors rely on these information to decide which
loans to invest in.
German Mittelstand Bonds: Yield Spreads and Liquidity
Since the launch of Mittelstand bonds, the yield spreads observed have increased steadily. In this
paper, we empirically analyze the importance of illiquidity of the bonds in explaining the yield
spreads. We analyze 92 Mittelstand bonds and employ a cross-sectional model to measure the
size of the liquidity premium. We use two different liquidity measures, namely the LOT liquidity
estimate and the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, we control for the default risk as well as bond and
ﬁrm characteristics. Our results suggest that investors do indeed demand a liquidity premium.
The size of the liquidity premium for Mittelstand bonds is high and equals approximately twice
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the size of the liquidity premium of speculative grade US corporate bonds. We estimate a
simultaneous equation model as a robustness check.
Pricing in the online invoice trading market: First empirical evidence
The possibility to pre-ﬁnance outstanding invoices through online invoice trading is an opportu-
nity for SMEs to raise short-term debt. The central aim of this paper is to analyze whether the
risk of payment difﬁculties is appropriately reﬂected in the pricing variables of online invoice
trading platforms.
To this end, we use data from the UK-based platform MarketInvoice, the market leader in
online invoice trading and analyze which factors explain the probability of default and the
loss rate, respectively. We apply logit and tobit models and ﬁnd that the interest rate is a key
predictor of both defaults and the loss rate. Moreover, the duration and the percentage funded
are also signiﬁcantly related to the probability of default. Since the platform changed the pricing
mechanism form a real-time auction to a ﬁxed price mechanism within the observation period,
we have the opportunity to compare two pricing regimes. Our results indicate that the probability
of default is higher within the auction period. However, we also show that the net return investors
gain are higher within the auction period.
Dynamics of Investor Communication in Equity Crowdfunding
Equity crowdfunding provides non-sophisticated private investors the possibility to invest in
(highly risky) start-ups. The start-ups that seek funding via equity crowdfunding can voluntarily
communicate with investors by posting updates. Previous research indicates that updates increase
investments in the focal crowdfunding campaign (Mollick, 2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017;
Block et al., 2018a). We investigate the communication behavior of start-ups during and after the
funding period and examine whether start-ups strategically post updates with speciﬁc language
or content.
Therefore, we use hand-collected data from two major German equity crowdfunding portals,
namely Companisto and Seedmatch, and apply several statistical models including probit
estimations and survival analysis. We ﬁnd evidence suggesting that start-ups strategically
communicate with investors. First, we analyze changes in the communication behavior during
and after the funding period. Our results show that start-ups post updates more frequently during
the funding period and that start-ups use more linguistic devices that enhance the feeling of
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group cohesion and group identity. Second, we focus on the funding period and ﬁnd that the
probability of an update during the funding period increases along with strong competition of
other contemporary crowdfunding campaigns.
Paralyzed by shock and confused by glut: The portfolio formation behavior of
peer-to-business lending investors
In this article, we investigate the investor behavior on a peer-to-business lending platform and
ﬁnd evidence suggesting that investors suffer from two new investment biases—the default
shock bias and the deep market bias. In particular, investors refrain from investing in new loans
and stop diversifying their portfolio after experiencing a loan default. This behavior results
in a worsening of the risk-return proﬁle of their portfolio. Moreover, investors appear to be
overwhelmed with a glut of simultaneously active loan campaigns. Consequently, they invest
less in new loans which, in turn, has a negative effect on the risk-return proﬁle of their portfolio.
Investment experience on the platform reduces the effect of the deep market bias.
We use data from the German crowdlending platform ZenCap which allows retail investors
to invest in corporate loans. In contrast to the stock market, peer-to-business investors cannot
receive a diversiﬁed portfolio at once but they have to invest in new loan campaigns continuously.
We analyze the investment behavior using several statistical methods including OLS and logit
regressions. In order to examine the risk-return proﬁle of the portfolios we construct Value
at Risk (VaR) measures and obtain the risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). We analyze
changes in the RAROC by applying two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations.
Four of the papers described above are published in academic journals and the last study is under
review at the date of the submission of this thesis. Due to different style-requirements of the
journals small formal differences in the presentation of the research papers may be present.
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Description-text related soft information in peer-to-peer
lending – Evidence from two leading European platforms
This research project is joint work with Gregor Dorfleitner, Christopher Priberny, Stephanie
Schuster, Johannes Stoiber, Ivan de Castro, and Julia Kammler. The paper has been published
as: Gregor Dorﬂeitner, Christopher Priberny, Stephanie Schuster, Johannes Stoiber, Martina
Weber, Ivan de Castro and Julia Kammler (2016), Description-text related soft information in
peer-to-peer lending – Evidence from two leading European platforms, Journal of Banking &
Finance 64, 169-187.
Abstract We examine the relation of soft factors that are derived from the description texts to
the probability of successful funding and to the default probability in peer-to-peer lending for
two leading European platforms. We ﬁnd that spelling errors, text length and the mentioning of
positive emotion evoking keywords predict the funding probability on the less restrictive of both
platforms, which even accepts applications without credit scores. This platform also shows a
better risk-return proﬁle. Conditional on being funded, text-related factors hardly predict default
probabilities in peer-to-peer lending for both platforms.
Keywords peer-to-peer lending, soft information, funding probability, probability of default
JEL Classification G20, G32
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2.1 Introduction
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending is regarded as being a major innovation in the area of retail banking.
In recent years, the number of platforms offering such services as well as the volume of
transactions have been steadily increasing. P2P lending, as one facet of crowdfunding and
thereby as a form of ﬁnancial disintermediation, is different to classical banking since a crowd
of peers decides whether a loan is granted. Even if classical hard facts such as the solvency of a
borrower or the purpose of the loan are relevant for the granting decision, additional information
about the borrower’s individual situation, the soft information, also enters into the P2P lending
decision process. This article examines the relation of soft information which are derived from
the description text of the loan application to the probability of successful funding as well as to
the default probability of granted loans. To this end, we are the ﬁrst to compare the transactions
and loan applications on the two leading European P2P platforms located in Germany, namely
Smava and Auxmoney, with respect to these soft factors. While Smava is more restrictive in
admitting loan applications in order to ensure a minimum level of credit quality, Auxmoney does
not require credit scores and leaves more room for voluntary information. Our study emphasizes
the role of the soft information related to loan description texts written by the loan applicants, in
particular orthography, text length and the presence of social and emotional keywords. The major
contribution lies in the comprehensive approach, with which we are able to draw the big picture.
We use an extensive set of controls, comprising other known soft factors and the extremely
important variable interest rate and we simultaneously study the relation to the funding and to
the default probability. We even assess the proﬁtability of the investments, which provides a
quantitative link between the willingness to fund, the danger of default and the rationality of
the investors. Additionally, by considering two differently designed platforms, both serving the
same market in the same cultural environment, we obtain insights into the question of how the
value of soft information depends on the presence or absence of hard facts.
P2P platforms provide lots of data on real transactions. Since, in contrast to bank-based lending,
those applications that do not lead to a transaction can also be observed, such platforms constitute
a form of natural experiment on loan granting decisions. Thus many researchers focus on this
relatively new phenomenon. The hitherto best-researched P2P platform is Prosper operating in
the U.S. and providing current and historical loan-related information for public download. Based
on data from Prosper, previous research ﬁnds evidence towards an effect of soft information
on funding success, interest rates and default rates. Iyer et al. (2016), for example, show that
lenders are able to determine information on the creditworthiness of a potential borrower from
soft factors such as the number of friend endorsements or the self-reported purpose of the loan.
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In addition, several authors examine the effect of including a picture in the loan proposal and
aspects of the applicant’s appearance (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Ravina, 2012). Gao and Lin
(2015) show that readability, positivity, objectivity and deception cues concerning description
texts are related to loan defaults on Prosper. This article contributes to this stream of literature
and analyzes the description texts. We put special emphasis on orthography here, as some
psychological studies like Figueredo and Varnhagen (2005) and Kreiner et al. (2002) support the
conjecture that spelling errors in the description text impair the perception of the creditworthiness
of the applicant. Other aspects are the signaling role of the text length and certain keywords
appearing in the description. Some keywords that are able to evoke special emotions may have a
positive effect on the probability of successful funding.
Our investigation is based on a simultaneous IV probit regression approach to overcome endo-
geneity issues related to the interest rate and identiﬁes inﬂuencing factors on the funding and the
default probability. We use 76,945 loan applications from Auxmoney and 10,423 from Smava to
examine the funding success and 3,298 closed granted loans from Auxmoney and 2,216 from
Smava, for which the event of a default or a non-default can be determined without doubt, in
order to research the default probability. We use all data available on each platform archive in
October 2013, resulting in the observation periods March 2008 to September 2013 (Auxmoney)
and February 2007 to September 2013 (Smava).
Our results show that investors on Auxmoney gain a higher return accompanied by a lower
default rate compared to Smava. Smava only allows loan applications with a minimum credit
score, and therefore a large share of loans are granted. Our results indicate that soft factors play
a minor role in explaining the funding probability and the default probability on Smava and
investors rely more on hard facts such as solvency scores or the suggested interest rate. This is
in contrast to Auxmoney, on which the provision of a credit score is not mandatory and only a
minor share of loans are granted. For this platform, many soft factors related to the description
text show signiﬁcant coefﬁcients in the funding probability regressions, whereas only few of
them also have a signiﬁcant effect in the default regressions. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence
supporting the fact that spelling errors are negatively related and the length of the description text
has an inverse u-shaped relation with the probability of successful funding. Keywords evoking
positive emotions also signiﬁcantly relate to the funding success. Another important factor on
both platforms is the interest rate suggested in the loan applications. Our ﬁndings show that on
both platforms, investors associate a higher interest rate with a lower solvency and shrink back
from funding those loans.
Concluding, investors appear to be capable of identifying creditworthy borrowers with the help
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of soft information even though hard facts like credit scores are not provided. However, if hard
facts of a certain quality are generally required by the platform then soft information plays a
minor role.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we review the relevant
literature, while in Section 3 we develop hypotheses concerning soft factors derived from the
description texts. In Section 4 we present a description of our data and the used methodology.
Section 5 discusses the results on the funding and the default probability—including robustness
checks—and compares both platforms. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature review
Since the start of the ﬁrst P2P lending platform Zopa in 2006, a considerable amount of academic
literature has evolved, in which several strands can be identiﬁed. Many of the studies focus on
the leading U.S. P2P lending platform Prosper, which has made its data publicly available.
One strand of literature analyzes the economic mechanisms of P2P markets (see Agrawal et al.,
2013; Belleﬂamme et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Gerber and Hui, 2013; Giudici et al., 2012;
Hemer, 2011; Moenninghoff and Wieandt, 2013; Solomon and Wash, 2014) and also discusses
legal aspects and other crowdfunding models. Like in bank-based lending, borrowers have an
incentive to overplay their ﬁnancial situation in their application (see Berger and Gleisner, 2009;
Weiss et al., 2010). Thus, creditors in P2P markets are dependent on a suitable platform design
that helps to overcome asymmetric information (see Diamond, 1984). Freedman and Jin (2008)
and Weiss et al. (2010) identify adverse selection effects on P2P platforms. The P2P platform
Prosper offers a social network, in which borrowers and lenders can interact. Both, creditors
and debtors, beneﬁt from this network which helps to mitigate information asymmetry (see
Freedman and Jin, 2008; Berger and Gleisner, 2009; Iyer et al., 2016; Everett, 2015; Hildebrand
et al., 2017; Lin et al., 2013). Furthermore, on Prosper the interest rate of a loan used to be
conducted by a Dutch auction process until December 19th 2010, when this procedure was
replaced by a posted price mechanism. This change is analyzed by Wei and Lin (2016) and
Meyer (2013). Both studies indicate a higher funding probability associated with a deteriorated
loan quality after this change.
Another strand of literature empirically analyzes the behavior of P2P market actors. There is
research on the capability of hard facts to serve as solvency indicators (see Bo¨hme and Po¨tzsch,
2010; Lin et al., 2013; Weiss et al., 2010). Soft factors can, however, still help to mitigate
asymmetric information. By now, there have been several studies that examine the inﬂuence
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of borrowers’ soft information with respect to funding success, interest rates and loan defaults.
There is evidence regarding a positive effect on the loan conditions when providing a picture in
the application (see e.g. Bo¨hme and Po¨tzsch, 2010; Iyer et al., 2016). However, when examining
the content of pictures with respect to skin color, charisma, age and gender, some studies ﬁnd
evidence in favor of taste-based discrimination when it comes to funding success and loan
conditions (see Duarte et al., 2012; Herzenstein et al., 2011; Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Ravina,
2012). Taste-based discrimination occurs if people are not treated equally due to prejudices
with respect to their appearance (see Becker, 1971; Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001). Duarte et al.
(2012) show that borrowers who have a trustworthy appearance face a better chance to have their
loan granted. Furthermore, attractive people beneﬁt from better loan conditions and a higher
funding probability while showing similar repayment rates (see Ravina, 2012). Several studies
show that older people are confronted with a lower funding probability and worse conditions,
in the case that their loan is granted (see Bo¨hme and Po¨tzsch, 2010; Faßbender, 2011; Pope
and Sydnor, 2011). Concerning young borrowers, ﬁndings differ. Bo¨hme and Po¨tzsch (2010)
observe poor loan conditions, but Pope and Sydnor (2011) reveal a higher funding probability for
this group. Barasinska and Scha¨fer (2014) ﬁnd no gender effect on the funding probability, while
Faßbender (2011) and Lin et al. (2013) show evidence for taste-based discrimination against
men. Gao and Lin (2015) ﬁnd that the readability of a loan application, a positive sentiment and
several deception cues are related to the default probability on Prosper. Iyer et al. (2016) also
analyze the description texts on Prosper for a similar short period (February 2007 to October
2008) and reveal the predictive power of soft factors such as the self-reported loan purpose or
text characteristics on the default probability. Sonenshein et al. (2011) examine the inﬂuence of
social accounts, such as whether a text provides an explanation, an acknowledgment or a denial,
on a successful funding, based on a Prosper data set consisting of 512 observations posted in
June 2006.
2.3 Hypotheses development
In the following, we utilize the insights of previous literature to derive testable hypotheses
regarding the soft factors related to the description text which are considered in this study.
Furthermore, our analysis focuses on the two leading P2P platforms in Germany, namely Smava
and Auxmoney. By comparing both platforms, insights into the platform structure and the loan
granting mechanism can be derived. These factors have not been analyzed regarding their effect
on P2P lending on a comprehensive data basis until now.
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Orthography Psychological surveys show that misspellings are often seen as indication of
poor cognitive skills of an author (see e.g. Kreiner et al., 2002). More speciﬁcally, Figueredo
and Varnhagen (2005) ﬁnd that a text is regarded as being particularly inferior if misspellings
are non-homophone, implying that they can be detected by a spell checker. Furthermore, bad
orthography makes a text difﬁcult to assess (Pynte et al., 2004) and thus can lower the probability
for successful funding. This view is supported by Gao and Lin (2015), who state that the
readability of a description text on Prosper is positively appreciated by the lenders. However,
in electronic communication an informal writing style is relatively common. Park et al. (2010)
explore the inﬂuence of misspellings in electronic meetings and ﬁnd that neither the participants’
satisfaction nor their productivity suffers from bad orthographical skills. P2P actors should
be quite familiar with the customs of internet communication which could mitigate a possibly
negative effect of spelling errors on the funding probability. Summarizing, if the description text
of a loan application contains misspellings, this could be interpreted as an indication of a less
solvent borrower or the applicant may even appear to be untrustworthy. Therefore, we expect a
negative relation to the funding success.
Hypothesis 1a (orthography): Loan applications with a high fraction of spelling mistakes
within the description text are less likely to be funded.
Even if we can expect—in the case that Hypothesis 1a is valid—that successfully funded loans
exhibit a more sophisticated spelling, orthography can still serve as a proxy for education. It is
well-known that there is a negative relation between a borrower’s level of education and his or
her default probability (Bhatt and Tang, 2002). Thus we conjecture that the default probability
positively depends on the share of spelling errors.
Hypothesis 1b (orthography): Granted loans with a low fraction of spelling mistakes within
the description text are less likely to default.
Description length Closely related to the matter of orthography is the question regarding the
length of the description text. First, the longer the text is, the more spelling mistakes could be
included. This is why we consider the relative fraction of spelling mistakes in the orthography
hypotheses. Second, the description text may contribute to a reduction of information asymme-
tries (see Michels, 2012) as the loan applicants can describe their individual situation in detail.
This makes it easier for lenders to assess an applicant’s loan request. Therefore, writing a longer
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text may serve as a signal of creditworthiness to the lenders and support a higher probability of
successful funding.
However, we also do expect that loans with a very long description text are supported less
willingly by the investors for two reasons. First, if the description length is far longer than
those of other loans, the investors who often only invest small amounts of money into the loans
will tend not to be willing to spend the time to read the text and as a consequence tend not to
fund such a loan. Second, long-winded description texts can indicate an intricate personality of
the applicant. Transferring this characteristic to the context of managing personal ﬁnance, the
lenders may conclude that the applicant tends not to be concise in this area either. This, in turn,
affects the repayment behavior and thus the creditworthiness.1
Hypothesis 2a (description length): The length of the description text in a loan application is
positively related to funding success up to a certain amount of words.
Loan applicants tend to provide information in the description text if these support the funding
probability. For this reason, a longer description text can be a signal of creditworthiness and
can be expected to result in a lower default probability. However, analogously to the reasoning
regarding Hypothesis 2a, above a certain value of the length, there may be reverse effects.
Hypothesis 2b (description length): The length of the description text in a loan application is
negatively related to the probability of default up to a certain amount of words.
Social and emotional motives Van Wingerden and Ryan (2011) show in a survey among
124 crowd investors in 2011 that a considerable number of them follow also intrinsic motiva-
tions instead of only seeking a ﬁnancial return. P2P lending is a more emotional matter than
e.g. investing money in a bank account, as one directly can observe who is the receiver of
the investment. While Gonzalez and Loureiro (2014) observe emotional biases regarding the
inﬂuence of the loan applicant’s picture, such an effect can also be expected for emotionally
appealing description texts, be they positive or negative. The lenders may be more willing
to invest the money in the case of negative emotions because of the inclination to help (see
Renneboog et al. (2008) for a general treatment of such investor behavior, Allison et al. (2013)
for the special case of P2P microlending and Bo¨hme and Po¨tzsch (2011) for weak evidence
1Furthermore, for companies there is corresponding evidence by Loughran and McDonald (2014), who analyze 10-K
documents and argue that negative information is often hidden within long texts.
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in P2P lending). In case of positive emotions, potential lenders can reveal the tendency of
wanting to participate in the positive issues related to the loan, as Bruton et al. (2015) show for
crowdfunding in general, or simply may be subject to the overconﬁdence bias (Hirshleifer, 2001)
due to the positive emotional statements in the text.2 The description text allows a borrower to
explain the loan purpose in detail and to address social motives which can be directly assessed
by possible investors. We assess the emotional character of a description text by the emotional
keywords used.
Hypothesis 3a (Social and emotional motives): Keywords with a social or emotional connota-
tion in the description texts are positively related to the funding success.
As the above mentioned reasons for granting a loan are rather irrational, it can be expected that
the risk of loans for which Hypothesis 3a applies is higher as for comparable loans with a similar
interest rate. This higher risk can be expected to yield a higher probability of default.
Hypothesis 3b (Social and emotional motives): Keywords with a social or emotional conno-
tation in the description text are positively related to the probability of default.
2.4 Data and methodology
2.4.1 Data
Our unique data set combines data from four sources. Individual loan data was derived from loan
applications published online by the P2P lending platforms Auxmoney (www.auxmoney.com)
between March 2008 and September 2013 and Smava (www.smava.de) between February 2007
and September 2013. A total of 92 observations from Auxomey and 24 observations from Smava
were excluded from further analysis due to obviously erroneous data. The resulting data sets
comprise 76,945 loan applications from Auxmoney and 10,423 from Smava. Neither platform
provides information regarding the repayment status of an individual loan. However, there is
a vibrant online platform called Wiseclerk (www.wiseclerk.com) that provides tools for P2P
investors which allow them to analyze the performance of their P2P loan portfolios. Therefore,
investors report their P2P loan portfolio composition and the corresponding loan defaults to
Wiseclerk. In the following, we use this data source to extract the information on whether a loan
is subject to default. Consequently, we classify closed granted loans without default information
as non-defaulted. Note that theoretically, there is a possible bias because P2P investors are not
2See Dowling and Lucey (2005) for the general role of positive emotions in ﬁnancial decision making.
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required to report defaulted loans. However, as P2P loans are usually ﬁnanced by many lenders,
it is very likely that defaults are indeed reported on Wiseclerk by at least one of these. For
example, if the probability that a lender, who has experienced a default on a loan, reports such
an event is assumed to be 0.5, which is a conservatively low value for internet-afﬁne lenders,
who also tend to be be intrinsically motivated3, then given a number of ten lenders per loan, the
probability for an error is only 0.098%. As we will argue below in Section 2.4.4, we can assume
this bias to be so small that it is negligible. Furthermore, the possibility that a loan erroneously
is reported as defaulted can be excluded. Lenders will rationally have no incentive for such a
costly behavior and in the unlikely case of such an event, creditors will have a high incentive to
clear out false statements. Additionally, we receive data on the German stock index (DAX) and
the yield curves derived from German government bonds from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
The aim of this study is to research both of the following: The probability of the loan being
granted by investors is examined via the indicator variable FGL, which documents a successful
funding. The default probability of granted P2P loans is analyzed utilizing the variable DEF,
which indicates a loan default. To analyze the latter, the data set is reduced considerably because
only granted loans that were closed before December 15th 2013 can be considered. The resulting
data sets regarding closed granted loans (CGL) comprise 3,298 (Auxmoney) and 2,216 (Smava)
observations.
2.4.2 Research design
To carve out the role of soft factors related to the description texts in the lending decision as
well as in the default behavior, we utilize data from two P2P platforms that are very distinct
with respect to the extent of requiring hard facts and also to the extent of inﬂuencing the lending
decision. The German P2P platforms Smava and Auxmoney have implemented different designs
concerning the procedure of loan applications. Smava—in contrast to Auxmoney—veriﬁes loan
applications with respect to several criteria to ensure that listed applications fulﬁll a minimum
level of creditworthiness. As a consequence, the importance of soft information for creditors can
possibly be less pronounced there. This could be anticipated by the applicants, who themselves
provide only a minimum of information regarding soft factors (see Lucas, 1972). Furthermore,
Smava provides a bidding assistant which supports investors by making automated bids on listed
applications.4 The bidding assistant is solely based on hard facts such as the Schufa score or the
loan duration and neglects soft information. In addition, some hard facts which have always been
3See Van Wingerden and Ryan (2011) for an overview on intrinsic motivation in crowdsourcing.
4Note that Auxmoney did not have a bidding assistant within the observation period.
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mandatory for Smava since the launch of the platform, have not been obligatory on Auxmoney
until February 2013. In the case of missing hard facts, investors may rely more strongly on soft
information.
With the difference between the probability of successful funding and the default probability
being that the ﬁrst is dependent on the perception of the P2P investors, while the latter is not,
we can argue that if there is a relation of soft factors to the default probability at all, there is no
reason for it to be different for both platforms. However, there surely is a difference between the
platforms with respect to the samples that can be investigated with respect to the likelihood of
defaulting. Thus, signiﬁcances of coefﬁcients could be different due to this effect.
2.4.3 Explanatory variables
Loan applications usually include a short description text regarding the loan’s purpose and/or
the personal situation of the applicant. We analyze this description in order to derive several
variables, which we use to examine the relations of soft factors derived from the description text
in P2P lending. All variables, including other control variables, are deﬁned in Table 2.1 and
those relevant for testing our hypotheses are shortly described in the following.
The orthographic quality of a description text—referring to Hypotheses 1a and 1b—is measured
by the variable SpellError which represents the percentage of misspelled words. The variable is
derived with a spelling check that is based on the open-source library GNU Aspell but accounts
for common terms regarding P2P lending. For this matter, we have treated errors classiﬁed by
the GNU Aspell which have appeared more than ten times in the analysis manually, regarding
the correctness of the spelling. Thereby, we have identiﬁed some correct terms that are not
included in the GNU Aspell, like abbreviations or names. Detailed information on the spelling
check is presented in Table 2.12 in the Appendix.
The length of the description text is proxied by the variable #Words which comprises the number
of words included. To capture the suggested inversely u-shaped relation of this factor, which
is suggested by Hypothesis 2a and 2b, we additionally include this variable in squared form in
the regressions. Furthermore, we generate a group of keyword indicator variables (KeyWord).
To this end, the description text is searched for German keywords regarding the following
categories: The indicator variable Fam indicates the usage of words associated with family, e.g.
wife, children. Other categories are negative aspects (Neg, e.g. inhumation), positive aspects
(Pos, e.g. dream) and separation (Separ). We consider this group of keywords as emotional and
socially connoted.
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Table 2.1 Description of variables.
Note: [a] indicates that variable is soley available for Auxmoney or Smava [s].
Variable Description
CEG CEG signal Solvency information provided by Creditreform GmbH. 1, if the CEG is the following category: Green: green, no negative
information , Yellow: yellow, twice the amount of the mean probability to default of consumer loans in Germany Red: red,
negative information, NA: no information available. 0, otherwise. Source: Auxmoney. [a]
DAX German stock index DAX Proxy for economic climate, measured as continuous returns over quarterly averages of the performance index DAX.
Source: Datastream.
DEF default indicator 1, if loan is defaulted, e.g. loan is subject to summary proceedings or collection handling. 0, otherwise. Source: Wise-
clerk.
Employment employment relationship 1, if loan applicant is an employee (Employee), self-employed person (Selfemp), civil servant (CivServant), pensioner
(Pension), or does pursue other form of permanent income realization (Other). 0, otherwise. Source: Smava [s]
FGL fully granted loan 1, if enough funds are provided by private investors that loan could be 100% granted. 0, otherwise. Note that in rare
cases enough funds were provided by investors but the loan was not retrieved by the loan applicant. Sources: Auxmoney,
Smava.
FedState federal state of loan applicant 1, if federal state of loan applicant is Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (BW), Bayern (BY), Berlin (BE), Brandenburg (BB), Bremen
(HB), Hamburg (HH), Hessen (HE), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV), Niedersachsen (NI), Nordrhein-Westfalen (NW),
Rheinland-Pfalz (RP), Saarland (SL), Sachsen (SN), Sachsen-Anhalt (ST), Schleswig-Holstein (SH) and Thu¨ringen (TH).
0, otherwise. Source: Smava. [s]
FundTime funding time Days needed to fully fund the loan. Estimated as period between the ﬁrst and the last bid regarding 100% funded loans
and categorized: Short (0 days), Mid (Auxmoney ≤ 10 days, Smava ≤ 5 days) and Long. 1, if observation falls in the
respective category. 0, otherwise. As no exact application date is provided by both platforms, we use the date of the ﬁrst
bid as a proxy. If no bid is available, the start date is derived based on the incremental identiﬁcation number of each loan
application. Derived from Auxmoney, Smava.
I interest rate Loan’s nominal interest rate . Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
Irf risk free interest rate Yield curve derived from German government bonds with maturities of three (for Auxmoney) and ﬁve (for Smava) years.
Source: Datastream.
KDF KDF indicator Share of debt service from personal net income, categorized: 1 (0%–20%), 2 (20%–40%), 3 (40%–60%) and 4 (60%–
80%).1, if observation falls in the respective category. 0, otherwise. Note that Smava does not allow any share larger than
67%. Source: Smava. [s]
KeyWord keywords Keywords associated with the following categories are mentioned in the description text: Family (Fam), negative (Neg),
positive (Pos), separation (Separ), Leisure (Leisure), Business (Business), debt restructuring (Restruc) and education
(Edu). We indicate the ﬁrst four keywords as being related to social and emotional motives. 1, if observation falls in the
respective category. 0, otherwise. Multiple references possible. Derived from Auxmoney, Smava.
#Lender number lenders Number of lenders derived from biddings on granted loans. Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
Male gender of loan applicant 1, if loan applicant is male, 0, otherwise. Source: Smava. [s]
Mat Short short time to maturity 1, if loan has a short time to maturity, 0 otherwise. A short time to maturity represents 24 month or less for Auxmoney
and 36 month or less for Smava. Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
Picture project picture 1, if a picture regarding funded project is available, 0, otherwise. Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
ResRate residual interest rate Loan’s nominal interest rate minus risk premium derived from Schufa score and time to maturity. Sources: Smava (risk
premia, loan’s nominal interest rate), Auxmoney.
Schufa schufa score Solvency indicator. Category A (excellent solvency) to M (poor) or not provided (NA). 1, if observation falls in the respec-
tive category. 0, otherwise. Note, that Schufa score is not mandatory for Auxmoney applications. Sources: Auxmoney,
Smava.
SpellError spelling error Share of words in loan description that is misspelled. The spell check is based in the open-source library GNU Aspell,
which has been manually extended. More details can be found in Table 2.12 in the Appendix. Derived from Auxmoney,
Smava.
TurnYear turn-of-the-year indicator 1, if loan application took place in December or January. 0, otherwise. Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
Volume loan volume The nominal volume of the loan. Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
#Words number of words Number of words used in the description text. Sources: Auxmoney, Smava.
Additionally, we consider several already documented effects on P2P lending platforms and
address peculiarities of Smava and Auxmoney by implementing several control variables. There-
fore, we use a second group of keywords as further controls, namely those describing the loan
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purpose without potentially raising emotions. These are debt restructuring (Restruc), education
(Edu), leisure activities (Leisure) and business (Business). All keywords and the associated
categories are displayed in Table 2.11 in the Appendix.
We capture turn-of-the-year effects with the control variable TurnYear, which indicates whether
a loan application was started in December or January. Approximately 54% of the German
workforce receive a special bonus payment at Christmas, which equals between 20% and
100% of their monthly income (see WSI, 2013). Some people spend this money on Christmas
presents, but 41% save at least a fraction of it (see GfK, 2010). As lenders use P2P platforms
as an investment opportunity, this capital may increase the supply in German P2P markets in
December and January and thus may improve the funding probability at the turn of the year.
Additionally, we add loan and borrower speciﬁc controls: the loan volume Volume (in logarithmic
representation), an indicator for short maturity (Mat Short), the solvency information (Schufa,
CEG, KDF) and the interest rate I (in logarithmic representation). Note that on both platforms,
the interest rate is suggested by the applicant and therefore inﬂuenced by his/her personal
solvency sentiment. Previous studies proved that a picture (e.g. Bo¨hme and Po¨tzsch, 2010; Iyer
et al., 2016) or gender information (e.g. Faßbender, 2011; Lin et al., 2013) have an inﬂuence
on the likelihood of the loan being granted or the probability of default. Therefore, we include
suitable variables (Picture, Male). Furthermore, we include quarterly returns of the German
stock index DAX (DAX) to account for macroeconomic effects. In the case of Smava, we
additionally control for the federal state (FedState) in which the loan applicant’s residence is
located, the applicant’s age (Age) and his employment situation (Employment).
2.4.4 Descriptive analysis
The descriptive measures of the metric variables and the relative frequencies of categorical
variables for the complete Auxmoney and Smava data sets and the CGL subsamples are shown
in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
The share of granted loans is much higher on Smava (89.2%) than on Auxmoney (17.6%). The
historical average default rates are within the same range for both platforms, amounting to 12%
on Auxmoney and to 13.8% on Smava.5 Continuing the discussion from above regarding the
likelihood of falsely reported non-defaults on Wiseclerk, we can state the following. When
5Interestingly, the default rates on both platforms decline over time, which we interpret as an indication that the
market participants become more experienced with time. Additionally, they also show similar values if we consider
the lifetime of the platform, i.e. Smava and Auxmoney have comparable default rates in their second, third year and
so on.
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics of metric variables.
Notes: AUX and SMA represent the Auxmoney and Smava data samples. CGL indicates the
subsamples of closed granted loans. QXY% refers to the XY% quantile. The variables are
deﬁned in Table 2.1. Data sources: Auxmoney, Smava, Datastream.
DATA N MIN Q25% MEDIAN MEAN Q75% MAX SD
variables concerning both platforms
Volume AUX 76,945 1,000 1,500 3,000 5,030.07 6,700 30,350 5,054.36
AUX, CGL 3,298 1,000 1,500 2,000 3,243.01 4,000 20,000 3,141.25
SMA 10,423 500 3,250 6,250 8,995.32 12,000 50,000 7,967.97
SMA, CGL 2,216 500 2,500 3,750 5,301.78 6,500 50,000 4,772.00
I AUX 76,945 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.03
AUX, CGL 3,298 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.02
SMA 10,423 0.01 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.03
SMA, CGL 2,216 2.50 7.40 9.80 10.37 13.35 18 3.56
SpellError AUX 76,617 0 0 2.99 7.83 9.09 100 13.87
AUX, CGL 3,298 0 0 2.11 3.51 4.26 100 5.61
SMA 10,367 0 0 0 2.71 2.86 100 7.77
SMA, CGL 2,208 0 0 1.08 3.27 3.70 100 7.61
DAX AUX 76,945 −0.23 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.18 0.07
AUX, CGL 3,298 −0.23 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.08
SMA 10,423 −0.23 −0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.09
SMA, CGL 2,216 −0.23 −0.08 0.01 −0.01 0.04 0.18 0.11
#Lender AUX, CGL 3,298 1 10 15 20.84 26 123 16.39
SMA, CGL 2,216 1 6 9 12.34 16 115 10.96
#Words AUX 76,945 0 13 34 55.94 70 8,441 83.52
AUX, CGL 3,298 1 44 81 109.40 138 2,129 108.35
SMA 10,423 0 19 26 41.43 50 531 43.62
SMA, CGL 2,216 0 21 38 53.73 71.50 531 52.31
ResRate AUX 19,035 −0.11 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.04
AUX, CGL 1,771 −0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.04
SMA 10,423 −0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.02
SMA, CGL 2,216 −0.01 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.16 0.02
variables concerning only one platform
Age SMA 10,423 20 36 45 46.33 54 95 13.33
SMA, CGL 2,216 23 36 46 47.16 55 93 14.21
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Table 2.3 Relative frequency distributions of categorical variables in percentage values.
Notes: AUX and SMA represent the Auxmoney (N=76,945) and Smava (N=10,423) data
samples. CGL indicates subsamples of closed granted loans, with N=3,298 (AUX) and
N=2,216 (SMA). KeyWord is shown in absolute frequencies. The variables are deﬁned in Table
2.1. Data sources: Auxmoney, Smava, Wiseclerk.
variables concerning both platforms
FGL 1(yes) 0
AUX 17.6 82.4
SMA 89.2 10.8
Picture 1(yes) 0
AUX 49.0 51.0
AUX, CGL 69.9 30.1
SMA 11.7 88.3
SMA, CGL 19.8 80.2
TurnYear 1(yes) 0
AUX 18.0 82.0
AUX, CGL 16.0 84.0
SMA 16,3 83.7
SMA, CGL 12.3 87.7
Mat Short 1(yes) 0
AUX 32.7 67.3
AUX, CGL 73.1 26.9
SMA 31.7 68.3
SMA, CGL 86.2 13.8
Schufa A B C D E F G H I
AUX 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.5 2.1 3.2 2.5 1.6
AUX, CGL 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.3 4.4 5.9 7.9 6.2 3.7
SMA 20.9 18.3 9.4 9.3 9.9 10.6 13.7 7.9
SMA, CGL 18.0 17.1 9.1 9.6 10.4 12.1 14.0 9.6
Schufa K L M NA
(continued) AUX 1.0 1.5 7.4 75.3
AUX, CGL 2.1 3.9 7.8 46.3
SMA
SMA, CGL
absolute frequencies as multiple references are possible
KeyWord Restruc Edu Neg Business Pos Fam Separ Leisure
AUX 13,137 5,685 4,831 6,267 20,620 11,893 2,068 2,914
AUX, CGL 980 402 354 497 1,440 656 135 141
SMA 2,567 430 348 1,022 3,385 894 140 286
SMA, CGL 624 142 135 244 816 275 55 103
variables concerning only the CGL subsamples
FundTime Short Mid Long
AUX, CGL 7.1 48.3 44.6
SMA, CGL 50.8 29.9 19.3
DEF 1(yes) 0
AUX, CGL 12.0 88.0
SMA, CGL 13.8 86.2
variables concerning only one platform
CEG Green Yellow Red NA
AUX 11.6 10.0 1,3 77.0
AUX, CGL 25.6 18.3 1.1 55.0
Male 1 (yes) 0
SMA 73.1 26.9
SMA, CGL 73.0 27.0
KDF 1 2 3 4
SMA 12.6 24.8 38.7 23.9
SMA, CGL 20.0 26.7 29.2 24.2
Employment Employee CivServant Selfemp Pension Other
SMA 51.7 4.0 34.9 9.1 0.2
SMA, CGL 57.5 4.8 26.5 10.7 0.4
FedState BY BW BE BB HB HH HE MV NI
SMA 16.5 12.9 7.5 3.5 0.8 3.3 8.0 1.6 8.7
SMA, CGL 16.0 12.5 7.9 2.8 0.7 3.2 9.2 1.7 9.1
FedState NW RP SL SN ST SH TH
(continued) SMA 19.6 4.3 0.9 4.5 2.1 3.5 2.3
SMA, CGL 19.1 4.1 0.9 4.6 2.0 3.8 2.3
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looking at the interrelation between the number of lenders (#Lender) reported in Table 2.2 and
the variable DEF in a contingency table (not reported here), there are no peculiar deviations in
the default rates of those loans which have been granted by only a few lenders. We interpret this
ﬁnding as a clear indication that the reporting of defaulted loans to Wiseclerk appears to work
even if a loan is granted by only a few lenders. We conclude that for a high number of lenders,
it is very unlikely that none of them reports a defaulted loan. In case of few lenders, a higher
amount of money is at risk, so that it is also very likely that a default is reported.6
Note that for each platform the fraction of loans in the CGL sample to the total of granted loans
is roughly one fourth. This is a consequence of the fact that in order to avoid a censored-data
bias, we have to discard many of the granted loan observations. More precisely, we skip the loan
observations with a maturity exceeding the observation period as these are still open and thus the
default status cannot be determined without doubt. In particular, this implies that observations
from the ﬁrst part of our observation period are over-represented in the CGL samples. Note
that we still use all of the corresponding granted loan observations that are not affected by the
censored-data problem. As we do not have indications that the mechanism behind the defaulting
has changed over time and as we still have enough loans with a longer maturity in the CGL
samples (defaulted and non-defaulted ones), we regard this analysis to be relevant for explaining
the defaults on both platforms.
The higher ability of the lenders on Auxmoney to identify risky loans cannot be based heavily on
traditional solvency measures, like the Schufa score, as a large share of all closed, granted loans
on Auxmoney provide no such score (46.3% no Schufa score and 55% no CEG score), whereas
for Smava, a Schufa score of at least H or better is mandatory. Therefore, soft information seems
to play a role for investors, when deciding whether to grant a speciﬁc loan.
On both platforms, the average nominal interest rate is slightly higher for closed granted loans
(13.12% on Auxmoney, 10.37% on Smava) than for all loan applications (11.60% on Auxmoney,
8.78% on Smava). For the sample period, we can observe that closed granted loans on Auxmoney
outperform Smava regarding risk and return. The higher average interest rate for granted loans
can either be a suitable compensation for the higher default risk or an overcompensation in order
to make the loan attractive for investors.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the volume of loans on Auxmoney (5,030.07 EUR on average) is
smaller compared to Smava (8,995.32 EUR on average) and the same holds for the maturity
(36.72 months on Auxmoney, 53.34 months on Smava). Regarding the hypotheses-related
6Additionally, to dispel remaining doubts we perform some additional checks below by utilizing only those closed
granted loans with a high number of lenders.
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variables SpellError and #Words, we observe differences between both platforms. Description
texts are on average longer on Auxmoney (55.94 vs. 41.43 words) and have more spelling errors
(7.83% vs. 2.71%) compared to Smava. Contrary to Auxmoney, the orthographical quality
is lower in the subsample of closed granted loans compared to the overall sample on Smava.
This is a ﬁrst hint that avoiding spelling errors appears not to be as important on Smava as on
Auxmoney.
Table 2.13 and Table 2.14 in the Appendix show the pairwise Bravais-Pearson correlations
among the explanatory variables for the two data sets. All signiﬁcant correlations show absolute
values below 0.8 indicating that no multicollinearity issues arise (see Kennedy, 2008).
2.4.5 Methodology
The dependent variables FGL and DEF of our analysis are both binary. Hence, logit or probit
regressions appear suitable (e.g. Barasinska and Scha¨fer, 2014), which only result in unbiased
estimators if no endogeneity concerns exist regarding the explanatory variables. In our setting,
the interest rate the borrowers are being charged can be subject to endogeneity because these
rates are posted by the borrowers themselves while considering their own solvency. We account
for this problem by applying simultaneous IV probit regressions (see Rivers and Vuong, 1988)
estimated via maximum likelihood with the risk free interest rate as instrumental variable. A
suitable instrument should explain a part of the variation of the dependent variable whereas
it should not be directly related to the explained variable in the structural equation (See e.g.
Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). This is economically sound for the risk free interest rate (Irf ),
which is deﬁned in Table 2.1. Consistently with the average maturities on both platforms, we use
the yield curve derived from government bonds with a maturity of three years on Auxmoney and
a maturity of ﬁve years on Smava as proxies for Irf . The regression model shows the following
structure regarding the latent variable y∗1i that is linked to the binary explained variable via the
probit speciﬁcation.
y∗1i = m
′
iδ +αy2i+ui (2.1)
y2i = m
′
iγ +pizi+ ei (2.2)
The vector m′i represents the explanatory variables and zi the instrumental variable. The terms
ui and ei are error terms of the structural and reduced form equation, respectively. Conducted
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Wald tests conﬁrm on the 1% signiﬁcance level that the IV probit approach is suitable to address
endogeneity in our setting.
2.5 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst analyze the factors inﬂuencing the funding probability and second those
regarding the default probability. Additionally, we perform some robustness checks and discuss
the differences between both platforms.
2.5.1 Funding probability
Auxmoney
The ﬁrst four columns in Table 2.4 show the results for the model speciﬁcations with FGL as
an dependent variable for Auxmoney. Speciﬁcations AF.I to AF.III incorporate the hypotheses-
related variables SpellError (Hypotheses 1a), #Words (Hypotheses 2a) and the keyword indicator
variables KeyWord Fam, KeyWord Neg, KeyWord Pos, KeyWord Separ (Hypothesis 3a) sepa-
rately, each together with the control variables. Speciﬁcation AF.IV represents the main model
including all variables simultaneously. The last column shows the average marginal effects for
Speciﬁcation AF.IV which are used to interpret the effects regarding their magnitude.
As expected, we ﬁnd a negative and highly signiﬁcant relationship between the percentage
of misspelled words and the funding probability in all relevant speciﬁcations. The average
marginal effect of SpellError shows a value of −0.0021, indicating that a spelling error increase
of 1% lowers the funding probability by 0.21% (Note, that SpellError is measured in percentage
points). At ﬁrst sight, the impact of this effect is not large, however, the distribution of SpellError
also has to be taken into account. Thus, a ceteris paribus increase by one standard deviation
of SpellError corresponds to a decrease of the default probability amounting to 2.9%, which
is a considerably large magnitude if compared to the other factors. Thus we can conﬁrm
Hypothesis 1a (orthography) for Auxmoney.
Regarding the length of the description text, the coefﬁcients of #Words in AF.II and AF.IV are
positive and highly signiﬁcant, whereas the coefﬁcients of the squared variable are negative. This
constitutes an inversely u-shaped pattern which is consistent with our expectation. According to
the average marginal effect, the funding probability increases by 5.2% if the description text is
increased ceteris paribus by one standard deviation. However, the funding probability decreases
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Table 2.4 Regression results concerning the funding probability on Auxmoney.
Notes: Model speciﬁcations AF.I to AF.IV are simultaneous IV probit regressions for the
funding probability. The column AME AF.IV shows the average marginal effect of the
variables on the funding probability with respect to speciﬁcation AF.IV. Z-statistics are shown
in parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
The AIC of a model only containing hard controls is 137,108.68. Reference categories: For
Mat categoryMid, for Schufa category M, for CEG category Red. The variables are deﬁned in
Table 2.1.
Funding probability (FGL)
AF.I AF.II AF.III AF.IV
Coeff. AME
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError −0.0115*** −0.00757*** −0.002082***
(−15.6) (−13.0)
#Words 0.00280*** 0.00226*** 0.0006212***
( 20.4) ( 17.1)
(#Words)2 −0.00000139*** −0.00000113*** −0.0000003100***
(−11.2) (−10.2)
KeyWord Pos 0.226*** 0.120*** 0.03288***
( 20.0) ( 11.9)
KeyWord Neg 0.112*** 0.00757 0.002082
( 6.00) ( 0.428)
KeyWord Fam 0.102*** 0.0192 0.005269
( 7.67) ( 1.60)
KeyWord Separ 0.0741*** −0.0170 −0.004675
( 2.64) ( −0.651)
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc 0.138*** 0.0736*** 0.134*** 0.0582*** 0.01601***
( 9.39) ( 5.75) ( 9.05) ( 4.69)
KeyWord Edu 0.143*** 0.0383** 0.136*** 0.0251 0.006911
( 7.65) ( 2.31) ( 7.35) ( 1.55)
KeyWord Business 0.174*** 0.0398** 0.167*** 0.0428*** 0.01178***
( 10.1) ( 2.45) ( 9.85) ( 2.67)
KeyWord Leisure 0.0480* −0.0447** 0.00957 −0.0398* −0.01096*
( 1.95) ( −1.98) ( 0.397) ( −1.80)
Picture 0.452*** 0.367*** 0.429*** 0.352*** 0.09672***
( 25.9) ( 23.3) ( 24.3) ( 22.4)
Hard controls
ln(I) −0.946*** −1.46*** −1.09*** −1.53*** −0.4203***
( −6.45) (−14.6) ( −7.90) (−16.1)
ln(Volume) −0.268*** −0.237*** −0.250*** −0.227*** −0.06249***
(−17.8) (−16.6) (−16.7) (−16.0)
Mat Short 0.239*** 0.0960*** 0.215*** 0.0695** 0.01913**
( 6.07) ( 3.06) ( 5.50) ( 2.31)
Schufa yes yes yes yes
CEG yes yes yes yes
DAX 0.575*** 0.536*** 0.586*** 0.537*** 0.1476***
( 7.68) ( 7.92) ( 8.01) ( 8.04)
TurnYear −0.0663*** −0.0735*** −0.0660*** −0.0717*** −0.01973***
( −4.92) ( −6.25) ( −5.06) ( −6.20)
CONST −0.986*** −2.23*** −1.54*** −2.35***
( −2.87) ( −9.11) ( −4.83) ( −9.85)
AIC 133,361.20 132,997.21 133,759.88 131,979.72
N 76,617 76,945 76,945 76,617
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Table 2.5 Regression results concerning the funding probability on Smava.
Notes: Model speciﬁcations SF.I to SF.IV are simultaneous IV probit regressions for the funding
probability. The column AME SF.IV shows the average marginal effect of the variables on the
funding probability with respect to speciﬁcation SF.IV. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
The symbols *, ** and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The AIC of a
model only containing hard controls is 216.26. Reference categories: For FedState category
BY , for Employment category Employee, for Mat category Mid, for Schufa category H, for
KDF category 4. The variables are deﬁned in Table 2.1.
Funding probability (FGL)
SF.I SF.II SF.III SF.IV
Coeff. AME
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError −0.00178 −0.00189 −0.0004463
( −0.998) ( −1.05)
#Words −0.000546 −0.000710 −0.0001674
( −0.799) ( −0.958)
(#Words)2 0.00000188 0.00000205 0.0000004800
( 0.818) ( 0.867)
KeyWord Pos 0.0255 0.0357 0.008431
( 0.857) ( 1.14)
KeyWord Neg 0.163** 0.173** 0.04077**
( 2.27) ( 2.35)
KeyWord Fam −0.145*** −0.139*** −0.03276***
( −3.12) ( −2.93)
KeyWord Separ 0.0737 0.0798 0.01882
( 0.647) ( 0.695)
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc −0.00381 −0.00240 −0.00781 −0.000465 −0.0001096
( −0.119) ( −0.0738) ( −0.243) ( −0.0142)
KeyWord Edu 0.0332 0.0380 0.0374 0.0483 0.01140
( 0.498) ( 0.560) ( 0.560) ( 0.709)
KeyWord Business 0.0675 0.0688 0.0625 0.0752 0.01773
( 1.49) ( 1.47) ( 1.37) ( 1.60)
KeyWord Leisure −0.0372 −0.0336 −0.0284 −0.0218 −0.005148
( −0.471) ( −0.422) ( −0.358) ( −0.273)
Picture −0.116*** −0.114*** −0.114*** −0.103** −0.02439**
( −2.89) ( −2.74) ( −2.80) ( −2.46)
Hard controls
ln(I) −3.19*** −3.18*** −3.19*** −3.16*** −0.7461***
(−31.6) (−30.9) (−31.5) (−30.1)
ln(Volume) −0.490*** −0.486*** −0.486*** −0.491*** −0.1159***
(−20.3) (−20.2) (−20.2) (−20.2)
Mat Short −0.0724** −0.0704** −0.0745** −0.0754** −0.01778**
( −2.11) ( −2.05) ( −2.17) ( −2.18)
Age −0.00512*** −0.00524*** −0.00513*** −0.00530*** −0.001249***
( −3.47) ( −3.54) ( −3.49) ( −3.55)
Male −0.109*** −0.112*** −0.105*** −0.106*** −0.02497***
( −3.41) ( −3.51) ( −3.30) ( −3.28)
Employment yes yes yes yes
Schufa yes yes yes yes
KDF yes yes yes yes
FedState yes yes yes yes
DAX −0.00849 −0.0154 −0.00336 0.0184 0.004338
( −0.0492) ( −0.0893) ( −0.0195) ( 0.106)
TurnYear 0.122*** 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.123*** 0.02905***
( 2.98) ( 2.85) ( 2.81) ( 2.98)
CONST −1.10*** −1.10*** −1.14*** −0.994**
( −2.87) ( −2.83) ( −2.99) ( −2.52)
AIC 234.61 210.57 178.46 207.60
N 10,367 10,423 10,423 10,367
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for very long description texts as the coefﬁcients of the squared variable are both signiﬁcantly
negative. This result conﬁrms Hypothesis 2a (description length).
Apart from the orthographical accuracy and the length of the description text, the content can
to some extent predict the funding probability. In speciﬁcation AF.I, almost all coefﬁcients of
the keyword variables related to emotional motives are signiﬁcantly positive. However, if the
other factors are taken into account, in AF.IV only KeyWord Pos remains signiﬁcant. Thus we
ﬁnd that loan applicants using positive keywords have a ceteris paribus 3.3% higher chance of
receiving a loan on Auxmoney. Concluding, we have limited evidence to support Hypothesis 3a
(social and emotional motives).
Moreover, keywords addressing a business purpose or debt restructuring are signiﬁcantly related
to a higher funding probability. Business activities are supposed to create positive cash ﬂows
in the future that can be used for servicing debt. Therefore, investors appear to invest more
willingly in such loan applications. A weakly signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient is attributed to
loans related to leisure activities.
Smava
Table 2.5 shows the regression results for Smava with FGL as dependent variable. Again, the
ﬁrst three regressions (SF.I to SF.III) include all control variables and the hypotheses-related
variables separately for each hypothesis. SF.IV is the main speciﬁcation including all variables
simultaneously.
The coefﬁcient of SpellError is insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. This phenomenon may be due
to the lower variation of SpellError in the Smava sample and to the generally lower level of
misspellings (2.71% on average). We derive similar results concerning the text length. Both
coefﬁcients for #Words are negative, close to zero and not signiﬁcant in SF.II and SF.IV. Hence,
we can neither approve nor reject Hypothesis 1a (orthography) and Hypothesis 2a (description
length). Thus, spelling errors and text length appear not to be predictive factors for the funding
probability on the platform Smava.
Moreover, two of the keyword indicators used in the description text are insigniﬁcant, two
are signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient of KeyWord Fam is negative and a loan application-related to
family has a ceteris paribus 3.28% lower chance to be ﬁnanced. Investors may associate a
family with payment obligations, which could affect repayment behavior. The relationship
between KeyWord Neg and the funding probability is signiﬁcantly positive, which indicates
some evidence in favor of Hypothesis 3a. Altogether, the opposite signs of the coefﬁcients of
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KeyWord Fam and KeyWord Neg provide somewhat unclear evidence. Thus, we can neither
reject nor conﬁrm Hypothesis 3a (social and emotional motives).
2.5.2 Probability of default
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 show the results of the default probability analysis.
Auxmoney
The speciﬁcations AD.I to AD.IV in Table 2.6 are similar to the model speciﬁcations concerning
the funding probability and with DEF as dependent variable for Auxmoney, but with additional
dummy variables related to the time needed to fully fund the loan as further control variables
to cover the aspect of rational herding. The last column shows the average marginal effects for
speciﬁcation AD.IV.
The coefﬁcients of SpellError #Words and the squared value of #Words are insigniﬁcant in all
relevant model speciﬁcations, which may be attributable to the fact that the loan applications
in the CGL subsample show a lower percentage of misspelled words and more words in the
loan descriptions as well as lower variation in both variables. Hence, we can neither approve
nor reject Hypothesis 1b (orthography) and Hypothesis 2b (description length). Both ﬁndings
are consistent with the results of Iyer et al. (2016), who also do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation
of spelling errors, but a signiﬁcantly negative one of the text length, both with the default
probability. Indeed, in our regressions the coefﬁcient of #Words is also negative with a relatively
high Z-statistic, albeit not signiﬁcant.
The social and emotional motives indicator KeyWord Separ is the only indicator which is
signiﬁcant at a 10% level. The positive coefﬁcient suggests that loan applicants using these
words have a higher probability of default. Possible problems in their personal lives may affect
their repayment behavior. However, as this is the only signiﬁcant effect we cannot conﬁrm
Hypothesis 3b (social motives indicator) in general.
All model speciﬁcations show a signiﬁcant positive relationship only between the indicator
variable KeyWord Business and the probability of default. This is noteworthy as this dummy
variable is also positively signiﬁcant in the funding regression. Thus we can state a certain inefﬁ-
ciency meaning that the lenders positively appreciate loans for business purposes, which in turn
are related to a higher probability of default. This ﬁnding is consistent with the weak evidence
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Table 2.6 Regression results concerning the default probability on Auxmoney.
Notes: Model speciﬁcations AD.I to AD.IV are simultaneous IV probit regressions for the
default probability. The column AME AD.IV shows the average marginal effect of the vari-
ables on the default probability with respect to speciﬁcation AD.IV. Z-statistics are shown in
parenthesis. The symbols *, ** and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
The AIC of a model only containing hard controls is -2663.78. Reference categories: For
FundTime categoryMid, forMat categoryMid, for Schufa category M, for CEG category Red.
The variables are deﬁned in Table 2.1.
Default probability (DEF)
AD.I AD.II AD.III AD.IV
Coeff. AME
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError 0.000708 0.00108 0.0002224
( 0.121) ( 0.186)
#Words −0.000414 −0.000744 −0.0001526
( −0.930) ( −1.56)
(#Words)2 0.000000510 0.000000630 0.0000001300
( 1.27) ( 1.52)
KeyWord Pos 0.0404 0.0655 0.01343
( 0.647) ( 1.02)
KeyWord Neg 0.0371 0.0533 0.01093
( 0.410) ( 0.581)
KeyWord Fam 0.0152 0.0365 0.007483
( 0.213) ( 0.500)
KeyWord Separ 0.232* 0.248* 0.05075*
( 1.76) ( 1.87)
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc −0.0716 −0.0697 −0.0826 −0.0742 −0.01521
( −1.11) ( −1.07) ( −1.27) ( −1.13)
KeyWord Edu −0.132 −0.132 −0.132 −0.118 −0.02417
( −1.44) ( −1.42) ( −1.44) ( −1.26)
KeyWord Business 0.242*** 0.251*** 0.236*** 0.261*** 0.05346***
( 3.16) ( 3.20) ( 3.07) ( 3.30)
KeyWord Leisure −0.0788 −0.0920 −0.0987 −0.0968 −0.01985
( −0.532) ( −0.606) ( −0.660) ( −0.636)
Picture −0.129** −0.126** −0.130** −0.126** −0.02587**
( −2.01) ( −1.97) ( −2.03) ( −1.96)
Hard controls
ln(I) 4.93*** 4.93*** 4.85*** 4.90*** 1.004***
( 7.98) ( 7.83) ( 7.71) ( 7.73)
ln(Volume) 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.142*** 0.149*** 0.03061***
( 2.65) ( 2.68) ( 2.59) ( 2.73)
Mat Short 0.283*** 0.279*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.05760***
( 2.97) ( 2.92) ( 2.96) ( 2.94)
FundTime Short −0.0999 −0.0941 −0.112 −0.100 −0.007725
( −0.726) ( −0.682) ( −0.810) ( −0.725)
FundTime Long 0.147** 0.152** 0.143** 0.152** −0.009080
( 2.33) ( 2.39) ( 2.26) ( 2.38)
Schufa yes yes yes yes
CEG yes yes yes yes
DAX 0.0510 0.0317 0.0590 0.0468 −0.005902
( 0.149) ( 0.0924) ( 0.171) ( 0.136)
TurnYear 0.0436 0.0440 0.0426 0.0421 −0.008491
( 0.539) ( 0.545) ( 0.526) ( 0.520)
CONST 7.59*** 7.63*** 7.44*** 7.50***
( 5.14) ( 5.12) ( 4.94) ( 4.99)
AIC −2,695.36 −2,727.55 −2,724.87 −2,734.85
N 3,298 3,298 3,298 3,298
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Table 2.7 Regression results concerning the default probability on Smava.
Notes: Model speciﬁcations SD.I to SD.IV are simultaneous IV probit regressions for the
default probability. The column AME SD.IV shows the average marginal effect of the variables
on the default probability with respect to speciﬁcation SD.IV. Z-statistics are shown in paren-
thesis. The symbols *, ** and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The AIC
of a model only containing hard controls is 75.97 Reference categories: For FedState category
BY , for Employment category Employee, for FundTime category Mid, for Mat category Mid,
for Schufa category H, for KDF category 4. The variables are deﬁned in Table 2.1.
Default probability (DEF)
SD.I SD.II SD.III SD.IV
Coeff. AME
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError 0.00262 0.00212 0.0004409
( −0.549) ( −0.443)
#Words −0.00158 −0.00223 −0.0004641
( −0.999) ( −1.32)
(#Words)2 0.00000237 0.00000365 0.0000007600
( 0.458) ( 0.695)
KeyWord Pos 0.0781 0.124 0.02584
( 1.05) ( 1.59)
KeyWord Neg −0.0824 −0.0342 −0.007113
( −0.611) ( −0.249)
KeyWord Fam −0.0276 0.00824 0.001714
( −0.252) ( 0.0742)
KeyWord Separ 0.0439 0.0832 0.01729
( 0.216) ( 0.407)
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc 0.0940 0.105 0.0761 0.0973 0.02022
( 1.19) ( 1.32) ( 0.960) ( 1.22)
KeyWord Edu −0.429*** −0.401** −0.436*** −0.405** −0.08411**
( −2.60) ( −2.42) ( −2.64) ( −2.46)
KeyWord Business 0.0662 0.0853 0.0574 0.0961 0.01998
( 0.594) ( 0.755) ( 0.516) ( 0.854)
KeyWord Leisure −0.0954 −0.0687 −0.111 −0.0881 −0.01831
( −0.573) ( −0.412) ( −0.663) ( −0.526)
Picture 0.0264 0.0601 0.0212 0.0560 0.01164
( 0.301) ( 0.663) ( 0.241) ( 0.620)
Hard controls
ln(I) 3.35*** 3.43*** 3.40*** 3.53*** 0.7338***
( 6.64) ( 6.84) ( 6.93) ( 7.42)
ln(Volume) 0.0765 0.0846 0.0777 0.0816 0.01696
( 1.34) ( 1.49) ( 1.38) ( 1.44)
Mat Short 0.332** 0.342** 0.345** 0.363** 0.07551**
( 1.98) ( 2.04) ( 2.10) ( 2.25)
FundTime Short −0.0834 −0.0807 −0.0753 −0.103 −0.02151
( −0.893) ( −0.867) ( −0.814) ( −1.12)
FundTime Long 0.112 0.117 0.109 0.118 0.02443
( 1.16) ( 1.22) ( 1.13) ( 1.22)
Age −0.00191 −0.00247 −0.00166 −0.00249 −0.0005174
( −0.520) ( −0.671) ( −0.450) ( −0.678)
Male 0.0705 0.0733 0.0825 0.0682 0.01417
( 0.876) ( 0.915) ( 1.03) ( 0.852)
Employment yes yes yes yes
Schufa yes yes yes yes
KDF yes yes yes yes
FedState yes yes yes yes
DAX 1.57*** 1.55*** 1.61*** 1.61*** 0.3348***
( 3.68) ( 3.66) ( 3.83) ( 3.87)
TurnYear 0.194* 0.199* 0.199* 0.212** 0.04403**
( 1.81) ( 1.87) ( 1.86) ( 2.00)
CONST −10.5*** −10.7*** −10.7*** −11.0***
( −7.51) ( −7.72) ( −7.83) ( −8.33)
AIC 66.32 73.97 65.12 67.75
N 2,208 2,216 2,216 2,208
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of Sonenshein et al. (2011) for such behavioral effects. However, this is the only seemingly
irrationality that can be found when comparing the funding and the default regressions.7
Summarizing, we observe a less strong relation of the description-text related soft factors to
the default probability as compared to the funding probability. Only the business keyword is
signiﬁcantly positively related, indicating some inefﬁciency, while providing a picture expectedly
is negatively related to the default probability, a ﬁnding that matches the results of other studies.
Altogether the market appears to be relatively efﬁcient in the sense that soft factors do not have
much prediction power with respect to the default.
Smava
The model speciﬁcations SD.I to SD.IV represent the regression results with DEF as dependent
variable for Smava. SD.I to SD.III separately for each hypothesis include the related variables
individually together with controls, while SD.IV includes all relevant variables. The last column
shows the average marginal effects for the main speciﬁcation.
Similarly to the results of Auxmoney, the coefﬁcients of the variables SpellError and #Words are
insigniﬁcant. Hence, the orthographical quality and the description length are both not related
to the probability of default in our data set on Smava and we can neither approve nor reject
Hypothesis 1b (orthography) and Hypothesis 2b (description length). Again, as with Auxmoney
the ﬁndings are consistent with the results of Iyer et al. (2016). Furthermore, we analyze the
effects of the social and emotional motives indicator variables. By contrast to Auxmoney, none
of the categories is signiﬁcant. Thus, we can neither conﬁrm nor reject Hypothesis 3b (social
and emotional motives) on Smava.
Solely the appearance of words referring to education in the description text is signiﬁcantly
negatively related to the probability of default.8 A possible explanation is that people who are
willing to take out a loan for their education have a great incentive to complete their education
successfully in order to achieve a higher income afterwards. Consequently, they should have
enough money for the repayment.
Summarizing, at Smava the soft factors nearly have no explaining power concerning the default
probability, neither the application-text related one nor the conventional ones such as providing
a picture.
7Still the behavior can be rational if the interest rate is high enough to cover the expected losses, which is not in our
scope.
8This is in line with the regressions for Auxmoney, where the coefﬁcient of this variable is also negative, but not
signiﬁcant.
30
Chapter 2 Description-text related soft information in peer-to-peer lending
2.5.3 Effects of control variables on funding and default probability
In the following, the effects of the control variables are brieﬂy presented.
Funding probability
The results suggest that posting a picture is negatively related with the funding probability
on Smava. This contradicts both, the signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient observed for Auxmoney
and the ﬁndings of previous research concerning the U.S. P2P platform Prosper (e.g. Iyer
et al., 2016). However, there could be an inﬂuence of the subject of the pictures, which is not
analyzed in our study. Furthermore, only 11.7% of the applicants on Smava upload a picture
which is signiﬁcantly lower than the 49.0% of Auxmoney. Additionally, we ﬁnd that a higher
interest rate decreases the probability of a successful funding on both platforms. This suggests
that the investors do suspect that a higher interest rate than suitable for the solvency class is
accompanied by a higher default rate. If the average marginal effect of ln(I) is related to one
standard deviation9 the impact on the funding probability is −18.46% on Auxmoney. Regarding
Smava, the average marginal effect related to one standard deviation change equals −26.5% and
thus has a even bigger magnitude than on Auxmoney. Thus, according to the average marginal
effect analysis the interest rate is an important factor, which again proves that neglecting this
variable, as other studies do, would lead to erroneous estimates.
The effects of Volume and the solvency indicators like the Schufa score are intuitive on both
platforms. Regarding the macroeconomic variables we derive ambiguous results. Whereas
the results for Auxmoney indicate a signiﬁcant positive relationship between DAX and the
funding probability, suggesting that investors tend to ﬁnance ceteris paribus more loans in times
of a positive economic climate, the same factor has a negative, but not signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
for Smava. Concerning the turn-of-the-year dummy TurnYear, we ﬁnd a negative effect for
Auxmoney and a positive effect for Smava. Remember that the following control variables are
only available for Smava. The signiﬁcant negative coefﬁcient of Age validates the ﬁndings of
Pope and Sydnor (2011) on Prosper. As women have a signiﬁcantly higher chance of obtaining
a loan on Smava, which is shown in the negative coefﬁcient of Male, another result of Pope and
Sydnor (2011) is also conﬁrmed in the German P2P market. Furthermore, only two federal state
dummies have a positive coefﬁcient while most of the other state variables are insigniﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. Moreover, pensioners and self-employed workers have a better chance of being
funded than employees and workers who form the reference category.
9The standard deviation of ln(I) is 43.93% which corresponds to SD(I) = 3.24% for Auxmoney.
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Default probability
Similarly to the funding probability, the interest rate shows highly predictive power in explaining
the default probability on both platforms. The highly signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients of ln(I)
and the high magnitudes of this effect are remarkable. Thus, an increase of the interest rate
by one standard deviation increases the likelihood of default ceteris paribus by 14.27% on
Auxmoney and by 25.99% on Smava. A higher interest rate results in a higher debt service
and could therefore be more difﬁcult for borrowers to repay. This ﬁnding is consistent with
Freedman and Jin (2008), who analyze this issue based on a Prosper data set. Furthermore,
the indicator Picture is signiﬁcantly negative on the 5% level in all regressions concerning
Auxmoney. Remember, that a picture increases the funding probability and is therefore seen as a
positive signal from an investors perspective. The negative coefﬁcient of Picture supports this
view. Loan applications including a picture have a ceteris paribus 2.59% lower likelihood of
defaulting. However, this effect cannot be shown for Smava, for which we observe a positive but
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient. Additionally, we ﬁnd that the length of the funding process affects the
default probability. Apparently, loans with a funding period greater than 10 days (Long) have a
signiﬁcant higher probability of default on Auxmoney compared to the reference categoryMid.
A possible explanation for this effect is that investors can derive information upon the solvency
of a loan applicant to some degree from the application and bid hesitantly for less solvent
applicants. Vice versa, for rather solvent borrowers, some kind of rational herding behavior
can occur (Lee and Lee, 2012). Concerning Smava, coefﬁcients are similar but not signiﬁcant.
The variable ln(Volume) has a signiﬁcantly positive effect on the probability of default only
for Auxmoney. The signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcients of the indicator for a short maturity on
both platforms are surprising. However, as many long-term loans have not been closed at the
end of our investigation period, they are not included in the CGL subsamples which therefore
over-represent short-term loans. Furthermore, some Schufa scores have signiﬁcant coefﬁcients
on both platforms. The coefﬁcients of the macroeconomic controls TurnYear and DAX are
signiﬁcantly positive in all speciﬁcations for Smava. Contrary to the results of Auxmoney, this
suggests that loan applications commenced in December or January and/or in times with better
economic sentiment predict a higher probability of default.
2.5.4 Robustness checks
We perform several model variations and subsample regressions as robustness checks which are
shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 for Auxmoney and Table 2.10 for Smava.
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Table 2.8 Subsample regressions concerning the solvency indicators for Auxmoney.
Notes: AFR.I and ADR.I are subsample regressions with respective speciﬁcations to AF.IV and
AD.IV (main results, already shown in Table 2.4 and 2.6) for a subsample containing only loans
without solvency indicators. AFR.II and ADR.II are subsample regressions with respective
speciﬁcations to AF.IV and AD.IV (main results, already shown in Table 2.4 and 2.6) for a
subsample containing only loans with solvency indicators. The columns indicated with AME
show the average marginal effects. The symbols *, ** and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10%,
5% and 1% level. Reference categories: For FundTime category Mid, for Mat category Mid,
for Schufa category M, for CEG category Red. The variables are deﬁned in Table 2.1.
Funding probability (FGL) Default probability (DEF)
no solvency score (NSI) solvency score (SI) no solvency score (NSI) solvency score (SI)
AFR.I AME AFR.II AME ADR.I AME ADR.II AME
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError −0.01*** −0.0021*** −0.01*** −0.0026*** 0.00 0.0004 −0.00 −0.0000
#Words 0.00*** 0.0007*** 0.00*** 0.0010*** 0.00 0.0001 −0.00* −0.0002*
(#Words)2 −0.00*** −0.0000*** −0.00*** −0.0000*** −0.00 −0.0000 0.00 0.0000
KeyWord Pos 0.11*** 0.0227*** 0.16*** 0.0503*** −0.10 −0.0177 0.14* 0.0305*
KeyWord Neg −0.01 −0.0021 −0.02 −0.0062 0.09 0.0162 0.07 0.0148
KeyWord Fam −0.01 −0.0024 0.07*** 0.0205*** 0.28** 0.0496** −0.14 −0.0298
KeyWord Separ −0.03 −0.0058 −0.05 −0.0156 0.22 0.0382 0.30* 0.0637*
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc 0.15*** 0.0327*** 0.00 0.0007 −0.17 −0.0293 −0.00 −0.0008
KeyWord Edu 0.03 0.0059 0.01 0.0022 −0.03 −0.0058 −0.15 −0.0326
KeyWord Business 0.06** 0.0138** 0.03 0.0086 0.22 0.0376 0.29*** 0.0615***
KeyWord Leisure −0.02 −0.0053 −0.09** −0.0283** −0.46 −0.0803 0.10 0.0207
Picture 0.48*** 0.1042*** 0.32*** 0.0984*** −0.23** −0.0393** −0.07 −0.0142
Hard controls
ln(I) −1.04*** −0.2249*** −1.95*** −0.6071*** 4.62*** 0.8058*** 4.83*** 1.0270***
ln(Volume) −0.20*** −0.0436*** −0.44*** −0.1354*** −0.02 −0.0029 0.30*** 0.0647***
Mat Short 0.17 0.0358 0.21*** 0.0662*** 0.30* 0.0515* 0.22* 0.0469*
FundTime Short 0.08 0.0143 −0.29 −0.0611
FundTime Long 0.06 0.0100 0.20** 0.0416**
Schufa yes yes yes yes
CEG yes yes yes yes
DAX 0.78*** 0.1682*** −0.09 −0.0296 −0.50 −0.0868 0.69 0.1468
TurnYear −0.08*** −0.0180*** 0.07*** 0.0218*** −0.21 −0.0369 0.17* 0.0368*
CONST −2.18*** −2.19*** 8.12*** 6.13***
N 55,233 21,384 1,311 1,987
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Table 2.9 Robustness checks concerning the residual interest rate and the Wiseclerk data quality for
Auxmoney.
Notes: AFR and ADR are regressions with respective speciﬁcations to AF.IV and AD.IV
(main results, already shown in Table 2.4 and 2.6) using the residual interest rate. ADDQ is
a regression with respect to speciﬁcation AD.IV (main results, already shown in Table 2.6)
for a subsample containing only loans with #Lender≥ 10. The symbols *, ** and *** express
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Reference categories: For FundTime categoryMid,
forMat categoryMid, for Schufa categoryM, for CEG category Red. The variables are deﬁned
in Table 2.1.
Application ResRate Data quality
FGL DEF DEF
AFR ADR ADDQ
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError −0.00760*** −0.00361 −0.00716
#Words 0.00319*** −0.00149** −0.00100*
(#Words)2 −0.00000172*** 0.00000121 0.000000930
KeyWord Pos 0.169*** 0.139 0.0834
KeyWord Neg −0.0126 0.110 0.0655
KeyWord Fam 0.0746*** −0.130 0.0196
KeyWord Separ −0.0538 0.240 0.348**
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc −0.0124 −0.0138 −0.0883
KeyWord Edu −0.0203 −0.144 −0.0905
KeyWord Business 0.0158 0.308*** 0.273***
KeyWord Leisure −0.115** 0.0771 −0.0490
Picture 0.338*** −0.0717 −0.115
Hard controls
ln(I) 5.06***
ResRate −19.5*** 33.6***
ln(Volume) −0.435*** 0.311*** 0.123**
Mat Short −0.00543 0.318** 0.328***
FundTime Short −0.258 0.0565
FundTime Long 0.167* 0.150**
Schufa yes yes yes
CEG yes yes yes
DAX −0.109 0.495 0.182
TurnYear 0.0651*** 0.198* 0.0642
CONST 2.25*** −4.01*** 7.93***
N 18,954 1,771 2,459
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Table 2.10 Robustness checks concerning the residual interest rate and the Wiseclerk data quality for
Smava.
Notes: SFR and SDR are regressions with respective speciﬁcations to SF.IV and SD.IV
(main results, already shown in Table 2.5 and 2.7) using the residual interest rate. SDDQ
is a regression with respect to speciﬁcation SD.IV (main results, already shown in Table
2.7) for a subsample containing only loans with #Lender≥ 9. The symbols *, ** and ***
express signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. For FedState category BY , for Employment
category Employee, for FundTime categoryMid, forMat categoryMid, for Schufa category
H, for KDF category 4. The variables are deﬁned in Table 2.1.
Application ResRate Data quality
FGL DEF DEF
SFR SDR SDDQ
Variables related to hypotheses
SpellError −0.00207 0.00198 0.00824
#Words −0.0000399 −0.00258 −0.00148
(#Words)2 0.000000850 0.00000428 0.000000690
KeyWord Pos 0.0357 0.133* 0.111
KeyWord Neg 0.192*** −0.00973 −0.177
KeyWord Fam −0.142*** 0.00182 0.226
KeyWord Separ 0.0578 0.154 0.187
Soft controls
KeyWord Restruc −0.0144 0.0992 0.0260
KeyWord Edu 0.0533 −0.430** −0.385*
KeyWord Business 0.0687 0.0982 0.232
KeyWord Leisure −0.00198 −0.0841 −0.181
Picture −0.101** 0.0549 −0.0596
Hard controls
ln(I) 2.43***
ResRate −37.5*** 31.5***
ln(Volume) −0.484*** 0.0794 0.000307
Mat Short −0.134*** 0.491*** −0.0634
FundTime Short −0.0378 −0.000567
FundTime Long 0.117 0.132
Age −0.00387*** −0.00133 −0.00230
Male −0.0981*** 0.0565 −0.0372
Employment yes yes yes
Schufa yes yes yes
KDF yes yes yes
FedState yes yes yes
DAX −0.189 1.13*** 1.15**
TurnYear 0.0836** 0.209* 0.248
CONST 7.59*** −3.77*** −6.82***
N 10,367 2,208 1,007
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Residual interest rate
Our analyses have so far proven that a highly predictive factor for the funding success and
defaults along with descriptive texts is the interest rate. For both platforms our results indicate
that a higher interest rate is associated with a lower funding and a higher default probability.
Particularly, the ﬁrst result is not intuitive at ﬁrst sight. Rational investors are expected to fund
loans that pay a higher interest rate for a certain amount of risk more likely. However, as already
mentioned before, the interest rate that a loan applicant suggests might include substantial
information about his personal solvency sentiment. Our results are already an indication for
this. One might argue that this effect might be biased because it is not clear to what extent the
interest rate is being set to account for the expected credit risk and what value the actual surplus
is. Therefore, we conduct a robustness check that substitutes the interest rate with the residual
interest rate (ResRate), which is deﬁned as the nominal interest rate minus the risk adjusted
market rate according to the Schufa score. In this setting, the ResRate captures the effect that a
borrower is willing to pay a higher or lower interest rate than the risk adjusted common market
rate. Note that using the ResRate can still be a source of endogeneity, as other explanatory
variables than the Schufa score might inﬂuence this measure. Therefore, we apply the IV probit
approach again.
The results for the funding and the default probability are shown in the ﬁrst two columns of
Table 2.9 for Auxmoney and in Table 2.10 for Smava. For both platforms, the coefﬁcients of
ResRate are similar and highly signiﬁcant. Comparably to the main regressions, the effect of
ResRate is negative concerning the funding success and positive regarding the default event.
This is a strong indication for the theory that a higher interest rate offered by a potential borrower
is a signal for lower solvency sentiment.
Regarding the hypotheses-related variables, the results are stable and we observe only small
changes. In the case of Smava, only the indicator for positive emotions shows a signiﬁcantly
positive relation with the default probability. This ﬁnding is a weak evidence supporting
Hypothesis 3b (social and emotional motives). For Auxmoney, the family-related keyword
indicator becomes highly signiﬁcant in Speciﬁcation AFR supporting Hypothesis 3a (social and
emotional motives) and concerning the default probability #Words is now signiﬁcantly negative
on the 10% level. Note that the Auxmoney samples are signiﬁcantly reduced in this setting
because only observations containing a Schufa score can be considered.
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Subsample regressions for solvency information on Auxmoney
One important difference between both platforms is that a solvency score (Schufa or CEG score)
was not mandatory for Auxmoney before February 2013. A share of 72.1% of all observations
in the Auxmoney data have no solvency score at all. Thus, the question arises whether the soft
factors resulting from the description text become more important whenever solvency scores are
missing. For this reason, we perform regressions on FGL and DEF on two disjunct subsamples,
one including observations with at least one solvency score (SI) and one without (NSI). The
results are presented in Table 2.8. Surprisingly, the results appear to be reasonably stable. With
regard to the funding probability, the family-related keyword indicator becomes signiﬁcantly
positive for the subsample with solvency scores. This is surprising, as we expected soft factors
to play a bigger role, whenever hard facts are scarce. The result is also different to Smava, where
we do not observe such an effect. With regard to average marginal effects, we observe a similar
picture. The hypotheses related average marginal effects do not differ a lot between the two
funding related subsamples. When considering the subsample with solvency information, the
magnitude of the interest rate is much higher than in the other subsample. This is economically
plausible, as it is easier for a potential lender to decide whether an interest rate is suitable in the
case that a solvency score is available. The higher average marginal effect of the variable DAX
in the subsample without any solvency score indicates that investors tend to ﬁnance those loans
especially in times of economic prosperity.
We observe more coefﬁcient changes with regard to the default probability. If no solvency score
is available, KeyWord Fam turns signiﬁcant and KeyWord Separ insigniﬁcant instead. For the
other subsample, #Words becomes signiﬁcantly negative and KeyWord Pos signiﬁcantly positive.
Although the average marginal effects of SpellError are insigniﬁcant in both subsamples, the
values differ considerably (0.036% for NSI vs. −0.003% for SI). Furthermore, we ﬁnd that
the average marginal effect of the indicator Picture shows more than the doubled amount in
the NSI subsample. However, we can not ﬁnd strong evidence supporting the fact that soft
information related to the description text is more important whenever hard facts are not available
on Auxmoney.
Data quality Wiseclerk
Last, we perform an additional check to test whether there are any indications for a bias due to
unreported defaults on Wiseclerk. To this end, we utilize only those closed granted loans with at
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least ten lenders, which corresponds to a share of 75% on Auxmoney.10 The regressions on this
subsample show fairly similar results with two additional coefﬁcients now becoming signiﬁcant,
but without a change of the sign (see Table 2.9, Speciﬁcation ADDQ). Regarding Smava, using
only those loans with at least nine lenders corresponds to the upper 46%.11
Again, the regressions do not change much (see Table 2.10, Speciﬁcation SDDQ). Altogether,
there is no evidence in favor of an unreported-default bias.
2.5.5 Comparisons of both platforms
Last, we compare the results of Auxmoney and Smava. As already evident in the isolated analysis,
there are different factors on both platforms which are signiﬁcantly related to the funding success.
Orthography, text length, the social and emotional motive indicator KeyWord Pos and most of
the other indicator variables are included in the investors’ loan assessment on Auxmoney.
Although KeyWord Fam and KeyWord Neg have signiﬁcant coefﬁcients, the other social and
emotional motives indicators as well as the variables SpellError and #Words are not signiﬁcantly
related to the funding success on Smava. Concluding, one might argue, that the soft factors
derived from the description texts are more important for investors in case that hard facts are not
available, which is true for most of the observations on Auxmoney. However, the robustness
check ‘subsample regressions for solvency information on Auxmoney’ proves that in the case
of Auxmoney measures related to the description text are still highly predictive factors even in
those cases in which solvency scores are available. This is a major difference in the investors’
behavior on both platforms. One reason might be, that investors on Auxmoney are more used
to considering soft information and analyzing the description texts. Furthermore, the bidding
assistant and the veriﬁcation of some provided information on Smava may reduce the incentive
for investors to look at other factors than interest rate and the solvency information. Hence, the
soft factors are more important on Auxmoney.
While the role of soft information in the funding process differs between the platforms, there
is almost no distinction when considering the default probability regressions. Neither the
orthography nor the text length are related to the probability of default on Auxmoney and
Smava. However, the default rates on both platforms are different, as the default probability is
10Again, with the above conservative calculus (see Section 2.4.1) assuming a 50% reporting probability of every
lender, this means that in this subsample, only less than 0.34 errors can be expected. Thus, we consider this
subsample as free of such errors.
11With the conservative calculus assuming a 50% reporting probability of every lender this means that in this
subsample only less than 0.47 errors can be expected.
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mostly explained by hard factors, e.g. solvency information or the interest rate, which also are
distinct between Auxmoney and Smava. Remember that the reason for this ﬁnding might be
that soft information is indeed used by investors in their granting decision. If this is the case
and the factors help to effectively distinct between good and bad loans, the observations of
closed granted loans tend to exhibit a corresponding moulding. In the case of Auxmoney, we
ﬁnd several indications for such a pattern. Particularly, the variables SpellError and #Words are
highly signiﬁcant factors for the funding probability and for both variables, the distributions of
the overall sample and of the subsample of closed, granted loans differs a lot.
Furthermore, our results suggest an astonishing ﬁnding concerning the interest rates which holds
for both platforms. Investors on Smava and Auxmoney seem to mistrust a higher (residual)
interest rate and therefore, a higher interest rate is related to a lower funding probability. When
considering the defaults, a higher (residual) interest rate indicates a higher default probability on
both platforms. Note that we cannot assess the proﬁtability of the investments directly. However,
if a loss given default (LGD) of even 90% is assumed, the annual rates of return on the average
loan of the CGL subsamples are 0.41% (Auxmoney) and −1.08% (Smava). For an LGD level
of 10%, the corresponding values are 5.55% (Auxmoney) and 2.25% (Smava).
Hence, investments in loans arranged by Auxmoney, which often lack credit scores, outperform
those into Smava loans during the observation period. This shows that investors are able to
effectively identify creditworthy borrowers even though hard facts are scarce. Our results
indicate that investors then base their granting decision successfully on soft factors that are
related to the description texts. Loan applicants without any or without sufﬁcient credit scores
are not serviced by banks, which do not gather information regarding soft factors in the same
way as P2P platforms. Identifying the borrowers with good solvency amongst the group of these
applicants may be proﬁtable. Maybe this is one reason why Auxmoney was able to replace
Smava as market leader in Germany.
2.6 Conclusion
In this article we analyze the role that soft information derived from description texts plays in
the funding decision and in predicting the default probability in P2P lending. We especially
focus on spelling errors, text length and the presence of social and emotional keywords in the
description text. We are the ﬁrst to investigate these factors simultaneously for two leading
platforms operating in the same target market but with different platform designs. This setting
allows us to derive novel insights regarding the behavior of the market participants. We use
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simultaneous IV probit regressions to account for interest-rate-related endogeneity and data
from two differently designed leading European P2P platforms, one with a more (Smava) and
one with a less (Auxmoney) restrictive application process. In several robustness checks, we
ﬁnd that our results are resilient.
Our ﬁndings are new and partially surprising: Overall, it turns out that there is no such thing
as a generalizable stable role that soft factors play in P2P lending and that the value for the
investors depends on the platform design and the requirement of credit scores. In particular,
spelling errors, text length and keywords evoking positive emotions are signiﬁcant drivers of the
funding probability on Auxmoney, while on Smava only two keywords are. The relation of the
text length turns out to be inversely u-shaped. However, these factors appear not to be related to
the default probability. When analyzing the (smaller) subsamples of closed granted loans with
respect to the probability of default, we ﬁnd that almost none of the soft factors are signiﬁcant
anymore. Yet, the usual control variables such as solvency scores and especially the interest
rate are. Additionally, we identify the interest rate as an important factor that correlates with
both, the funding and the default probability. We ﬁnd that high interest rates show a positive
relation with the default probability. This effect is also regarded as a signal for lower solvency by
potential investors on both platforms. Altogether the evidence indicates a relatively efﬁcient and
rational market. Even though Auxmoney allows borrowers to apply for a loan without providing
a credit score, which is not possible in conventional banking, we observe the risk-return proﬁle
to be sufﬁcient to ensure an acceptable average return for the investors. As our results are mainly
based on correlation analysis, even the conﬁrmed hypotheses do not establish a causal relation.
Therefore, a limitation of our research lies in the fact that the reasoning behind the hypotheses
cannot be proven.
Summarizing, we can conclude that investors on P2P platforms react to soft information related
to the description texts when deciding upon funding. The extent of reacting appears to depend
on the platform’s hard information requirements for loan applications. By following the soft
information the investors do not act irrationally in the sense that the repayment behavior of the
granted loans is almost solely dependent on hard facts. Some soft factors may even help to
identify debtors with a good level of creditworthiness. Therefore, P2P platforms can indeed
provide loans for people who would otherwise not have been able to receive a loan. Yet, this
market extension does not come with additional risk for well-diversiﬁed investors as long as
the interest rate is set in a way which accounts for the hard facts. From this point of view, the
present tendency of P2P platforms to standardize the loan application process similar to that of
banks is to be considered critically as it partially erodes the beneﬁts of P2P lending.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.11 Keywords regarding loan purpose and classiﬁcation.
Category German keywords
KeyWord Fam Ehefrau, Ehemann, Erziehung, Familie, Heirat, Hochzeit, Kind, Kinder, verheiratet, Verlobung
KeyWord Edu Ausbildung, Studium, Weiterbildung
KeyWord Leisure Reise, Urlaub
KeyWord Business Betriebsmittel, Gewerb, Investition, selbststa¨ndig, Unternehmen
KeyWord Restruc Ablo¨se, Liquidita¨t, Umschuld, Unterstu¨tzung, Dispo, Investition, Finanzamt
KeyWord Neg Beerdigung, klag, krank, schwierig, verstorben
KeyWord Pos danke, freuen, Traum, dringend, gesund, Wunsch, Vertrauen
KeyWord Separ geschieden, scheiden, Scheidung, Trennung
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Table 2.12 P2P-speciﬁc adaptions of the GNU Aspell regarding the spell check. Words that have been
classiﬁed by the GNU Aspell as erroneous, but appeared more than ten times in the analysis
have been checked manually regarding the correctness of the spelling. Thereby, we identiﬁed
some terms that were indeed correctly spelled but were not included in the GNU Aspell.
Therefore, we replenished the GNU Aspell by terms shown in this Table.
A Abbezahlung, abgezockt, ABS, Abschluß, Abverkauf, Abzocke, ADHS, AGB, AIS, ALG, Android, Anschluß, Anschub-
ﬁnanzierung, Antalya, App, Apps, arbeitssuchend, Arvato, Astra, ASU, Aufstockungskredit, ausgelernter, Auskunfteien,
Auslegware, auxmoney, Auxmoney, Avant, Avensis, Azubi
B BAfo¨G, Barclay, Barclaycard, Basisscore, berufsbedingten, Berufsunfa¨higkeitsversicherung, Besicherung, BHKW,
BHW, Bianca, Bio, bißchen, Bistro, Bitcoin, Bj., BJ, BU, Burnout, BWA, BWL
C Caddy, Carport, Carport, Cashﬂow, Catering, CDI, CEG, Chevrolet, CHF, Christopher, Clio, CLK, CNC, Coach, Coach-
ing, Combi, Community, Consultant, Controlling, Corsa, Creditreform, Cruiser
D Dachgeschoß, Dacia, Da¨mmung, Daniela, daß, .de, Deko, DHL, Disco, Discount, Discounter, Dispo, Dispoausgle-
ich, Dispokredit, Dispokredite, Dispokredites, Dispokredits, Disporahmens, Dispos, Dispozinsen, DJ, Dominic, DPD,
dreiko¨pﬁge
E EC, Edit, EEG, EFH, Eigentu¨mergemeinschaft, Einliegerwohnung, Erbengemeinschaft, Erdgeschoß, Ergotherapeutin,
Ergotherapie, Erledigungsvermerk, Erwerbsminderungsrente, Erwerbsunfa¨higkeitsrente, Escort, ESP, Espace, Estrich,
ETW, EUR, Event, Events, Exfrau, Exfreund, Exfreundin, Exmann
F Fabia, Factoring, fahrtu¨chtig, Fam., festangestellt, festangestellte, FH, Fiesta, Filialleiter, Filialleiterin, Fixum, Focus,
Franchise, Franchisegeber, Franchisenehmer, Freelancer, Freiberuﬂichkeit
G Gabionen, Galaxy, ganztags, Geru¨stbau, Gesellenpru¨fung, Grunderwerbsteuer, GT
H Hartz, Herzenswunsch, hochladen, Homeofﬁce, HTC, HUK, Hyundai
I Ibiza, iMac, Imkerei, Infoscore, Inkassobu¨ro, Inkassobu¨ros, iPad, iPhone
J Jasmin, Jennifer, Jenny, Jessica, Julian
K Ka, Katja, KDF, Kevin, KfW, Kia, Kids, Kitaplatz, KMU, Kontokorrentkredit, kostendeckend, Kostgeld,
krankgeschrieben, KV, kWh
L Label, Laguna, lasern, Laura, LBS, LEGO, Leon, Lifestyle, Limousine, Lounge, Luca, Lupo
M Macao, MacBook, Maik, mailen, Maklercourtage, Malerbetrieb, Mandy, Manuel, Marco, Marcus, Marina, Mario, Mar-
vin, Master, Masterstudium, Mathias, MBA, Mechatroniker, Merchandising, MfG, Mia, Michelle, Micro, mietfrei,
Mike, mittelsta¨ndige, mittelsta¨ndigen, Model, monatl., Mondeo, Monique, Mountainbike, MPU, mtl., Mu¨nsterland,
muß, mußte, mu¨ßte, mußten, mu¨ßten
N Nachﬁnanzierung, nachzahlen, Nancy, Newsletter, Nico
O Octavia, offenstehende, OP, O¨PNV
P Partyservice, Passat, PayPal, Photovoltaikanlage, Physiotherapie, Playstation, Polo, Portokasse, Postident, PostIdent,
Printmedien, Promoterin, Provisionsbasis, Provisionszahlungen, PTA, Punto, PVC
R Ranking, Rasenma¨her, Ratenho¨he, Ratenkredit, Ratenkredite, Reha, Rene, renovierungsbedu¨rftig, Renovierungskosten,
Restaurantfachfrau, Restaurantfachmann, Restaurantleiter, RKV, Roadster, Roller, Ronny, Roswitha, Rover, RSV
S Santander, Sarah, Schlecker, Schluß, schmerzfrei, schnellstens, Schufa, SCHUFA, Schufaauskunft, Schufaeintrag, Sch-
ufaeintra¨ge, Schufascore, Schufawert, Schuldnerberatung, schwerbehindert, schwerbehinderten, Science, Score, Scores,
Scorewert, Scoring, Seat, Security, Semesterbeitrag, SEO, Sharan, Shirts, Silvia, Sklerose, Skoda, Sky, smava, Smava,
Smavaner, Snacks, Solaranlage, Solaranlagen, Solarenergie, Sollzinsen, Sorgerecht, Speditionskaufmann, Spielothek,
Sportback, Stauraum, Steven, Stickmaschine, Style, Suzuki, SWK
T Tablet, Tacho, Targobank, TDI, Teamleiter, TEUR, Timo, Touran, Touring, Trader, Trading, Tsd., Tuning, Turbo, Twingo
U U¨berschuß, U¨berziehungszins, U¨berziehungszinsen, UG, Umﬁnanzierung, Uniklinik, UPS, USD
V Vanessa, Variant, Vectra, verh., Vespa, Viktor, Vinyl, VIP, vorﬁnanzieren, vorﬁnanziert
W Wa¨rmeda¨mmung, wegzukommen, Wellness, Wellnessbereich, WG, Whirlpool, wußte
X Xenon
Y Yamaha
Z Zaﬁra, zuteilungsreif
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Table 2.13 Pairwise Bravais-Pearson correlation coefﬁcients among the explanatory variables concerning
the Auxmoney data set.
Notes: The symbol * expresses signiﬁcance at the 5% level. The variables are deﬁned in Table
2.1.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
01. CEG NA 1.00
02. CEG Green −0.66* 1.00
03. CEG Yellow −0.61* −0.12* 1.00
04. CEG Red −0.21* −0.04* −0.04* 1.00
05. DAX −0.06* 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 1.00
06. FGL −0.41* 0.38* 0.17* 0.02* 0.05* 1
07. ln(I) −0.13* 0.09* 0.08* 0.02* 0.02* 0.15* 1
08. ln(Irf ) 0.09* −0.03* −0.07* −0.07* −0.18* −0.01* 0.04* 1.00
09. KeyWord Business −0.11* 0.11* 0.03* −0.00 −0.00 0.09* 0.05* 0.05*
10. KeyWord Edu −0.05* −0.01* 0.09* −0.01* −0.00 0.06* 0.03* 0.01*
11. KeyWord Fam −0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 0.01* −0.01* 0.05* 0.04* 0.04*
12. KeyWord Leisure −0.01* 0.01* 0.01* −0.00 −0.00 0.02* 0.01* −0.01*
13. KeyWord Restruc −0.14* 0.12* 0.06* −0.01 0.01* 0.11* 0.04* 0.04*
14. KeyWord Neg −0.05* 0.04* 0.03* −0.00 −0.01* 0.05* 0.04* 0.04*
15. KeyWord Pos −0.09* 0.04* 0.08* 0.01 −0.02* 0.12* 0.09* 0.07*
16. KeyWord Separ −0.01* 0.02* −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 0.02* 0.02* 0.02*
17. Mat Short 0.06* −0.08* −0.01* 0.04* 0.00 0.15* −0.07* 0.13*
18. Mat Mid −0.06* 0.08* 0.01* −0.04* −0.00 −0.15* 0.07* −0.13*
19. Picture −0.15* 0.10* 0.09* 0.05* 0.04* 0.20* 0.13* 0.05*
20. SpellError 0.12* −0.09* −0.07* 0.00 0.00 −0.12* −0.07* −0.05*
21. TurnYear 0.03* −0.03* −0.04* 0.06* 0.02* −0.01* −0.04* −0.29*
22. ln(Volume) −0.18* 0.23* 0.04* −0.11* 0.01* −0.05* 0.00 −0.01*
23. #Words −0.18* 0.13* 0.11* −0.00 −0.01* 0.19* 0.11* 0.11*
24. (#Words)2 −0.02* 0.01* 0.01* −0.00 −0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.01*
9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
09. KeyWord Business 1.00
10. KeyWord Edu 0.02* 1.00
11. KeyWord Fam 0.01* 0.01* 1.00
12. KeyWord Leisure 0.03* 0.00 0.08* 1.00
13. KeyWord Restruc 0.15* 0.03* 0.00 −0.01 1
14. KeyWord Neg 0.06* 0.04* 0.08* 0.04* 0.04* 1
15. KeyWord Pos 0.07* 0.07* 0.13* 0.03* 0.07* 0.09* 1
16. KeyWord Separ 0.01* −0.00 0.07* 0.01* 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 1
17. Mat Short −0.01* 0.02* −0.01* 0.02* −0.03* −0.00 0.04* −0.00
18. Mat Mid 0.01* −0.02* 0.01* −0.02* 0.03* 0.00 −0.04* 0.00
19. Picture 0.05* 0.04* 0.05* 0.01* 0.05* 0.04* 0.10* 0.02*
20. SpellError −0.08* −0.06* −0.05* −0.01 −0.08* −0.06* −0.11* −0.04*
21. TurnYear −0.01* −0.02* −0.01* −0.01* −0.01* −0.00 −0.02* −0.00
22. ln(Volume) 0.14* −0.04* −0.01* −0.01* 0.12* 0.00 −0.02* 0.00
23. #Words 0.26* 0.16* 0.21* 0.12* 0.17* 0.22* 0.29* 0.14*
24. (#Words)2 0.04* 0.03* 0.03* 0.04* 0.02* 0.04* 0.03* 0.05*
17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
17. Mat Short 1
18. Mat Mid −1.00* 1
19. Picture 0.03* −0.03* 1
20. SpellError −0.03* 0.03* −0.08* 1
21. TurnYear −0.00 0.00 0.02* 0.02* 1
22. ln(Volume) −0.45* 0.45* −0.04* −0.03* −0.08* 1
23. #Words 0.01* −0.01* 0.14* −0.14* −0.04* 0.10* 1
24. (#Words)2 −0.00 0.00 0.02* −0.01* −0.01 0.02* 0.54* 1
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Table 2.14 Pairwise Bravais-Pearson correlation coefﬁcients among the explanatory variables concerning
the Smava data set.
Notes: The symbol * expresses signiﬁcance at the 5% level. The variables are deﬁned in Table
2.1.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
01. Age 1.00
02. DAX −0.04* 1.00
03. FGL −0.04* 0.23* 1.00
04. Employment CivServant 0.01 −0.02 0.01 1.00
05. Employment Employee −0.42* 0.02 0.03* −0.22* 1.00
06. Employment Other −0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.06* 1.00
07. Employment Pension 0.64* 0.01 0.01 −0.07* −0.35* −0.02 1.00
08. Employment Selfemp 0.04* −0.02 −0.04* −0.14* −0.75* −0.04* −0.22* 1.00
09. KDF 1 −0.01 −0.04* −0.22* 0.00 0.05* 0.00 0.02 −0.06* 1
10. KDF 2 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.01 0.04* −0.06* −0.24* 1
11. KDF 3 −0.02 0.05* 0.09* −0.02 0.02 −0.00 −0.01 −0.00 −0.31* −0.43* 1
12. KDF 4 0.03* −0.02* 0.09* −0.00 −0.08* 0.01 −0.04* 0.11* −0.24* −0.33* −0.42*
13. ln(I) −0.06* −0.22* 0.05* −0.08* −0.10* 0.00 −0.01 0.15* −0.16* −0.06* 0.04*
14. ln(Irf ) 0.06* −0.22* −0.29* −0.02 −0.03* 0.04* −0.00 0.04* 0.06* −0.04* −0.08*
15. KeyWord Business −0.04* −0.05* −0.05* −0.06* −0.18* −0.01 −0.10* 0.28* −0.02 −0.04* 0.01
16. KeyWord Edu −0.05* −0.05* −0.01 0.02 0.04* −0.01 −0.04* −0.02 0.01 −0.00 −0.01
17. KeyWord Fam 0.01 −0.06* −0.06* 0.04* 0.04* −0.00 0.02 −0.07* 0.01 −0.01 −0.01
18. KeyWord Leisure −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.01 0.04* 0.00 −0.01 −0.04* 0.02 0.01 −0.01
19. KeyWord Restruc −0.04* −0.05* −0.02 0.01 −0.07* −0.02 −0.06* 0.11* −0.03* −0.02 −0.01
20. KeyWord Neg 0.03* −0.05* −0.02 −0.02 −0.04* 0.03* 0.01 0.04* 0 −0.02 −0.01
21. KeyWord Pos −0.06* −0.10* −0.00 −0.01 0.04* 0.02 −0.02 −0.03* −0.02 0 −0.00
22. KeyWord Separ 0.01 −0.02* −0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.00
23. Male −0.11* 0.00 −0.03* 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.09* 0.08* 0.01 −0.02* 0.00
24. Mat Short 0.00 −0.17* −0.04* 0.05* 0.09* 0.04* 0.04* −0.14* 0.21* 0.05* −0.11*
25. Mat Mid −0.00 0.17* 0.04* −0.05* −0.09* −0.04* −0.04* 0.14* −0.21* −0.05* 0.11*
26. Picture −0.04* −0.12* −0.08* −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.04* 0.04* 0.01 −0.01 0.01
27. SpellError 0.02 −0.00 −0.02 −0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.00
28. TurnYear 0.00 −0.12* 0.07* 0.02* 0.02 −0.02 0.03* −0.05* −0.04* −0.00 0.04*
29. ln(Volume) 0.07* 0.03* −0.19* −0.06* −0.30* −0.04* −0.11* 0.42* −0.09* −0.03* 0.07*
30. #Words −0.07* −0.17* −0.10* −0.01 −0.06* 0.00 −0.05* 0.10* −0.01 −0.02 0.00
31. (#Words)2 −0.03* −0.11* −0.06* −0.02 −0.05* 0.00 −0.01 0.07* −0.01 −0.01 0
12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.
12. KDF 4 1
13. ln(I) 0.16* 1
14. ln(Irf ) 0.08* 0.26* 1
15. KeyWord Business 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 1
16. KeyWord Edu 0.01 0.01 0.07* 0.03* 1
17. KeyWord Fam 0.01 −0.01 0.10* 0.05* 0.07* 1
18. KeyWord Leisure −0.01 0.02 0.09* 0.02 0.01 0.08* 1
19. KeyWord Restruc 0.06* 0.01 0.10* 0.23* 0.05* 0.03* −0.00 1
20. KeyWord Neg 0.03* 0.06* 0.09* 0.06* 0.04* 0.05* 0.04* 0.08* 1
21. KeyWord Pos 0.02 0.06* −0.02 0.08* 0.05* 0.07* 0.02 0.09* 0.06* 1
22. KeyWord Separ −0.00 0.00 0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.06* −0.00 0.06* 0.03* 0.01
23. Male 0.01 −0.04* 0.01 0.03* −0.07* 0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.06* −0.05*
24. Mat Short −0.10* 0.05* 0.24* −0.07* 0.00 0.01 0.04* −0.05* 0.01 0.04*
25. Mat Mid 0.10* −0.05* −0.24* 0.07* −0.00 −0.01 −0.04* 0.05* −0.01 −0.04*
26. Picture −0.01 0.04* 0.19* 0.11* 0.04* 0.11* 0.06* 0.06* 0.05* 0.11*
27. SpellError −0.00 0.02 0.07* −0.04* −0.01 −0.03* 0.00 −0.05* −0.02* −0.10*
28. TurnYear −0.01 −0.04* 0.01 −0.02 0.02 −0.01 −0.01 0.04* 0.02* −0.01
29. ln(Volume) 0.03* −0.08* −0.06* 0.21* −0.00 0.01 −0.04* 0.11* 0.02 −0.01
30. #Words 0.03* 0.10* 0.22* 0.29* 0.19* 0.22* 0.11* 0.23* 0.23* 0.32*
31. (#Words)2 0.01 0.08* 0.14* 0.21* 0.14* 0.15* 0.08* 0.16* 0.17* 0.19*
22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
22. KeyWord Separ 1
23. Male −0.01 1
24. Mat Short 0.02 0.01 1
25. Mat Mid −0.02 −0.01 −1 1
26. Picture 0.05* 0.00 0.05* −0.05* 1
27. SpellError −0.02 0.01 −0.01 0.01 −0.02 1
28. TurnYear 0.01 −0.03* −0.07* 0.07* −0.03* −0.00 1
29. ln(Volume) 0.01 0.04* −0.38* 0.38* 0.05* −0.03* 0 1
30. #Words 0.13* −0.03* 0.00 −0.00 0.32* −0.10* −0.00 0.14* 1
31. (#Words)2 0.10* −0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.24* −0.05* 0.01 0.11* 0.88* 1
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German Mittelstand bonds: Yield spreads and liquidity
This research project is joint work with Sebastian Utz and Maximilian Wimmer. The paper has
been published as: Sebastian Utz, Maximilian Wimmer and Martina Weber (2017), German
Mittelstand Bonds: Yield Spreads and Liquidity, Journal of Business Economics 86(1), 103-
129.
Abstract We estimate a cross-sectional model of the yield spreads of German Mittelstand bonds
as a function of liquidity measures as well as a number of variables that control for both the
characteristics of the issuing ﬁrm and the bond characteristics. Our results show a signiﬁcant
positive effect of illiquidity on the yield spread, which persists after controlling for the risk of
the bond. Economically, the size of the liquidity premium of Mittelstand bonds is approximately
twice the size of speculative grade US corporate bonds. Our ﬁndings are robust to different
measures of liquidity and potential endogeneity biases.
Keywords German Mittelstand Bond, Liquidity, Yield Spread, SME, Minibonds
JEL Classification G12, G32
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3.1 Introduction
The German Mittelstand is often hailed as the powerhouse of the German economy. It is
characterized by being mostly medium-sized, family-owned, and family-run companies, which
traditionally lend through relationship banking to cover their ﬁnancing needs. However, with
the phase-in of the Basel II regulations, ﬁnancing via relationship banking has become more
restrictive for many Mittelstand ﬁrms, as the new regulations enforce a mandatory rating for
all issued loans (Schindele and Szczesny, 2015). Launched in 2010, the possibility to issue
Mittelstand bonds with volumes of less than 100 million Euro on the capital market is a remedy
for the Mittelstand to close this ﬁnancing gap. Yet, the observed yield spreads of Mittelstand
bonds are high. Longstaff et al. (2005) argue that default risk is the key determinant for the
yield spread of corporate bonds over government benchmarks. Notwithstanding, they also ﬁnd
that default risk cannot explain the entire variation of the spread. Indeed, market frictions such
as liquidity costs also play an important role (Fisher, 1959; Chen et al., 2007b). The size of
the liquidity premium, however, depends on the the credit rating of the issuing ﬁrm, i.e. less
solvent ﬁrms show higher liquidity premia. Since the solvency of Mittelstand ﬁrms is often
unclear, we empirically examine the size of the liquidity premium that is priced in the spread
of Mittelstand bonds. We ﬁnd that illiquidity is indeed signiﬁcantly associated with the yield
spread after controlling for default risk. Economically, the size of the liquidity premium of
Mittelstand bonds is approximately twice the size of speculative grade US corporate bonds. Our
results are robust to different measures of liquidity and a potential endogeneity bias.
Mittelstand bonds are a young ﬁnancing vehicle enabling small and mid cap ﬁrms to directly tap
capital markets. Since its launch in 2010 the market for Mittelstand bonds has developed rapidly.
Five German stock exchanges1 created segments for Mittelstand bonds and more than 120 bonds
with a total volume exceeding 6 billion Euros have been issued in the period to July 2015.
However, studies such as Kammler and Ro¨der (2013) report a total loss of capital of 3.71%
on the Stuttgart Stock Exchange for Mittelstand bonds by the end of 2012. After the default
of several Mittelstand bonds, two stock exchanges (Stuttgart and Dusseldorf) decided to close
their segments for Mittelstand bonds. By contrast, the remaining stock exchanges successfully
established their Mittelstand segments. For instance, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange reports four
new bond emissions in the ﬁrst half of 2015.
For the analysis of the relationship of bond-speciﬁc liquidity and the yield spread, we use two
different liquidity estimates, namely the bid–ask spread and the LOT liquidity estimate based on
1Namely Stuttgart (bondm), Frankfurt (Entry Standard), Dusseldorf (Der Mittelstandsmarkt), Munich (m:access) and
Hannover/Hamburg (Mittelstandsboerse).
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Lesmond et al. (1999). While the bid–ask spread is a canonical measure of liquidity (see e.g.
Brandt and Kavajecz, 2004; Fleming, 2003), data to calculate that spread is not available for
all bonds. Therefore, we use the LOT liquidity estimate as an alternative measure of liquidity.
The LOT liquidity estimate reﬂects the round-trip liquidity costs based on the frequency of zero
returns. To analyze the yield spread determinants, we apply ﬁxed effects panel regressions with
clustered standard errors and regress the yield spread on the liquidity estimates and bond-speciﬁc,
ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and macroeconomic variables. To control for potential endogeneity of the liquidity
measures and the credit rating, we apply a simultaneous equation model performing a three-stage
least squares estimation technique.
Analyzing a comprehensive sample of 92 Mittelstand bonds, we ﬁnd that investors demand
a higher liquidity premium for more illiquid Mittelstand bonds. Both liquidity measures are
signiﬁcantly positively related to the yield spread in our regressions. A 1% increase in the
bid–ask spread leads to an incremental increase in the yield spread in the range of 3.19% to
6.41%. The predicted increase of the yield spread is slightly smaller for a similar increase in the
LOT liquidity estimate. Since the within R2 ranges between 58% and 82%, our models provide
high explanatory power for the variation of the yield spread of Mittelstand bonds. Therefore,
we conﬁrm that default risk accounts for only part of the variation of the yield spread. Bond
liquidity is another key determinant of the spread, which is especially pronounced for Mittelstand
bonds.
Our paper has important implications for ﬁnancial managers of Mittelstand ﬁrms. While the
observed high yield spreads are commonly perceived as a proxy for default risk, which is
exogenous for the ﬁrms, we highlight that a signiﬁcant part of the yield spread is indeed
associated to illiquidity. Illiquidity, in turn, results as a consequence of trading costs, search
problems, private information, and inventory risk of market makers (Bagehot, 1971; Amihud
and Mendelson, 1980) and is therefore, at least partly, endogenous for ﬁrms. Thus, by reducing
the sources of illiquidity, Mittelstand ﬁrms can decrease the yield spreads of their issued bonds
and thus reduce their effective cost of capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the theory of this paper
and Section 3.3 explains the institutional setting of the Mittelstand bond market, our data, and
our methodological framework. We present and discuss our results in Section 3.4. Section 3.5
concludes.
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3.2 Background
Due to their opportunity costs, investors expect to be compensated for lending money. On the
one hand, they expect to earn the risk-free interest rate as compensation for the time value of
money. Moreover, for risk-bearing investments, investors expect to earn an additional return—
the risk premium—as compensation for the risk of their investment. The yield spread of a
corporate bond is the difference between the bond’s yield to maturity and the yield to maturity
of a benchmark government bond that has exactly the same maturity and currency. Since such a
benchmark government bond rarely exists, the benchmark yield is typically interpolated using a
benchmark government bond with a lower maturity and a benchmark government bond with a
higher maturity. As government bonds are considered to be risk-free, the yield spread measures
the risk premium for the investment in a corporate bond.
While default risk, i.e. the risk that the principal of the bond is not repaid in full at maturity,
certainly is a crucial determinant of the yield spreads, default risk cannot explain the full
variation of corporate bond yield spreads. For instance, Fisher (1959) analyzes the determinants
of corporate bond yield spreads for the years 1927, 1932, 1937, 1949, and 1953. He ﬁnds that
yield spreads are positively inﬂuenced by default risk and negatively inﬂuenced by marketability—
a synonym for liquidity. More recently, Chen et al. (2007b) conﬁrm the existence of a liquidity
premium using a comprehensive sample of US corporate bonds over the period from 1995 to
2003 and ﬁnd that the liquidity premium is higher for speculative grade bonds compared to
investment grade bonds.
Generally, the term liquidity describes the ease of trading a security (Amihud et al., 2005). In
frictionless markets, every security can be traded at no cost all of the time. Therefore, in standard
asset pricing theories which are based on the assumption of frictionless markets (e.g. Cochrane,
2001; Dufﬁe, 1996), liquidity does not affect asset prices. However, real markets are far from
being frictionless. There are four market imperfections that induce illiquidity to the markets2:
Exogenous trading costs, search problems, adverse selection due to private information, and
inventory risk for market makers. Trading costs and search problems directly adversely inﬂuence
liquidity by reducing the number of noise traders on the markets. Private information induces
the existence of informed and uninformed traders. Since market makers generally lose from
trades with informed traders, they need to charge a certain bid–ask spread to gain from trades
with uninformed (noise) traders (Bagehot, 1971). Finally, since not all traders are present at all
times, market makers need to build up an inventory in order to provide immediate trading to any
2We refer to Amihud et al. (2005) for a detailed overview of the sources of illiquidity.
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trader. Such an inventory inhibits a price risk which the market makers have to hold and wish to
be compensated for by higher bid–ask spreads (Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll,
1981).
Given this theoretical framework, we hypothesize that liquidity inﬂuences the yield spreads of
Mittelstand bonds, too. Due to the relatively small size of Mittelstand ﬁrms, we expect a relatively
large liquidity premium as private information is adversely related to ﬁrm size (Diamond and
Verrecchia, 1991; Vega, 2006). To gain evidence on this hypothesis, we continue our paper
with an empirical study of a comprehensive sample of Mittelstand bonds that disentangles the
inﬂuences of default risk and liquidity on the yield spreads.
3.3 Data and methodology
In this chapter, we commence with a brief overview on the development of the Mittelstand bond
market and describe our sample of Mittelstand bonds. Afterward, we introduce the two liquidity
measures employed in our study in detail.
3.3.1 German Mittelstand bonds
The application of the Basel II rules on all banks in the European Union in January 2007
introduced a mandatory rating for each ﬁrm applying for a loan. As a result, the interest rates
offered to low-rated ﬁrms have increased signiﬁcantly because of higher equity requirements for
such loans (Mu¨ller et al., 2011; Schindele and Szczesny, 2015). Mittelstand ﬁrms are affected
in particular by these adverse conditions due to their relatively low equity ratios compared to
large ﬁrms (Feiler and Kirstein, 2014). The Basel III accords continue to pursue the aim of the
Basel II capital requirements to increase the resilience of banks during crises. The relationship
bank system, which was an essential backbone for German Mittelstand ﬁrms, is facing serious
difﬁculties in offering reasonable loan conditions for poorly or non-rated Mittelstand ﬁrms.
Therefore, the Mittelstand needs an alternative source of ﬁnancing. Since Mittelstand ﬁrms are
often family-run, they are reluctant to tap equity markets in order to not dilute their ownership
and control rights.
Common stock exchanges, so far, allowed only bond emissions with a volume of at least
100 million Euros, which exceeds the required amount of capital for small or mid cap ﬁrms
in general. As long as the relationship bank system runs properly, small and mid cap ﬁrms
can avoid costly public bond issues. In the light of the new requirements stemming from the
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developments according to bank regulations, small and mid cap ﬁrms have to reconsider this
method of ﬁnancing. Instead of solely relying on relationship bank loans, they need to tap other
debt ﬁnancing instruments to be able to invest and successfully compete in an international
market environment.
Recognizing this funding gap, the Stuttgart Stock Exchange was the ﬁrst German stock ex-
change to create bondm, a segment that enables small and mid cap ﬁrms to access the pub-
lic capital market in 2010. Four other German stock exchanges—namely Frankfurt (Entry
Standard), Dusseldorf (Der Mittelstandsmarkt), Munich (m:access), and Hannover/Hamburg
(Mittelstandsboerse)—followed suit. Yet, the requirements for bond emissions vary considerably
between the exchanges. While in Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, and Munich a minimum volume of
25 million Euros or 10 million Euros respectively is obligatory, Hannover/Hamburg and Frank-
furt accept any size of emission. Furthermore, a strict rating obligation only exists in Dusseldorf
and Munich. The Frankfurt and Stuttgart exchanges accept emissions without ratings for listed
companies while the Hannover/Hamburg exchange generally waives the rating obligation. De-
spite this heterogeneous institutional setting, Mittelstand bonds usually have certain common
characteristics. Mostly, these bonds have an issue volume of 15 to 150 million Euros, a maturity
of 3 to 10 years, and a ﬁxed coupon.
In our paper we deﬁne Mittelstand bonds as corporate bonds that are or were traded in the
respective segments on any one of the ﬁve stock exchanges. We hand-collect the International
Securities Identiﬁcation Numbers (ISINs) of the Mittelstand bonds from the homepages of the
ﬁve stock exchanges to form our data set. In sum, we derive a data set of 120 bonds in the period
from November 24, 2010, to July 15, 2015, with a total issue volume of more than 6 billion Euros.
Since the introduction of Mittelstand bonds, several issuers have declared insolvency. Analyzing
the bondm segment up to December 2012, Kammler and Ro¨der (2013) ﬁnd a total loss of capital
of 3.71% and a negative internal rate of return of−3.04% for investments into Mittelstand bonds.
Scho¨ning (2014) also uses bondm data to calculate the risk-adjusted interest rate for Mittelstand
bonds. He ﬁnds that the coupons of many bonds are well below the risk-adjusted value. In the
light of this development, the stock exchanges of Stuttgart and Dusseldorf decided to shut down
their segments for Mittelstand bonds. By contrast, Frankfurt’s Entry Standard continues to be
successful. In the ﬁrst half of 2015 four new bonds with a total volume of 220 million Euros
were issued.
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3.3.2 Yield spreads and corporate information
We use the ISINs of our sample of 120 Mittelstand bonds to match bond and ﬁrm-characteristic
data from four different sources. Daily data on the bid–ask spread, the clean price, and the yield
spread are obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. For our regression analysis we use the
yearly average of the daily yield spreads. Bond-speciﬁc and macroeconomic factors are crucial
for explaining the yield spread and the bond liquidity (Elton et al., 2001; Chakravarty and Sarkar,
1999; Campbell and Taksler, 2003). Therefore, we also download the time to maturity, the age of
the bond, the 1-year yield on German Bunds, and the term slope (difference in yields of 10-year
and 2-year German Bunds) from Datastream. Additionally, we estimate the bond volatility by
calculating the yearly standard deviation of the clean prices.
Default risk is another important bond characteristic (Longstaff et al., 2005). However, Mit-
telstand bonds are usually not rated by any of the three leading rating agencies but by smaller
German agencies instead. Hence, we collect the credit ratings from rating reports when they
are accessible on http://anleihen-ﬁnder.de, a website that provides data for most Mittelstand
bonds. When available, we use the bond rating, otherwise the credit rating of the issuing ﬁrm.
From the credit ratings, we construct the variable Rating Scale which codes a numeric value
to each rating class ranging from 1 for A (the best rating in our sample) to 15 for D (default).
Furthermore, we double check the ratings of bonds with a clean price below 80% at any point
during our sample period. We ﬁnd that the issuers of 24 bonds in our sample have bankrupted
throughout the observation period. We use the day they declared insolvency to manually change
the respective ratings to D.
However, as there is no general rating obligation on all ﬁve stock exchanges, not all ﬁrms and
bonds are rated. Since credit ratings are mostly derived from ﬁnancial ratios, accounting data can
provide similar insights into the default risk and the solvency of a ﬁrm. In particular, we consider
interest coverage, operating income to sales, long-term debt to assets, and debt to capital as
ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables (Campbell and Taksler, 2003). We deﬁne interest coverage as
EBIT plus interest divided by interest. Accounting data to calculate these performance measures
is obtained from Bureau van Dijk’s Dafne, a database with ﬁnancial information for more
than one million German companies. In the case that Dafne data was not available (i.e. for
non-German companies) we use Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus (via WRDS) as a second database
for ﬁnancial information. To avoid a potential forward-looking bias, we lag these ratios by one
year for our further analysis.
Furthermore, we exclude all bonds that defaulted during our sample period for our regression
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analysis to avoid a potential bias due to the non-linear increase in the yield spread of ﬁrms
that are close to default. We also exclude one bond with obviously incorrect clean prices in
Datastream. We ﬁnally disregard bonds for which no yield spread is available on Datastream and
callable bonds after the announcement of the exercise of the call since the clean price usually
equals the call price after the announcement. In sum, our ﬁnal sample comprises 92 German
Mittelstand bonds. We list all bonds of our ﬁnal sample and the main bond characteristics in
Table 3.8 in Appendix 3.6.1.
3.3.3 Bid–ask spread
As it describes the round-trip transaction costs for an immediate transaction, the bid–ask spread
is a canonical and commonly used measure of liquidity. We obtain data on daily composite
bid and ask prices from Datastream. These composite prices are calculated as the average of
all available contributors’ quotes. The (relative) bid–ask spread is the difference between the
ask and bid prices divided by the average of both prices. Yet, data to calculate this spread is
not always available. In particular in the beginning of our observation period, data on bid and
ask quotes is rare, since the coverage of ask prices in Datastream starts for most bonds only in
October 2013. For each bond, we estimate the average yearly bid–ask spread by calculating the
mean of all daily spreads, if at least one bid–ask spread is available in the respective bond-year.
3.3.4 LOT liquidity estimate
Our second measure of liquidity is based on the limited dependent variable model of Tobin
(1958) and Rosett (1959). Lesmond et al. (1999) use this model to estimate transaction costs
based on the frequency of zero returns of equity. In this paper, we refer to this measure as the
LOT liquidity estimate and calculate it in the version of Chen et al. (2007b) for corporate bonds.
In contrast to bid–ask spreads that are only available for a limited number of ﬁrms due to poor
data availability, the LOT liquidity estimate requires only the time series of daily returns to
endogenously estimate liquidity in terms of transaction costs on a ﬁrm level. In a nutshell, the
LOT liquidity estimate models illiquidity through the incidence of zero returns. In the presence
of transaction costs, not all information will be immediately priced. Only if the value of the
information exceeds the costs of trading, will a marginal investor trade on it. On the other hand,
if the value of the information is below the costs of trading, a marginal investor will refrain from
trading, causing a zero return. The LOT liquidity estimate is deﬁned as the difference between
the buy-side and sell-side transaction costs for a marginal investor. It is estimated by modeling
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α2, j
α1, j R
∗
j,t
R j,t
Figure 3.1 LOT liquidity estimate model. This graph details the relationship between the ‘true’ return
R∗j,t (on the x-axis) and the measured return R j,t (on the y-axis). The bold solid line depicts
the case of perfect information, the dashed line depicts the measured expected return that the
investors would price given uncertainty about the true return.
the return generating process of a bond and comparing the thereby computed ‘true’ returns with
observed bond returns. In particular, it estimates the buy-side and sell-side transaction costs
by observing the thresholds of the ‘true’ returns that lead to a trade, i.e. a non-zero observed
return.
Liquidity costs cause assets to have lower prices in order to compensate investors for illiquidity
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). In the case of bonds, the difference between the observed value
on the market and the intrinsic ‘true’ value is the liquidity premium (Amihud and Mendelson,
1986, 1987). Figure 3.1 illustrates the liquidity effects on bond returns. The bold line represents
the case of perfect information. In this instance, a marginal trader will only buy (sell) a bond j
at time t if she receives information about the bond that has a higher value than the buy-side
costs α2, j (sell-side costs α1, j). Therefore, the observed return R j,t is zero when the value of the
new information, i.e. the ‘true’ return R∗j,t , is between α1, j and α2, j. Only if the ‘true’ return R
∗
j,t
exceeds the buy-side costs α2, j (sell-side costs α1, j), does a marginal trader start trading and we
observe a return R j,t , which is the ‘true’ return R
∗
j,t reduced by the buy-side costs α2, j (sell-side
costs α1, j). Therefore, in the case of perfect information, we have the following relationship of
R j,t and R
∗
j,t :
R j,t = R
∗
j,t −α1, j if R∗j,t < α1, j and α1, j < 0
R j,t = 0 if α1, j ≤ R∗j,t ≤ α2, j (3.1)
R j,t = R
∗
j,t −α2, j if R∗j,t > α2, j and α2, j > 0.
To compute the liquidity cost threshold for each bond, we need a model for the ‘true’ return R∗j,t .
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Following the methodology of Chen et al. (2007b), we use a two-factor model to estimate the
‘true’ return of corporate bonds. The ﬁrst factor is the long-term interest rate and the second
factor the equity market return. This model accounts for the fact that corporate bonds are
essentially a hybrid between a risk-free bond and equity. In order to obtain stable estimation
coefﬁcients, the risk coefﬁcients are scaled by the duration D of the respective bond (see Jarrow,
1978). In particular, our two-factor model for the ‘true’ returns is
R∗j,t = β j,1D j,t ·∆R f ,t +β j,2D j,t ·∆DAXt + ε j,t , (3.2)
where ∆R f ,t is the daily change in the 10-year German Bunds rate and ∆DAXt is the daily return
on the DAX 30 composite stock index.
Since the error term ε j,t in model (3.2) introduces uncertainty about the ‘true’ return, the expected
return that investors price given the uncertainty about the ‘true’ return slightly differs from
equation (3.1). Rosett (1959) models the locus of this curve. The dashed line in Figure 3.1
illustrates the relationship of the measured return and the measured expected return in the case
of uncertainty.
With σ j being the (unknown) standard deviation of the error term ε j,t , we estimate the liquidity
cost thresholds α1, j and α2, j of each bond j in year t by maximizing the logarithm of the
likelihood function L(α1, j,α2, j,β j,1,β j,2,σ j | R j,t ,∆DAXt)
max
α1, j,α2, j,β j,1,β j,2,σ j
lnL= ∑
t∈R1
ln
1√
2piσ2j
− ∑
t∈R1
1
2σ2j
(R j,t +α1, j−β j,1D j,t ·∆R f ,t −β2,tD j,t ·∆DAXt)2
+ ∑
t∈R2
ln
1√
2piσ2j
− ∑
t∈R2
1
2σ2j
(R j,t +α2, j−β j,1D j,t ·∆R f ,t −β2,tD j,t ·∆DAXt)2
+ ∑
t∈R0
ln(Φ2, j−Φ1, j),
where R1 denotes the set of days with negative measured returns R j,t , R2 denotes the set of days
with positive measured returns R j,t , and R0 denotes the set of days with zero returns. The term
Φi, j represents the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution for each
bond-year evaluated at (αi, j−β j,1D j,t ·∆R f ,t −β j,2D j,t ·∆DAXt)/σ j. For purposes of liquidity
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estimation, the critical parameters of the limited dependent variable model are in the intercept
terms, α1, j and α2, j. We deﬁne the LOT liquidity estimate for bond j
LOT j = α2, j−α1, j
by the difference of the buy-side and the sell-side cost estimates per year.
Table 3.1 This table reports upon the number of bonds, average costs of sell trades (α1 j), buy trades (α2 j),
LOT liquidity estimate (α2 j−α1 j), and the t-statistics testing for zero LOT separated by year.
Year # Obs αˆ1 (%) αˆ2 (%) LOT (%) t(LOT)
2010 3 −0.093335 0.178805 0.272140 1.977116
2011 25 −0.338217 0.528104 0.866321 2.441339
2012 51 −0.113481 0.221435 0.334916 3.315454
2013 78 −0.273492 0.400965 0.674457 5.948445
2014 88 −0.712876 0.749138 1.462014 5.244218
2015 88 −0.859537 0.796175 1.655712 5.384455
Daily clean prices, duration, DAX index, and Bunds returns are obtained from Datastream.
Table 3.1 reports upon the number of bonds, the average sell-side and buy-side cost estimates,
the average LOT liquidity measure, and the average t-statistics testing for zero LOT per year.
The LOT liquidity estimates are signiﬁcantly different from zero in all years. The Spearman
correlation of the LOT liquidity measure and the bid–ask spreads is 65.7% over all bond-year
observations.
Notice that the LOT liquidity measure accounts for additional information from the return
generating process besides zero returns, such as commission costs, opportunity costs, and price
impact costs. Potential limitations of the LOT model occur in the case of no or too many zero
returns (more than 85%) within one year. In our sample the average yearly percentage of zero
returns of the cross-section of all bonds is 18.7%. Furthermore, our data contains at least one
zero return observation in each bond-year.
Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.6.2 presents a summary of all variables, their detailed meanings, and
their respective data sources.
3.4 Results
Before performing our main regression analysis on the yield spread determinants of Mittelstand
bonds, we commence this chapter presenting summary statistics of our sample and several tests
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regarding the consistency of our two liquidity measures.
3.4.1 Summary statistics
Table 3.2 reports upon summary statistics for the time-invariant bond characteristics and account-
ing data of the issuing ﬁrms of the Mittelstand bonds in our sample. The average issue volume
equals 46 million Euros and is small compared to common corporate bonds. Furthermore, the
bonds pay relatively high interest with an average coupon of 7.23%. However, the size of the
coupons varies noticeably and ranges from 2.00% (DF Deutsche Forfait AG) to 11.5% (Air
Berlin AG). In terms of maturity the bonds do not show much variation. A mean maturity of 5.21
years and a standard deviation of 0.08 years suggest that the bonds are relatively homogenous
in this property. Additionally, issuing ﬁrms’ accounting data at the emission date of the bonds
is presented. With −20.6 million Euros in 2011, Air Berlin AG has the lowest EBIT in our
sample. By contrast, Porr AG is highly proﬁtable with an EBIT of more than 88 million Euros.
Taking sales and total assets into account, the ﬁgures indicate that the ﬁrms in our sample
differ considerably in size and in proﬁtability. The same pattern can be observed with respect
to leverage. While some ﬁrms have a very low debt to assets ratio (Peach Property: 0.01),
other companies are deeply indebted (FC Schalke 04: 1.33). Yet, in the case of FC Schalke 04
the extremely high leverage mostly results from discretionary accounting policies such as the
non-capitalization of the fair value of the squad.
Further summary statistics on time-variant measures grouped by year are presented in Table 3.3.
The average yield spread and both liquidity measures—the bid–ask spread and the LOT liquidity
estimate—tend to increase over the sample period. The average bid–ask spread is particularly
high in 2011 (9.24%). However, data to calculate the spread is scarce at the beginning of the
sample period and thus there is only one ﬁrm with valid bid–ask spread data available in 2010
and 2011. Along with the yield spread and the liquidity measures the rating scale increases over
time. This is a ﬁrst indication that higher liquidity costs are reﬂected in higher yield spreads.
3.4.2 Bid–ask spread tests
The correlation of 65.7% between the bid–ask spread and the LOT liquidity estimate indicates a
relatively strong dependence between our two measures of liquidity. To conﬁrm the consistency
of these liquidity estimates we perform further tests. We regress the bid–ask spread on the LOT
liquidity estimate and control variables.
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Table 3.2 This table reports upon descriptive statistics of the Mittelstand bonds in the year of the emission of the bonds. We report the number of
observations (# Obs), the mean value of all bonds, the standard deviation (sd), skewness, kurtosis, minimum value (min), ﬁrst quartile
(q25), median value, third quartile (q75), and maximum value (max).
# Obs mean sd skewness kurtosis min q25 median q75 max
Volume (in thousands) 92 462,08.25 46,962.93 2.528 9.072 3455 20,000 30,000 50,000 225,000
Coupon (%) 92 7.27 1.05 −1.685 10.087 2.00 6.75 7.25 8.00 11.50
Maturity (years) 92 5.21 0.08 2.791 13.987 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 10.00
EBIT (in thousands) 67 1,255.38 41,194.29 −3.293 18.200 −206,336 −996.55 2,886.30 10,291.74 88,026
Total Assets (in thousands) 72 307,991.40 538,016.50 2.594 8.531 373.79 43,130.74 106,130.40 259,354.20 2,296,470
Sales (in thousands) 61 259,982 689,293.60 5.158 30.950 1,534 31,512.55 79,037 174,968 4,663,798
Debt to assets 64 0.47 0.22 0.735 5.934 0.01 0.36 0.47 0.57 1.33
5
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Table 3.3 This table reports upon summary statistics of the Mittelstand bonds separated by year. Yield
spread refers to the difference of a bond yield and an equivalent government benchmark.
Bid–ask spread is a proportional spread as described in Section 3.3.3. LOT equals the liquidity
estimate as described in Section 3.3.4. Rating scale assigns a numeric value to each rating
class starting with 1 for A up to 15 for D. Yield spreads are denoted in basis points (bp). # Obs
denotes the number of observations.
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Yield Spread (bp)
Mean 474.519 621.519 674.059 687.959 996.540 1236.411
# Obs 3 24 50 76 86 86
Bid–Ask Spread (%)
Mean 0.300 9.236 3.134 1.312 1.968 2.367
# Obs 1 1 5 67 85 85
LOT (%)
Mean 0.272 0.895 0.340 0.674 1.462 1.656
# Obs 3 24 50 78 88 88
Rating Scale
Mean 5.154 5.493 6.092 6.572 6.723
# Obs 0 13 39 61 70 71
Analyzing stock data from 1997 and 1998, Stoll (2000) ﬁnds expanding bid–ask spreads with
increasing volatility of stock returns. Furthermore, Brandt and Kavajecz (2004) emphasize the
importance of bond volatility in explaining liquidity costs in the US Treasury market. Thus,
we include bond volatility as a control variable. Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999) use further
bond characteristics to identify determinants of the bid–ask spreads of corporate, municipal, and
government bonds. They argue that the age of the bond and credit risk are positively related to
the spread. Sarig and Warga (1989) argue that bonds become less liquid with time and therefore
use the age of the bond as a measure of liquidity. Their results support the hypothesis of a
positive relationship between the age of the bond and the yield spread. Hence, we also include
the age of the bond as bond-speciﬁc control and use the variable Rating Scale to capture the
effect of credit risk.
We analyze the bid–ask spread by a ﬁxed effects panel regression as follows:
Bid–Ask Spreadi,t = η0+η1LOT i,t +η2Bond Volatilityi,t
+η3Agei,t +η4Rating Scalei,t + εt ,
where the subscript i, t denotes bond i in year t. We ﬁrst regress the bid–ask spread on the LOT
liquidity estimate only and second on the LOT liquidity estimate including the control variables.
The results are reported in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 3.4.
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Table 3.4 This table reports upon liquidity measure tests. The dependent variable is the bid–ask spread in
the ﬁrst and the second model and the yield spread in the third and the fourth model. We apply
ﬁxed effects panel regressions and cluster the standard errors at bond level. (B) indicates that
we use the bid–ask spread and (L) the LOT liquidity estimate as explanatory liquidity measure.
The absolute value of t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at a
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Bid–Ask Spread Yield Spread
(L) (L) (B) (L)
Bid–Ask Spread 269.24**
(2.45)
LOT 0.56*** 0.51** 197.53***
(3.23) (2.06) (3.07)
Bond Volatility 0.09***
(3.38)
Age of the bond 0.22**
(2.03)
Rating Scale 0.14
(0.93)
Constant 1.38*** 0.93 444.90** 686.13***
(7.49) (0.97) (2.04) (9.60)
# Obs 244 192 239 325
F-Statistic 10.42 6.65 5.98 9.45
Within R2 0.55 0.68 0.55 0.43
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The ﬁrst model suggests a highly signiﬁcant positive relationship between both liquidity mea-
sures. According to the within R2 the LOT liquidity estimate explains 55% of the variation of
the bid–ask spread. This result is robust to adding control variables in the next model. In line
with the above literature, higher bond volatility and higher age of the bond is associated with
higher bid–ask spreads. However, the rating is insigniﬁcant in our sample.
3.4.3 Yield spread determinants of Mittelstand bonds
Having conﬁrmed the consistency of our liquidity measures, we now move on with our main
analysis—the examination of whether illiquidity in fact explains part of the yield spread variation
in our sample.
To gain more preliminary insight into the relationship of the yield spread and our liquidity
measures, we directly regress the yield spread on the bid–ask spread and the LOT liquidity
estimate, respectively. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 3.4. The
coefﬁcients of both liquidity estimates are positive and signiﬁcant at a 1% level. The regressions
including the bid–ask spread and the LOT liquidity estimate show a within R2 of 55% and 43%,
respectively, and thus, a high explanatory power regarding the variation of the yield spreads.
This suggests that higher liquidity costs are indeed associated with higher yield spreads.
However, these preliminary ﬁndings neglect that there are other determinants for the yield spread
that might affect the outcome of the regressions. In order to add rigor to our results, we include
an array of bond-speciﬁc, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and macroeconomic control variables that are other
well-documented determinants of yield spreads.
Default risk is the most prominent determinant of the yield spread. Longstaff et al. (2005)
analyze a comprehensive data set on credit default swaps and corresponding bond price data and
point out that default risk accounts for the majority of the yield spread. Depending on the credit
rating, between 51% and 83% of the yield spread can be explained by default risk. Hence, we
add the variable Rating Scale to capture this effect in our regression. Yet, approximately 23% of
our bonds are not rated. Therefore, we include accounting ratios to measure the effect of the
default risk for these bonds, too. Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that while high values of
the interest coverage and the income to sales ratio suggest healthy companies, the opposite is
true for the two other accounting ratios. Long-term debt to assets and debt to capital describe
the leverage of a company. Since highly leveraged ﬁrms are more likely to default, we expect
the former two accounting variables to be negatively and the latter two to be positively related to
the yield spread. Complete accounting ratios are available for only 57% of our observations,
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however. Nevertheless, we can increase our sample, as there are 44 bond-years without rating
but with accounting data.
Campbell and Taksler (2003) document a positive relationship between the time to maturity
and the yield spread for investment grade bonds. Chen et al. (2007b) conﬁrm this effect for
investment grade bonds. Yet they ﬁnd the opposite effect for speculative grade bonds. To control
for this potential inﬂuence we include time to maturity as a control variable in our regression
analysis.
Furthermore, the general economic growth plays an important role. Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995) argue that increases in the spot rates cause a steeper risk-neutral drift term in the ﬁrm
value process. Therefore, the probability of default of the ﬁrm decreases (see e.g. Merton, 1974)
and thus the yield spreads decrease, too. Hence, we add the rate on 1-year German Bunds, our
proxy for the risk-free interest rate, as a control variable and expect it to be negatively associated
with the yield spread. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) argue that the term structure of the yield
curve has an effect on the yield spread as well. A decreasing term slope indicates an expected
weaker economy and therefore lower recovery rates. In turn, we expect this to lead to higher
yield spreads. Thus, we include the term slope as an additional control variable.
We specify our general regression model as follows:
Yield Spreadi,t = η0+η1Liquidityi,t +η2Maturityi,t +η3Government Bondi,t
+η4Term Slopei,t +η5Rating Scalei,t +η6Income/Salesi,t−1
+η7Debt/Assetsi,t−1+η8Interest Coveragei,t−1
+η9Debt/Capitali,t−1+ εt ,
where the subscript i, t denotes bond i in year t and Liquidity refers to either the bid–ask spread
or the LOT liquidity estimate, respectively.
We apply three different regression models for each liquidity estimate. Model 1 includes
credit rating but not accounting data. Model 2 includes both credit rating and accounting data.
Model 3 includes accounting data but not credit rating. Considering the availability of rating and
accounting data in our overall sample, Model 1 maintains the largest sample whereas Model 2
has the smallest sample. We run each model for our two liquidity measure speciﬁcations, bid–ask
spread and LOT liquidity estimate. Using the LOT liquidity estimate maintains larger sample
sizes compared to the bid–ask spread due to better data availability. The results of the regressions
are presented in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.5 This table reports upon panel regression results with yield spread as dependent variable and
ﬁxed effects. Standard errors are clustered at bond level. (B) indicates that we use the bid–ask
spread and (L) the LOT liquidity estimate as explanatory liquidity measure. The absolute
values of the t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance at a 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
(B) (L) (B) (L) (B) (L)
Bid–Ask Spread 319.48*** 579.83*** 641.42***
(3.17) (4.90) (5.60)
LOT 203.68*** 201.41*** 264.95***
(3.28) (2.76) (3.00)
Time to Maturity −70.95 78.09 394.18 136.33 −244.91 35.51
(0.13) (0.96) (0.63) (1.02) (0.56) (0.36)
Government Bond −48.56 −223.00 −535.33 −316.60 −1862.36 −223.52
(0.03) (1.37) (0.21) (1.26) (0.92) (1.30)
Term Slope 107.53 −303.83 −782.24 −818.78 574.39 −952.95*
(0.06) (1.56) (0.38) (1.60) (0.39) (1.93)
Rating Scale 303.61* 301.12*** 483.37*** 318.12***
(1.96) (2.99) (3.23) (2.80)
Income to Sales −89.57 −63.91 −237.32 −147.85
(0.70) (0.94) (1.25) (1.54)
Debt to Assets −687.59 38.80 −855.18 −11.66
(0.92) (0.05) (1.04) (0.02)
Interest Coverage 32.77 −5.63 38.48 −5.82***
(0.90) (0.83) (0.95) (3.07)
Debt to Capital 145.47 −81.56 2728.49 703.78
(0.10) (0.12) (1.38) (0.90)
Constant −1517.63 −1126.31 −3339.77** −630.79 −1721.13 1251.83**
(1.20) (1.50) (2.08) (0.84) (0.92) (2.45)
# Obs 187 248 106 148 132 188
F-Statistic 7.02 4.56 7.53 3.18 8.91 3.83
Within R2 0.71 0.59 0.82 0.60 0.75 0.58
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Table 3.6 This table reports upon panel regression results with yield spread as dependent variable and ﬁxed effects. Accounting variables are
added one by one. Standard errors are clustered at bond level. (B) indicates that we use the bid–ask spread and (L) the LOT liquidity
estimate as explanatory liquidity measure. The absolute values of the t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote signiﬁcance
at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(B) (L) (B) (L) (B) (L) (B) (L)
Bid–Ask Spread 623.40*** 370.14** 374.45*** 405.95***
(6.10) (2.50) (2.77) (2.82)
LOT 261.36*** 264.09*** 274.37*** 277.69***
(3.00) (2.98) (3.14) (3.04)
Time to Maturity −469.26 −10.55 −539.25*** 50.40 −1157.65* 25.31 −481.55*** 84.82
(0.89) (0.14) (2.93) (0.54) (1.82) (0.33) (2.87) (0.94)
Government Bond −2377.79 −25.47 −933.08 −119.20 −5021.13* −262.14 −826.68 −99.99
(0.97) (0.17) (0.89) (0.83) (1.90) (1.50) (0.82) (0.72)
Term Slope 1195.04 −925.46* 641.72 −979.41** 3167.37 −909.53* 560.14 −1005.60**
(0.68) (1.98) (1.13) (2.11) (1.54) (1.95) (1.04) (2.23)
Income to Sales −99.99 −189.38**
(1.52) (2.17)
Debt to Assets 554.89 247.00
(0.69) (0.61)
Interest Coverage −25.60 −6.43**
(1.52) (2.49)
Debt to Capital 1724.20** 820.53
(2.49) (1.49)
Constant 159.20 1914.35*** 1145.90 1618.96*** 586.40 1750.09*** −112.16 946.20**
(0.25) (4.09) (1.29) (4.35) (0.92) (4.10) (0.12) (2.06)
# Obs 140 197 144 202 139 196 158 221
F-Statistic 10.79 4.28 8.28 3.33 9.27 4.15 9.41 3.51
Within R2 0.73 0.56 0.63 0.55 0.65 0.57 0.63 0.52
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The liquidity estimates are highly signiﬁcant in each model irrespective of whether credit rating,
accounting variables, or all control variables are used. We ﬁnd that the results are consistent
for both liquidity estimates. In each model the coefﬁcients of the bid–ask spread and the LOT
liquidity estimate are positive and signiﬁcant at a 1% level. A higher value of the liquidity
measures indicates higher liquidity costs. Hence, our results do indeed support our main
hypothesis that lower bond liquidity is associated with a higher yield spread for Mittelstand
bonds.
The economic signiﬁcance varies slightly between the liquidity estimates. The ﬁrst model
suggests that a 1% increase of the bid–ask spread is related to an incremental 3.19% increase
in the yield spread. When using the LOT liquidity estimate instead the associated incremental
increase of the yield spread only equals 2.04%. While the coefﬁcient of the bid–ask spread
increases in the second model after adding the accounting data the coefﬁcient of the LOT
liquidity estimate remains at a similar level compared to the ﬁrst model. Yet, the coefﬁcients on
both liquidity estimates show the highest values in Model 3, in which accounting data instead
of the rating information is included. Here, we can report that a 1% increase in the bid–ask
spread (LOT liquidity measure) is related to an incremental 6.41% (2.65%) increase in the yield
spreads. Comparing our results to the results of Chen et al. (2007b), we observe that the effect of
the liquidity measures for Mittelstand bonds is approximately twice as strong as for speculative
grade US corporate bonds and four to eight times as pronounced as for investment grade US
corporate bonds.
Credit rating, one of our proxies for the default risk, is also highly signiﬁcant. In both Models 1
and 2, and also for both liquidity speciﬁcations, a higher rating scale, and thus a higher default
risk, is associated with a higher yield spread. In each model and each speciﬁcation the coefﬁcient
of rating scale is positive indicating that a rating downgrade by one step is related to an increase
of the yield spread by 3.00% to 4.90%. All other control variables are insigniﬁcant in Models
1 and 2. Yet, in the LOT liquidity speciﬁcation of Model 3, term slope and interest coverage
are signiﬁcant. Consistent with Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) the sign of term slope is negative.
Interest coverage is also negatively related with the yield spread. As a high interest coverage
suggests high ﬁnancial performance and solvency, this result is intuitive. To further detail the
effect of the accounting variables we modify Model 3 and include the accounting variables one
by one. The results are presented in Table 3.6. Using bid–ask spread as the liquidity measure
speciﬁcation, debt to capital is the only signiﬁcant accounting control variable. On the other
hand, regressing the yield spread on the LOT liquidity estimate plus the control variables shows
that while the accounting variables related to the ﬁrm performance (interest coverage and income
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to sales) are as expected negatively signiﬁcant, both leverage ratios are insigniﬁcant.
Both liquidity measures provide high explanatory power regarding the yield spread of Mittelstand
bonds. The values of the within R2 range from 71% to 82% for the bid–ask spread and from
58% to 60% for LOT liquidity estimate. We observe higher within R2 for regressions using the
bid–ask spread compared to the LOT liquidity estimate. In particular, in Model 2 the bid–ask
spread explains in combination with the other control variables 82% of the variation of the yield
spread. Using the same control variables, the LOT liquidity estimate provides a within R2 of
60% and thus, slightly lower explanatory power.
3.4.4 Simultaneous equation model tests
To control for potential endogeneity biases we apply a simultaneous equation model. A possible
source of endogeneity are the liquidity estimates. In particular, liquidity costs could be inﬂuenced
by credit rating. Credit quality is a main driver of adverse selection costs due to private
information in the context of corporate bonds. Assuming that private information problems are
more severe for bonds with a higher default risk indicates that bonds with a lower credit rating
should incorporate higher private information costs. Private information costs, in turn, are a
determinant of the liquidity costs. Thus a lower credit rating might lead to lower bond liquidity.
Furthermore, the credit rating itself could be a second source of endogeneity. Rating agencies
might not only consider accounting data to assess the quality of a bond but also account for
market information observed through the yield spread. Hence, a higher yield spread could result
in a lower credit rating.
To recognize that the liquidity and the credit rating might be determined endogenously we
specify a system of three equations as follows:
Yield Spreadi,t = η0+η1Liquidityi,t +η2Maturityi,t +η3Government Bondi,t
+η4Term Slopei,t +η5Rating Scalei,t + εt
Liquidityi,t = η0+η1Bond Volatilityi,t +η2Rating Scalei,t
+η3Yield Spreadi,t + εt
Rating Scalei,t = η0+η1Income/Salesi,t−1+η2Debt/Assetsi,t−1
+η3Interest Coveragei,t−1+η4Debt/Capitali,t−1
+η5Yield Spreadi,t + εt
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where the subscript i, t denote bond i in year t and Liquidity refers to the bid–ask spread or the
LOT liquidity estimate. As both the liquidity measures and the credit rating are endogenous in
our framework, we use a three-stage least squares estimation technique to examine how these
variables simultaneously impact the yield spread. The results are presented in Table 3.7. We
estimate a separate model for each liquidity measure. The ﬁrst column of each model shows a
GLS-type estimation using the yield spread as dependent variable and the instrumented values
instead of the endogenous variables. The last two columns represent the ﬁrst-stage regression of
the endogenous variables.
The results highlight that a possible bias due to endogeneity does not affect the previously exam-
ined relationship between liquidity and yield spread. In our sample the ﬁrst-stage regressions
cannot conﬁrm an inﬂuence of the credit rating on the liquidity measures. However, the yield
spread is signiﬁcantly associated with both liquidity estimates. Regressing the rating scale on
the yield spread and other variables also indicates that a higher yield spread is related to a higher
rating scale and thus a lower bond quality. Nonetheless, when accounting for these endogeneities
using the simultaneous equation model we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcients of both liquidity measures
remain positive and signiﬁcant at 1% level in the third-stage regressions. Therefore, after con-
trolling for potential endogeneity bias we can indeed conclude that lower liquidity leads to a
higher yield spread for the Mittelstand bonds.
Credit rating has a positive sign in the third stage of both models, yet, the coefﬁcients are
insigniﬁcant. Moreover, none of the other control variables is signiﬁcantly associated with the
yield spread. The R2 indicates that 65% of the variation in the yield spread can be explained by
Model (B). However, performing the same regression with the LOT liquidity estimate instead of
the bid–ask spread only explains 5% of the variation.
3.5 Conclusion
The decision on the capital structure is critical for ﬁrms all over the world. US ﬁrms frequently
tap capital markets to raise money and cover only one quarter of their funding requirements
with traditional bank loans. By contrast, the German Mittelstand relied heavily on loans via
relationship banking. Yet, in the light of tighter regulation, a trend towards other funding sources
is clearly observable. Issuing bonds is a promising option to structure debt for Mittelstand
ﬁrms.
Since the launch of the Mittelstand bonds market in 2010, yield spreads have increased steadily.
In the next few years many of the early issued bonds will mature. Therefore, the near future
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Table 3.7 This table reports upon simultaneous equation tests using three-stage least squared regressions.
The instrumental variable indicates the dependent variable of each regression. The ﬁrst column
of each model represents a GLS-type estimation using the instrumented values instead of the
endogenous regressors. The last two columns represent the ﬁrst-stage regression. (B) indicates
that we use the bid–ask spread and (L) the LOT liquidity estimate as explanatory liquidity
measure. The absolute values of the t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote
signiﬁcance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Model (B) Model (L)
Instrumental Yield Bid–Ask Rating Yield
LOT
Rating
Variable Spread Spread Scale Spread Scale
Bid–Ask Spread 573.68***
(4.92)
LOT 729.52***
(4.42)
Time to Maturity 3.72 −2.67
(0.09) (0.12)
Government Bond −767.65 −176.39
(0.63) (0.56)
Term Slope −248.24 87.00
(0.60) (0.35)
Rating Scale 54.92 −0.10 91.64 −0.13
(0.54) (0.63) (0.81) (0.88)
Bond Volatility 0.11*** 0.02
(2.90) (0.58)
Yield Spread 1.03E−3*** 1.35E−3*** 1.30E−3*** 1.76E−3***
(4.86) (4.61) (4.45) (6.39)
Interest Coverage −0.07 0.03
(0.80) (0.77)
Income to Sales 0.06 −0.07
(0.21) (0.26)
Debt to Assets −2.61*** −0.97
(2.77) (1.34)
Debt to Capital 3.71*** 2.49***
(2.91) (2.64)
Constant −64.13 0.92 3.47*** −410.00 0.50 2.94***
(0.08) (1.13) (3.42) (0.73) (0.65) (4.10)
# Obs 106 106 106 148 148 148
R2 0.65 0.67 0.35 0.05 0.19 0.18
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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will show whether Mittelstand ﬁrms will be able to reschedule their debt. Rescheduling debt
requires issuing new bonds to pay back the existing bond. The new bonds, however, will require
a coupon that is adjusted to the contemporaneous level of the yield spread. Pessimists claim that
given the current level of yield spreads, many Mittelstand ﬁrms will not be able to afford such
new bonds. Moreover, with the default of more Mittelstand bonds, the perceived risk of this
investment class will increase, increasing the yield spreads further and thus closing the vicious
circle.
Our research provides important insights into this debate. We show that the effect of illiquidity
on the yield spread is especially pronounced for Mittelstand bonds. This ﬁnding could open a
back door towards the future of Mittelstand bonds. While, given a ﬁxed investment and operating
policies, default risk of Mittelstand ﬁrms is mostly exogenous3, liquidity is endogenous for the
ﬁrms. As an example, ﬁrms could increase the liquidity of their bonds by decreasing the adverse
selection costs due to private information, for instance by more timely and comprehensive
reporting. As our research shows, even small increases in the liquidity of Mittelstand bonds can
lead to substantial decreases in the yield spreads.
3Notice that as discussed in Section 3.3.1 Mittelstand ﬁrms are very reluctant to increase their equity on public
markets in order to not dilute the founding family’s ownership and control rights.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 List of all Mittelstand bonds
Table 3.8 This table reports upon characteristics of all German Mittelstand bonds om our ﬁnal sample.
ISIN Borrower Name Maturity
(years)
Coupon
(%)
Volume (in
thousands)
Issue Date
AT0000A0U9J2 Scholz AG 5 8.5 182,500 03/08/12
AT0000A0XJ15 Porr AG 4 6.25 50,000 12/04/12
AT0000A185Y1 UBM
Realita¨tenentwicklung AG
5 4.875 200,000 07/09/14
DE000A11QGQ1 KTG Agrar AG 5 7.25 50,000 10/15/14
DE000A11QHZ0 HanseYachts AG 5 8 20,000 06/03/14
DE000A11QJA9 Vedes AG 5 7.125 20,000 06/24/14
DE000A12T1W6 Beate Uhse AG 5 7.75 30,000 07/09/14
DE000A12UAA8 KSW Immobilien GmbH
& Co. KG
5 6.5 25,000 10/07/14
DE000A12UD98 Studierendengesellschaft
Witten Herdecke EV
10 3.6 7,500 12/02/14
DE000A13SAD4 Neue ZWL Zahnradwerk
Leipzig GmbH
6 7.5 25,000 02/17/15
DE000A161F97 Katjes International
GmbH & Co. KG
5 5.5 60,000 05/15/15
DE000A1CR0X3 Albis Leasing AG 5 7.625 50,000 10/04/11
DE000A1ELQU9 KTG Agrar AG 5 6.75 50,000 06/01/09
DE000A1EWGX1 Duerr AG 5 7.25 225,000 09/28/10
DE000A1EWL99 Nabaltec AG 5 6.5 30,000 10/15/10
DE000A1EWNF4 Hahn Immobilien
Beteiligungs AG
5 6.25 20,000 10/01/12
DE000A1G9AQ4 Enterprise Holdings LTD 5 7 35,000 09/26/12
DE000A1H3EY2 MAG IAS GmbH 5 7.5 50,000 02/08/11
DE000A1H3F20 Albert Reiff GmbH & Co.
KG
5 7.25 30,000 05/27/11
DE000A1H3GE9 Joh. Friedrich Behrens AG 5 8 30,000 03/15/11
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continued.
ISIN Borrower Name Maturity
(years)
Coupon
(%)
Volume (in
thousands)
Issue Date
DE000A1H3J67 German Pellets GmbH 5 7.25 75,000 04/01/11
DE000A1H3V53 ENO Energy GmbH 5 7.375 25,000 06/30/11
DE000A1H3VN9 KTG Agrar AG 6 7.125 200,000 06/06/11
DE000A1H3YJ1 Semper Idem Underberg
GmbH
5 7.125 70,000 04/20/11
DE000A1H3YK9 Valensina GmbH 5 7.375 85,000 04/28/11
DE000A1HJLL6 S&T AG 5 7.25 15,000 05/22/13
DE000A1HLTD2 Metalcorp Group BV 5 8.75 50,000 06/27/13
DE000A1HPZD0 VST Building
Technologies AG
6 8.5 15,000 10/02/13
DE000A1HSNV2 Porr AG 5 6.25 50,000 11/26/13
DE000A1K0169 Bastei Luebbe GmbH &
Co. KG
5 6.75 30,000 10/26/11
DE000A1K0FA0 Eyemaxx Real Estate AG 5 7.5 25,000 07/26/11
DE000A1K0FF9 GIF Gesellschaft fu¨r
Industrieforschung MBH
5 8.5 3,455 09/20/11
DE000A1K0NJ5 MITEC Automotive AG 5 7.75 50,000 03/30/12
DE000A1K0QA7 Royalbeach Spielwaren
und Sportartikel Vertriebs
GmbH
5 8.125 25,000 10/28/11
DE000A1K0SE5 Textilkontor Walter
Seidensticker GmbH
6 7.25 30,000 03/12/12
DE000A1K0U44 Procar Automobile Finanz
Holding GmbH & Co. KG
5 7.75 12,000 10/14/11
DE000A1KQ367 Uniwheels Property
Germany GmbH
5 7.5 44499 04/19/11
DE000A1KQ3C2 Senivita Sozial
Gemeinnuetzige GmbH
5 6.5 15,000 05/17/11
DE000A1KQ8K4 Peach Property Group
Deutschland GmbH
5 6.6 50,000 07/18/11
DE000A1KQZL5 MS Spaichingen GmbH 5 7.25 23,000 07/15/11
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continued.
ISIN Borrower Name Maturity
(years)
Coupon
(%)
Volume (in
thousands)
Issue Date
DE000A1KRBM2 Katjes International
GmbH & Co. KG
5 7.125 45,000 07/19/11
DE000A1MA9E1 Golﬁno AG 5 7.25 12,000 04/05/12
DE000A1MASJ4 Singulus Technologies AG 5 7.75 60,000 03/23/12
DE000A1ML257 KTG Energie AG 6 7.25 50,000 09/28/12
DE000A1ML4T7 Fussballclub
Gelsenkirchen Schalke 04
EV
7 6.75 35,000 06/11/12
DE000A1MLSJ1 Ekosem-Agrar GmbH 5 8.75 50,000 03/23/12
DE000A1MLWH7 Eyemaxx Real Estate AG 5.56 7.75 15,000 04/11/12
DE000A1MLYJ9 Friedola Gebr Holzapfel
GmbH
5 7.25 13,000 04/11/12
DE000A1PGQL4 BDT Media Automation
GmbH
5 8.125 17,380 10/09/12
DE000A1PGQR1 Rene Lezard Mode GmbH 5 7.25 15,000 11/26/12
DE000A1PGRG2 Travel24 com AG 5 7.5 25,000 09/17/12
DE000A1PGUT9 posterXXL AG 5 7.25 15,000 07/27/12
DE000A1PGWZ2 Steilmann Boecker
Fashion Point GmbH &
Co. KG
5 6.75 40,000 06/27/12
DE000A1R07C3 Constantin Medien AG 5 7 65,000 04/23/13
DE000A1R07G4 Deutsche Rohstoff AG 5 8 100,000 07/11/13
DE000A1R09H8 Timeless Homes GmbH 7 9 10,000 07/02/13
DE000A1R0RZ5 Ekosem-Agrar GmbH 6 8.5 78,000 12/07/12
DE000A1R0VD4 Homann Holzwerkstoffe
GmbH
5 7 100,000 12/14/12
DE000A1R0YA4 Rudolf Woehrl AG 5 6.5 30,000 02/12/13
DE000A1R1A42 Adler Real Estate AG 5 8.75 35,000 04/03/13
DE000A1R1BR4 Alno AG 5 8.5 45,000 05/14/13
DE000A1R1CC4 DF Deutsche Fortfait AG 7 2 30,000 05/27/13
DE000A1RE1V3 Berentzen Gruppe AG 5 6.5 50,000 10/18/12
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ISIN Borrower Name Maturity
(years)
Coupon
(%)
Volume (in
thousands)
Issue Date
DE000A1RE5T8 Laurel GmbH 5 7.125 20,000 11/16/12
DE000A1RE7P2 Jacob Stauder GmbH &
Co. KG
5 7.5 10,000 11/23/12
DE000A1RE8B0 Euroboden GmbH 5 7.375 15,000 07/16/13
DE000A1REWV2 Karlsberg Brauerei GmbH 5 7.375 30,000 09/28/12
DE000A1REXA4 Eterna Mode Holding
GmbH
5 8 55,000 10/09/12
DE000A1RFBP5 Immobilien Projekt
Salamander Areal
Kornwestheim
7 6.75 30,000 12/06/12
DE000A1TM2T3 Eyemaxx Real Estate AG 6 7.875 15,000 03/26/13
DE000A1TM8Z7 Stern Immobilien AG 5 6.25 20,000 05/23/13
DE000A1TNA70 Sanha GmbH Co. & KG 5 7.75 37,500 06/04/13
DE000A1TNAP7 German Pellets GmbH 5 7.25 72,000 07/09/13
DE000A1TND44 More & More AG 5 8.125 13,000 06/11/13
DE000A1TND93 Paragon AG 5 7.25 20,000 07/02/13
DE000A1TNFX0 Peine GmbH 5 8 15,000 07/05/13
DE000A1TNG90 Karlie Group GmbH 5 6.75 30,000 06/25/13
DE000A1TNGG3 Cloud NO 7 GmbH 4 6 35,000 07/03/13
DE000A1TNHC0 Bioenergie Taufkirchen
GmbH & Co. KG
7 6.5 15,000 07/30/13
DE000A1TNJY0 Gamigo AG 5 8.5 15,000 06/20/13
DE000A1X3HZ2 Helma Eigenheimbau AG 5 5.875 35,000 09/19/13
DE000A1X3MA5 Alfmeier Praezision
Baugruppen und
Systemloesungen AG
5 7.5 30,000 10/29/13
DE000A1X3MD9 Gebr. Sanders GmbH &
Co. KG
5 8.75 18,000 10/22/13
DE000A1X3MS7 Sympatex Holding GmbH 5 8 13,000 12/03/13
DE000A1X3VZ3 Ferratum Capital Germany
GmbH
5 8 25,000 10/21/13
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continued.
ISIN Borrower Name Maturity
(years)
Coupon
(%)
Volume (in
thousands)
Issue Date
DE000A1YC1F9 Neue ZWL Zahnradwerk
Leipzig GmbH
5 7.5 25,000 03/04/14
DE000A1YC7Y7 GEWA 5 TO 1 GmbH &
Co. KG
4 6.5 35,000 03/24/14
DE000A1YCRD0 Hoermann Finance GmbH 5 6.25 50,000 12/05/13
DE000A1ZWPT5 Enterprise Holdings LTD 5 7 85,000 03/30/15
DE000AB100A6 Air Berlin PLC 5 8.5 200,000 11/10/10
DE000AB100B4 Air Berlin PLC 7 8.25 225,000 04/19/11
DE000AB100C2 Air Berlin PLC 3 11.5 150,000 11/01/11
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3.6.2 List of all variables
Table 3.9 This table describes the variables employed in our study.
Variable Name Abbreviation Description Data Source
Age of the Bond Age Time period since the issuance of the
bond (in years)
Datastream
Bid–Ask Spread Bid–Ask
Spread
Calculated as the ask quote minus the
bid quote divided by the average of
both quotes
Datastream
Bond Volatility Bond Volatil-
ity
Yearly standard deviation of the clean
prices of the bond
Datastream
DAX Return ∆DAX Daily return on the DAX 30 composite
stock index
Datastream
Debt to Assets Debt / Assets Long-term debt to assets Dafne /
Amadeus
Debt to Capital Debt / Capital Total debt to capital Dafne /
Amadeus
Duration D Modiﬁed Duration to ﬁnal date Datastream
Government
Bond
Government
Bond
1-year German Bunds rate Datastream
Income to Sales Income / Sales Operating income to sales Dafne /
Amadeus
Interest
Coverage
Interest Cover-
age
EBIT plus interest to interest Dafne /
Amadeus
LOT Liquidity
Estimate
LOT Liquidity measure based on Lesmond
et al. (1999)
Datastream
Rating Scale Rating Scale Numeric value for each rating class
ranging from 1 for A (the best rating in
our sample) to 15 for D (default)
Rating
Reports
Risk-free Bond R f ,t 10-year German Bunds rate Datastream
Term Slope Term Slope Difference in rates of 10-year and
2-year German Bunds
Datastream
Time to
Maturity
Maturity Remaining life of a Mittelstand bond Datastream
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continued.
Variable Name Abbreviation Description Data Source
Yield Spread Yield Spread Spread of the yield of a Mittelstand
bond over an equivalent government
benchmark bond
Datastream
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Chapter 4
Pricing in the online invoice trading market: First empirical
evidence.
This research project is joint work with Gregor Dorfleitner and Jaqueline Rad. The paper has
been published as: Gregor Dorﬂeitner, Jacqueline Rad and Martina Weber (2017), Pricing in the
online invoice trading market: First empirical evidence, Economics Letters 161, 56-61.
Abstract In recent years, online invoice trading has gained importance in providing SMEs with
short-term ﬁnancing. In this paper, we present ﬁrst empirical evidence concerning the question
whether the risk of payment difﬁculties is appropriately reﬂected in the pricing variables.
To this end, we investigate predictors of default of online invoice trading platforms. We
analyze both the probability of default and the loss rate and ﬁnd that the interest rate, the
duration and the percentage funded have good predictive power. Furthermore, we show that the
pricing mechanism (auction vs. ﬁxed prices) helps to explain defaults on online invoice trading
platforms.
Keywords Invoice trading, Factoring, FinTech, MarketInvoice, auction, efﬁciency, PD fore-
cast
JEL Classification G21, G23, L31, M14
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4.1 Introduction
Invoice trading is a fast and easy way in which small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
can raise short-term debt by pre-ﬁnancing their outstanding invoices through individual or
institutional investors. In this study, we empirically analyze whether the risk of payment
difﬁculties is appropriately reﬂected in the prices of online invoice trading platforms. To this end,
we use a novel data set stemming from an invoice trading platform to investigate which factors
predict defaults, i.e. events in which the investors do not fully receive the invested amount plus
interest rate.
SMEs often face difﬁculties in obtaining sufﬁcient sources of ﬁnancing. In addition to the
traditional factoring market and other forms of ﬁnancing such as bank loans and overdraft
facilities, online invoice trading platforms can help SMEs to raise working capital. Generally,
these web-based platforms are hosted by FinTechs. In recent years, the market for online invoice
trading has grown substantially. In the UK, the market volume more than tripled between
2013 and 2015 (Zhang et al., 2016). While in 2013 the volume amounted to £97m, the market
exceeded this ﬁgure considerably with nearly £325m in 2015. From a global perspective, online
invoice trading is likely to continue to grow further.
We are the ﬁrst to analyze this new market of invoice trading on web-based platforms. We use
data of the world’s largest invoice trading platform MarketInvoice henceforth also called the
platform, which is based in the UK. To investigate the determinants of repayment difﬁculties, we
focus on crystallized losses and the loss rate of the invoices and apply both logit and tobit models.
We ﬁnd that the interest rate, the duration and the percentage of the invoice funded are related to
the default probability. Within our observation period, the platform applies two different market
mechanisms to set the prices of the invoices, namely an auction and a ﬁxed-price mechanism. We
show that the default probability is lower within the ﬁxed-price regime. However, the gross yield
as well as the return for investors are higher within the auction period. On online invoice trading
platforms, an invoice is generally sold to several investors. Hence, our study also contributes to
the growing amount of literature upon different forms of crowdfunding.
4.2 Related literature
In general, factoring is a short-term supply of ﬁnancing whereby companies sell their accounts
receivables at a discount in exchange for immediate cash. In recourse factoring and usually also
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in invoice trading, the buyer pre-ﬁnances the invoice but does not resume the credit risk for a
potential default of the invoice.
Klapper (2006) states that factoring is a growing source of ﬁnancing for SMEs all around the
world. However, she ﬁnds evidence proving that the factoring market is larger in countries with
good economic development and growth as well as in countries with a sound provision of credit
information on companies. Soufani (2002b) focuses on the UK factoring market and examines
parameters inﬂuencing the decision of factoring companies to purchase accounts receivables.
Additionally, Soufani (2002a) investigates the choice of companies to use factoring as a source
of ﬁnancing.
In online invoice trading, an invoice is generally sold to one or more investors. Hence, the
concept is closely linked to other forms of crowdfunding upon which a vast amount of literature
has been published. In particular, previous research deals with determinants of defaults in
crowdfunding. Several studies ﬁnd that the interest rate and other loan characteristics such as the
credit score are highly important in explaining the default probability in crowdfunding (see for
example Dorﬂeitner et al., 2016; Serrano-Cinca et al., 2015; Emekter et al., 2015). Yet, further
academic work shows that other pieces of information such as the perceived creditworthiness
of the borrower (see Duarte et al., 2012) or online friendships (see Lin et al., 2013) are also
associated with defaults.
In crowdfunding, prices are generally either set by the platform (ﬁxed price) or emerge in
market-based auctions. In the early days of crowdfunding, many platforms preferred the auction
mechanism. However, most of these platforms have changed from auctions to ﬁxed prices over
time. Wei and Lin (2016) examine the latter price regime change on the US crowdlending
platform Prosper. They ﬁnd that loans are more likely to be funded under a ﬁxed-price regime.
However, the default rates are higher when the platform posts the prices, which is also reﬂected
by higher interest rates. While Huang (2017) also focuses on the price regime change on Prosper,
Chen et al. (2014) analyze whether the auction on Prosper leads to the lowest payments of
borrowers under the assumption of strategic and rational agents.
Further research deals with similar market mechanisms in other crowdfunding forms. Hornuf
and Schwienbacher (2017) compare the funding dynamics of equity crowdfunding portals with
a ﬁxed price and those using an auction mechanism. In contrast to platforms with ﬁxed prices,
the funding patterns of platforms using auctions are U-shaped. Franks et al. (2016) focus on the
lending-based crowdfunding platform FundingCircle. Amongst others, they ﬁnd that auctions
generate additional information that helps to predict defaults. Furthermore, there are several
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studies that compare ﬁxed-price regimes with auction mechanism in other markets (e. g. Wang
(1993); Hammond (2013); Einav et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2007a)).
4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Institutional background and data
A transaction on the platform constitutes the pre-ﬁnancing of invoices in the sense of recourse
factoring. The investors purchase the accounts receivables but do not assume the risk of the
debtor’s insolvency. Figure 4.1 visualizes how a transaction is proceeded.
After the seller has uploaded the invoice and after the platform has veriﬁed it, investors can
purchase either the invoice or fractions of it. Dependent on the seller’s industry, the duration of
an invoice and the stage of the seller’s business, the investors fund a fraction of up to 90 % and
more of the invoice face value. This fraction is called the advance. A transaction is frequently
split between 20 or more investors. Subsequent to the funding, the seller immediately receives
the advance value. Within the payment period, the investors accrue interest on a daily basis until
the invoice is repaid. At maturity, the debtor (the seller’s customer) repays the full face value
of the invoice to the platform. Then the platform pays back the advance value and all accrued
interest to the investors. Finally, the seller receives the non-advanced remainder less interest
(see MarketInvoice Limited, 2017b, 2016). In case the debtor does not fully pay the invoice, the
platform demands that the seller repurchases the invoice. Therefore, only cases in which neither
the seller nor the debtor repay the entire advance value plus interest result in crystallized losses
for investors. This marks a big difference to the ﬁeld of crowdlending, where the credit risk
solely depends on the risk of the debtor.
Since the end of 2013, the interest rate on the face value of the invoice as well as the maximum
advance rate have been predetermined by a platform-internal risk-based pricing model. Within
this pricing mechanism, the seller receives the invested amount regardless of whether or not the
maximum advance rate is reached. Before December, 2013, this interest rate and the percentage
funded were set through a real-time auction mechanism. Before the start of an auction, the seller
deﬁnes the minimum advance value and the maximum interest rate he or she is willing to pay as
well as the duration of the auction. The investors bid based on information about these seller
requirements and a rating of the invoice provided by the platform. The bids that satisfy the
minimum requirements deﬁned by the seller and that are best in the sense of a high advance
value and a low interest rate are executed at the end of the auction at a unique interest rate and at
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an advance that is as high as possible.1 According to a statement of the platform, the auction
system was no longer suitable because of the rapidly growing volume of invoices and, therefore,
they changed to a ﬁxed-price mechanism. Furthermore, the platform states that data on more
than 18,200 invoices enables the platform to develop a ﬁxed-price model, which assesses the
assets in a timely manner.
Debtor InvestorsPlatform
Seller / SME
gets advance
value
gets non-advanced
remainder − interest
pays the invoice
fund the advance
get advance value + interest
Figure 4.1 A transaction on the platform.
To sell invoices companies have to fulﬁl several requirements deﬁned by the platform such as a
turnover of at least £100,000 and a business activity of more than six month. Furthermore, only
limited or LLP companies are allowed to use the invoice trading platform. The invoices can be
bought by accredited institutional investors, family ofﬁces and also self-certiﬁed sophisticated
investors as well as certiﬁcated high net worth individuals.
The dataset used in this paper was obtained from MarketInvoice and contains all completed
fundings from March 2011 until mid-May 2017. We only consider closed transactions and
therefore exclude all information on invoices that still await repayment and have not yet resulted
in crystallized losses. After data cleansing, our data set includes 19,566 observations.
1The realized advance emerges as the sum of the investment volumes of the successful bids divided by face value,
while it needs to be less or equal to the maximum advance the successful bidders are willing to accept. Consider for
example the auction of an invoice worth £10,000, which the seller wants to be ﬁnanced at a maximum interest rate
of 10 % and a minimum advance rate of 60 %. We consider four bidders, each offering a volume of £2500. Bidder
A offers an interest rate of 8 % and a maximum advance rate of 75 %, B 7 % and 85 %, C 9 % and 85 %, and D
8.5 % and 60 %, respectively. At the end of the auction, the invoice is sold to A, B, and C for an interest rate of 9 %.
The advance rate equals 75 %. Bidder D is not successful even though his offered interest rate is lower than the
winning interest rate of 9 %. D only accepts an advance rate of 60 %, thus, selling the invoice to A, B, and D would
violate this condition.
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4.3.2 Methods and Explanatory Variables
To study the pricing in the invoice trading market, we focus on repayment difﬁculties of sold
invoices. First, we consider defaults with a binary variable (Default) indicating whether or
not a seller has failed to fully repay the invoice. To this end, we estimate logit models with
Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors. Second, we investigate the
determinants of the percentage of an invoice which has not been paid back (Loss Rate). In the
majority of the cases, we do not observe any form of payment difﬁculties and our dependent
variable equals zero. In the case of a default, the loss rate ranges between 0 and 1. Thus, we
apply a tobit estimation.
In both approaches we include several explanatory variables. The interest rate investors demand
for funding the invoice (Gross Yield) serves as a proxy for the perceived risk of a given invoice.2
The lower the creditworthiness of the seller and the debtor, the higher the yield investors demand.
Furthermore, the platform also considers the default risk when deciding on the advance rate.
Whether investors do so in the auction mechanism is unclear. Additionally, we consider the
maturity of the invoice (Time to pay) as well as the loan amount (Advance Value). All dependent
and explanatory variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
4.3.3 Descriptive analysis
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the categorical and the metric variables. The data
reveals that defaults are rare in this form of factoring. Only 384 out of 19,566 sold invoices
resulted in crystallized losses for the investors. The maximum loss investors faced of a single
invoice equals almost £500,000. With a mean of £167 and a median of zero, the outstanding
amount is highly skewed with a fat right tail. On average, the investors funded 81 % of the
invoice value resulting in a mean advance value of £48,609. Taking into account the outstanding
amount and the advance value of defaulted transactions reveals an average loss given default
(LGD) rate of 14.7 %. The interest investors gain for funding the invoices ranges between 4.03 %
and 48.16 % p. a. On average, the rate equals 12.28 % p. a. Furthermore, the data shows that the
majority of the invoices are sold with a ﬁxed price set by the platform. An auction only took
place for approximately 9.4 % of the transactions.
2The rating provided by the platform is highly correlated with the interest rate (correlation coefﬁcient of 0.92). In the
further analysis we therefore only focus on the gross yield.
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Table 4.1 Deﬁnition of variables.
Advance (%) The percentage of the invoice value which is funded by the investors and paid out to the
seller upfront.
Advance Value The amount of money which is funded by the investors and paid out to the seller
upfront, in GBP.
Auction Dummy variable that indicates whether the price of the transaction is set via an auction.
The platform used an auction model for all transactions until December 2013.
Default Dummy variable that indicates whether both the debtor and the seller are unable to fully
repay the invoice amount plus interest. In particular, a transaction is regarded as default
when the seller has gone into liquidation or administration and the process reveals that
the seller does not have enough assets to cover the outstanding liabilities. Furthermore,
invoices are marked as default when 180 days have passed without resolution
(MarketInvoice Limited, 2016).
Gross Yield (%) The gross yield an investor receives on average p. a. as a percentage of the advance
value. The gross yield equals the annualized interest rate, whereby the interest rate
equals the total fee the seller has to pay for the invoice discounting service.
LGD The loss given default (LGD) equals the share of the invoice that is not paid back in the
event of a default.
Loss Rate The percentage of an invoice that is not paid back. Calculated as Outstanding over
Advance Value.
Outstanding The residual debt that both the debtor and the invoice seller have not repaid before
settlement of the transaction.
Time to pay The difference between the Advance Date and the Expected Payment Date.
When focusing on the subsamples, we ﬁnd some crucial differences between the auction period
and the ﬁxed-price period. We test for a difference of means using a t-test allowing unequal
variances. We ﬁnd that both the average default rate and the loss rate are signiﬁcantly higher
within the auction period. However, the average annual gross yield is signiﬁcantly higher during
this period as well. It is noteworthy that the advance rate is also signiﬁcantly higher during the
auction period. This phenomenon can be explained by the auction mechanism itself (illustrated
in footnote 1), which maximizes the advance given the restrictions of the seller and the bidders.
The LGD does not signiﬁcantly change between the two pricing mechanisms.
4.4 Results
Table 4.3 shows the average marginal effects of our ﬁrst model, the logit regressions, with the
default dummy as dependent variable. We present the estimation results for our second model,
the tobit regressions with the loss rate as dependent variable, in table 4.4, respectively. In both
models we estimate Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors and test for potential
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics. The variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
Categorical Vari-
ables
n Yes Mean S.D. Auction Fixed Price Difference
Default 19,566 384 0.020 0.139 0.034 0.018 0.0153***
Auction 19,566 1,848 0.094 0.292
Metric Variables n Mean S.D. Min Median Max
Outstanding 19,566 167.45 5299.50 0.00 0.00 488,898.80
Loss Rate 19,566 0.003 0.0482 0.00 0.00 1.00
LGD 384 0.147 0.3118 0.00 0.00 1.00
Gross Yield 19,566 12.276 4.070 4.03 11.35 48.16
Advance (%) 19,566 81.329 7.874 3.37 85.00 97.00
Time to pay 19,566 45.589 27.353 0.00 41.00 404.00
Advance Value 19,566 48,609.44 88,409.53 78.55 21,524.40 1,670,064.00
Auction (n=1848) Fixed Price (n=17,718 ) Difference
Subsamples Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Outstanding 202.686 2272.091 163.775 5520.490 38.911
Loss Rate 0.005 0.052 0.003 0.048 0.003**
LGD 0.156 0.239 0.146 0.324 0.010
Gross Yield 16.812 5.152 11.802 3.627 5.009***
Advance (%) 83.950 6.147 81.055 7.983 2.894***
Time to pay 38.577 23.263 46.320 27.643 −7.744***
Advance Value 47,132.430 71,639.660 48,763.490 89,979.120 −1631.065
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issues due to multicollinearity3. Speciﬁcation (1) includes all explanatory variables as well as
year dummies to capture variation over time. In speciﬁcation (2), we incorporate a dummy for
the auction period instead of the year dummies. The last two speciﬁcations, (3) and (4), focus on
subsamples for the different pricing mechanisms.
Table 4.3 Average marginal effects of the logit models. The dependent variable is the default dummy. The
regression is performed using Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %,
and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Complete Complete Auction Fixed Price
Gross Yield 0.0010*** 0.0015*** 0.0035*** 0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0002)
Time to pay 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0006*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000)
Advance (%) −0.0004*** −0.0002 0.0011 −0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001)
ln(Advance Value) −0.0026*** −0.0021*** −0.0006 −0.0026***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0034) (0.0008)
Auction 0.0059*
(0.0030)
Year Dummies Yes No No No
Observations 19,566 19,566 1848 17,718
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.0515 0.1396 0.0387
We ﬁnd that the gross yield reveals good predictive power in explaining both the default
probability and the loss rates. An increase in the gross yield is associated with a higher
probability of default and a higher loss rate. This is consistent with previous research. Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) explain that borrowers who accept high interest rates perceive their own
creditworthiness as being poor and are therefore more likely to default. Interestingly, both in
logit and tobit models we ﬁnd that the gross yield has the highest average marginal effect for the
auction period. The magnitude of the effect is smaller for the ﬁxed-price regime.
Furthermore, the results show a signiﬁcant, positive relationship between the maturity of the
invoice and the probability of default. Sellers are less likely to default on invoices with a short
expected time until payment. The same relationship holds true for the loss rates.
The effect of the advance rate is more complex. In our ﬁrst model, we ﬁnd that the advance
rate is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with the probability of default in the ﬁrst and the last
speciﬁcation. Within the ﬁxed-price regime the platform sets the advance rate and considers,
3In all speciﬁcations, the variance inﬂation factors are below a value of 1.40.
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Table 4.4 Average marginal effects of the tobit models. The dependent variable is the loss rate. The
regression is performed using Eicker–Huber–White heteroskedastic-consistent errors. Standard
errors are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %,
and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are deﬁned in Table 4.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Complete Complete Auction Fixed Price
Gross Yield 0.0472*** 0.0503*** 0.0549*** 0.0365*
(0.0131) (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.0189)
Time to pay 0.0079*** 0.0080*** 0.0084*** 0.0082***
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0014)
Advance (%) −0.0110 −0.0065 0.0353*** −0.0182**
(0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0121) (0.0082)
ln(Advance Value) 0.0417 0.0492 −0.0867 0.0594
(0.0548) (0.0544) (0.0740) (0.0684)
Auction 0.5354***
(0.1546)
Year Dummies Yes No No No
Observations 19,566 19,566 1848 17,718
Pseudo-R2 0.0809 0.0711 0.1822 0.0407
among other things, the risk of the invoice not being repaid. Thus, the signiﬁcant negative
relationship reﬂects the ability of the platform to assess the creditworthiness of the sellers. In
our second model, the advance rate is signiﬁcantly negatively related to the loss rates under the
ﬁxed-price regime as well. Yet, for the auction subsamples we do not ﬁnd such a relationship.
We interpret this result in the following way. From an investor’s perspective, the interest rate is a
more important pricing parameter than the advance rate since a high interest rate always has
a positive impact on the expected return, while the investors only beneﬁt from a low advance
rate in the case of a default. Furthermore, the risk can effectively be reduced by diversifying
the portfolio of invoices. Thus, investors prefer to price the risk by demanding high interest
rates rather than by demanding low advance rates. Moreover, the auction mechanism fosters
high advance rates, which also can be observed empirically (see Table 4.2). An analysis of the
pairwise Bravais-Pearson correlation coefﬁcients undermines this view. The correlation between
the gross yield and the advance is considerably higher in the ﬁxed-price period (−0.48) than
in the auction period (−0.33) indicating that the advance indeed is a more relevant measure
for credit risk in the ﬁxed-price period than before. However, the signiﬁcantly positive sign of
the advance rate in the auction subsample of the second model cannot be explained just by this
consideration. We regard this result as an indication for the presence of sophisticated investors
which tended to demand high interest rates for risky invoices by at the same time allowing high
advances in order to maximize their return. Indeed, this notion is in line with an analysis of the
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investors’ net returns4. We ﬁnd that during the auction period the average net return amounts
to 7.52 % p.a. This rate decreases considerably to only 4.18 % p.a. when prices are set by the
platform.
In our ﬁrst model, the results show a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the amount of the
loan and defaults in all speciﬁcations except the auction-period subsample. Larger and more
creditworthy companies can be assumed to obtain larger loans more easily. Hence, the advance
value may be a proxy for the size of the seller. Additionally, this result indicates that sellers of
invoices do not tend to engage in fraudulent behavior. Otherwise they would tend to strategically
default on larger loans. We do not observe any signiﬁcant relationships between the advance
value and the loss rates in our second model.
Moreover, the auction dummy is signiﬁcantly associated with the defaults and the loss rates. Both
the probability of default and the loss rates are higher under the auction mechanism indicating
that riskier invoices were sold within the auction period. In line with Wei and Lin (2016), we
show that the market mechanism resulting in higher interest rates is associated with higher
default rates. This is also consistent with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) who point out that high
interest rates are related to high default rates. Better economic conditions in the years of the
ﬁxed-price period may be another reason for higher loss rates during the auction period. Large
parts of the UK observed less company insolvencies in recent years than in the auction period
(United Kingdom Statistics Authority, 2017).
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically analyze the determinants of defaults and the loss rates in online
invoice trading. In line with previous literature, we ﬁnd that the interest rate plays an important
role in explaining the default probability in the context of invoice trading (see Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981; Dorﬂeitner et al., 2016; Wei and Lin, 2016). Furthermore, the duration and the percentage
funded are associated with the defaults.
As the platform has changed the pricing mechanism from a real-time auction to a ﬁxed-price
regime, we have the opportunity to compare these two market mechanisms. We ﬁnd that the
default probability is higher within in the auction period. Furthermore, we show that the average
4Net returns equal the returns after losses and fees. We generally assume a fee of 25 % of the gains (MarketInvoice
Limited, 2017a). Furthermore, we assume that sellers of defaulted invoices do not pay interest. To control for the
macroeconomic environment we also deduct the respective average LIBOR rate.
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net return investors gained was higher during the auction period than afterwards. So, one can
interpret the change from the auction to the ﬁxed-price regime as an attempt to make the pricing
fairer for the companies selling the invoices.
As the market for online invoice trading is growing quickly the opportunity and the need for
future research arises. In this study, we only focus on data of the market leader for online invoice
trading. A rich data set of different online invoice trading providers could enable greater insights
into the market. Furthermore, as sellers use invoice trading repeatedly, reputation effects may
arise. Further research should focus on the question to what extent the reputation of sellers
lowers the information asymmetries and therefore affects the prices for sold invoices. A more
detailed analysis of the different market mechanisms and the consequences for both investors
and sellers could be of interest as well.
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Dynamics of investor communication in equity crowdfunding
This research project is joint work with Gregor Dorfleitner and Lars Hornuf. The paper is
forthcoming in the Journal of Electronic Markets.
Abstract In crowdfunding, start-ups can voluntarily communicate with their investors by posting
updates. We investigate whether start-ups strategically use updates, which have previously been
shown to increase investments. To this end, we use hand-collected data from 751 updates and
39,036 investment decisions from two major German equity crowdfunding portals: Seedmatch
and Companisto. We ﬁnd evidence of strategic communication behavior of start-ups during
an equity crowdfunding campaign. During the funding period, start-ups more frequently post
updates with linguistic devices that enhance the group identity and the group cohesion as well
as updates on the business development. Furthermore, the probability of an update during the
funding period increases along with strong competition of other contemporary crowdfunding
campaigns.
Keywords Investor Communication, Entrepreneurial Finance, Sentiment Analysis, Linguistic
Devices
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5.1 Introduction
In recent years, equity crowdfunding has gained increasing importance in providing start-ups
with funding. In contrast to traditional early-stage ﬁnancing sources such as venture capital and
banks, equity crowdfunding has introduced the possibility for non-sophisticated private investors
to invest in start-ups. However, there are crucial differences between the information rights and
the experience of venture capitalists and crowd investors. In this article, we therefore analyze
the communication behavior of start-ups in equity crowdfunding during and after the funding
period and investigate whether entrepreneurs use voluntary disclosure strategically.
Recent academic research in equity crowdfunding analyzes follow-up fundings, crowd exits
and insolvencies of successfully funded equity crowdfunding campaigns (Hornuf and Schmitt,
2016; Signori and Vismara, 2018; Hornuf et al., 2018). However, the majority of the literature
investigates determinants of the funding success of a campaign. A correlation between the
success of campaigns and the size and education of the management team as well as particular
project characteristics—e.g. the share of equity offered or disclosure of ﬁnancial projections—
has been shown (Ahlers et al., 2015; Vismara, 2016; Bernstein et al., 2017). Furthermore, the
posting of voluntary information in the form of updates during the campaign increases the
likelihood of funding success (Mollick, 2014; Block et al., 2018a).
Both the crowdfunding and the corporate ﬁnance literature (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991;
Healy and Palepu, 2001; Merton, 1987) provide evidence of a positive impact of voluntary
disclosure on the funding success or the company value, respectively. Yet Block et al. (2018a)
ﬁnd that the effect of updates on the success of equity crowdfunding campaigns depends on the
content of the published information. Not all updates have a positive impact on the invested
amount and the number of investments. Updates with veriﬁable and business-related information
about the development of the start-up are most relevant, while the business model, team, and
promotional activities evoke less interest among investors. Furthermore, the language of updates,
i.e. the sentiment, can inﬂuence the perception of the investors. In our paper we reverse the
research question of Block et al. (2018a). Instead of investigating the effect of updates on
the funding success, we examine whether start-ups take into account these previously shown
relationships and strategically post updates containing a speciﬁc language or content. To this
end, we investigate the sentiment, the language, and the content of updates. First, we analyze
changes in the communication behavior during and after the funding period. Second, we focus
solely on the funding period and investigate which circumstances increase the likelihood of
start-ups posting an update.
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We use hand-collected data from two major German equity crowdfunding portals—Seedmatch
and Companisto—to investigate the communication behavior of start-ups. Therefore, we use
the data set of Block et al. (2018a) and expand it with further updates posted during1 and after
the funding period. Through analyzing the language and the content of 751 updates as well as
39,036 individual investment decisions, we ﬁnd evidence that start-ups use updates during the
funding period strategically. The frequency of updates is signiﬁcantly higher over the course
of the funding period than afterwards and start-ups use more linguistic devices that create a
feeling of group cohesion and group identity. We also ﬁnd some evidence for the hypothesis that
start-ups strategically post updates with speciﬁc content during the funding period. Moreover,
during the funding period the probability of an update increases along with strong competition
of other contemporary equity crowdfunding campaigns.
Our study thus contributes to answering the question of whether start-ups rationally use investor
communication to ensure successful funding and to what extent and in what way they change
their communication behavior after the funding is ensured. While the answer to the ﬁrst question
could help to improve the entrepreneurial behavior in crowdfunding campaigns, the latter aspect
may be important for both the decision making of investors and in the context of investor
protection. Knowledge about the possibly strategic communication behavior of start-ups can
help investors to optimize their investment decisions.All these issues are highly relevant for the
continued development of the regulatory framework for equity crowdfunding.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe our hypotheses
regarding changes in the communication behavior of start-ups and the determinants of updates
during the funding period. Section 3 provides an overview of the data set and the key variables.
Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and analyzes the use of updates in equity crowdfunding.
Section 5 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical foundation and hypotheses
In crowdfunding, updates are a form of voluntary disclosure for start-ups. There are several
reasons why start-ups publish updates both during and after the funding period of the campaign,
thereby informing (potential) investors about developments regarding the start-up.
1On Seedmatch, entrepreneurs can post updates on two different parts of the webpage. In contrast to Block et al.
(2018a) we take into account both of these possibilities to publish updates. In this way, we make use of additional
80 updates during the funding period.
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Generally, the managers of a company are assumed to have comparatively good knowledge
of the ﬁrm value and the expected future performance of the company than investors. These
information asymmetries between managers and shareholders can be reduced by providing
additional information through voluntary disclosure. Furthermore, updates can serve as a signal
of quality (Mollick, 2014; Block et al., 2018a). According to Spence (2002), signals can further
reduce information asymmetries between the involved parties. Lower information asymmetries,
can in turn, reduce the cost of capital for companies (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Healy
and Palepu, 2001; Merton, 1987). Rational entrepreneurs can therefore be expected to publish
updates during the funding period of a campaign. Previous research shows that updates are
indeed important for the funding success of a crowdfunding campaign (Xu et al., 2014; Mollick,
2014; Kuppuswamy and Bayus, 2017; Block et al., 2018a; Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017).
Subsequent to the funding period, communication with investors is rational as well. The
reasons for participation in crowdfunding are diverse. Hamari et al. (2016) describe internal
motivations such as perceived sustainability and enjoyment as well as external motivations
including reputation and economic beneﬁts. Therefore, monetary motives may not necessarily
be the only reason either for entrepreneurs or for investors to engage in equity crowdfunding.
Particularly in crowdfunding, the support and feedback of the crowd both in the development and
promotion of products and services can be considered as being important for the future success
of the start-up. If these non-monetary incentives play a role for investors and the start-up, we
expect the entrepreneur to communicate with the investors both during and after the campaign.
In crowdfunding, no regulations concerning the form or the content of voluntary disclosure exist,
and usually no third party veriﬁes the published information. Therefore, entrepreneurs can easily
make use of the signaling effect of updates and strategically post updates with speciﬁc content or
language during the funding period. In this way, they can signal quality to investors and thereby
gain investments. As the business development of the start-up is not different at any speciﬁc
time during or directly after the funding period ends per se, the availability of the disclosable
hard information should not signiﬁcantly change during and after the funding period. Hence, if
either the language or the content of updates signiﬁcantly differs between these two periods, we
conclude that start-ups strategically post updates to encourage investors. In the following, we
derive several hypotheses regarding such strategic communication behavior of start-ups.
The ﬁnancial disclosure literature indicates that an optimistic and positive tone of reports is
associated with increased ﬁrm performance (Li, 2010; Davis et al., 2012; Henry, 2008). For
example, Henry (2008) investigates the effect of language used in earnings press releases on the
stock price. He shows that press releases written in a positive tone are associated with higher
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abnormal returns. The results remain stable even after controlling for the ﬁnancial results of
the company. Positivity is also closely linked to the concept of passion in the literature on
entrepreneurship. Empirical evidence suggests that the optimism, passion, and self-conﬁdence
of an entrepreneur increase the likelihood of obtaining venture capital and indirectly raise the
prospects of future growth (Baum and Locke, 2004; Cardon et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009).
Start-ups might prefer to use updates with a more positive tone during the funding period to show
that they are passionate and optimistic. As the business development of start-ups should not
be better in the funding period than afterwards per se, a more positive tone during the funding
period suggests strategic communication behavior of start-ups.
Hypothesis 1: During the funding period, updates have a more positive tone than after the
funding period.
Furthermore, Allison et al. (2013) use the warm-glow theory of Andreoni (1990) to explain fund-
ing success on Kiva, a crowdfunding platform for micro loans. The warm-glow theory suggests
that individuals receive utility by helping others. By examining the credit applications of micro
loans, Allison et al. (2013) show that credit applications containing linguistic devices that evoke
warm-glow effects experience faster funding. Gerber and Hui (2013) ﬁnd similar motives for
other forms of crowdfunding. They point out that investors are motivated by the desire to help
others and to be part of a community. By publishing updates with speciﬁc linguistic devices that
evoke a feeling of cohesion start-ups may try to use this coherence. Using emotional language
and the ﬁrst person plural can create a feeling of group identity and improve the group cohesion
(Zheng, 2000; Sexton and Helmreich, 2000; Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010). Furthermore,
using the past tense can create a psychological distance (Tausczik and Pennebaker, 2010) and
therefore, we expect start-ups to strategically employ the ﬁrst person plural, more frequently
use emotional language, and increase the use of the present tense in updates during the funding
period. Such communication behavior of start-ups tends to indicate a strategic use of language
in updates since, on average, the disclosable hard information should not signiﬁcantly change
during and after the funding period.
Hypothesis 2: During the funding period, updates contain more linguistic devices that evoke a
feeling of group cohesion than they do after the funding period.
As there are no rules concerning the content of updates in crowdfunding, start-ups can generally
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publish any type of information in updates. Yet it is not surprising that not all forms of updates
promote the funding success of a campaign (Xu et al., 2014; Block et al., 2018a). In particular,
updates informing about new developments of start-ups such as new funding sources, the de-
velopment of the respective business, and updates containing information about cooperations
increase the funding success within the funding period. By contrast, updates with information
that was previously available such as information about the entrepreneurial team or the business
model are not signiﬁcantly associated with an increase in investments (Block et al., 2018a). If
entrepreneurs wish to target the investment spirit, start-ups can be expected to publish dispropor-
tionately more updates disclosing information about new developments during the funding period
than after the funding period. Again, as there should not per se be a higher density of these new
developments within the funding period than later on, posting relatively fewer of these updates
after the end of the campaign provides evidence of strategic communication behavior of start-ups.
Hypothesis 3: During the funding period, entrepreneurs publish more updates with information
on new funding sources, the business development, and updates with information about coopera-
tions of the start-up.
On most of the equity crowdfunding platforms, start-ups deﬁne a funding goal before the cam-
paign begins. The funding goal represents the threshold of the invested amount of money the
start-ups need to obtain to be successfully funded. Therefore, start-ups have a strong incentive
to obtain investments worth a minimum of the amount of the funding goal. Hornuf and Schwien-
bacher (2017) highlight the L-shape of investments under a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served mechanism in
equity crowdfunding. Vulkan et al. (2016) ﬁnd that the chances for successful funding decrease
after the campaign has begun. Hence, start-ups that are almost at the end of the funding period
and have attracted investments below the funding goal are expected to act promptly in order to
gain more backers. They may post more updates to trigger the investments needed to reach the
funding goal, even if the probability of disclosable information does not change over the course
of the funding period.
Hypothesis 4: Start-ups are more likely to post an update when the funding goal of the campaign
has not been achieved and the remaining funding period is short.
During the funding period, start-ups may also consider the competitive environment of their
equity crowdfunding campaigns. Many parallel equity crowdfunding campaigns or so-called
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blockbusters, popular campaigns with an extremely large number of backers, may lure investors
away from the focal crowdfunding campaign. When competition is strong, start-ups may be more
likely to post an update to draw attention to their own campaign. However, previous research
indicates that blockbusters not only accelerate investments in the focal campaign but also in-
crease them in other crowdfunding campaigns (Kickstarter, 2012). This is because blockbusters
usually enjoy extensive media coverage and new backers may be attracted to crowdfunding
in general. With data from the reward-based crowdfunding portals Kickstarter and Indiegogo,
Doshi (2016) shows that, on average, the invested volume increases in the blockbusters’ project
category. Depending on the project category, blockbuster can also create spill-over effects
to other project categories. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) analyze voluntary disclosure in
competitive markets. They highlight that under some assumptions such as low entry costs to
the market, strong competition favors voluntary disclosure to deter the entry of competitors. In
the context of equity crowdfunding, Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017) and Block et al. (2018a)
ﬁnd a positive relationship between a strong competition of campaigns and the funding success
of a particular campaign. Overall, the probability of disclosing voluntary information in the
form of updates can be expected to increase in a highly competitive environment. Since the
available disclosable hard information should not depend on the competitive environment, such
communication would again suggest a strategic behavior of start-ups.
Hypothesis 5: Start-ups are more likely to post an update when the number of competing
investments in contemporary equity crowdfunding campaigns is high.
5.3 Data
5.3.1 Data sources
For the empirical analysis we hand-collect data from two German equity crowdfunding portals—
Seedmatch and Companisto—during the period from June 7 2012 to April 27 2015. The portals
Seedmatch and Companisto are the market leaders for equity crowdfunding in Germany and
account for around 75% of the total equity crowdfunding capital raised in Germany during the
observation period. We obtain all data directly from the platforms. Habitually, start-ups do
not only use equity crowdfunding portals to post their updates but also publish the information
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on social media platforms or in newsletters. After the campaign, the equity crowdfunding
portals retain a page with a project overview as well as all key characteristics of the campaign
and the possibility to post updates. As start-ups also seek visibility when the campaign has
concluded, we expect the start-ups still to use all communication channels including the equity
crowdfunding portals, in order to post their updates. For the further analysis we use two different
data sets.
To analyze changes in the communication behavior of start-ups we focus on the updates posted
during and after the funding period and examine all campaigns run on Seedmatch and Com-
panisto that include at least one update. In total, our ﬁrst data set (updates data set) includes
751 updates of 97 equity crowdfunding campaigns. With 64 campaigns the majority of the 97
campaigns were run on Seedmatch. Yet start-ups running equity crowdfunding campaigns on
Companisto appear to post more updates. Approximately 52% of the updates in our data set
were posted on this portal. Several start-ups run multiple equity crowdfunding campaigns, hence
the 97 campaigns belong to 88 unique start-ups. Most of these start-ups operate either in the
information & communication or in the wholesale & retail sectors.
We additionally obtained a second data set with daily investment data for 71 campaigns (in-
vestment data set) to further investigate the determinants of updates during the funding period.
Investment data refers to the daily investments of all backers as well as the total invested amount
on each campaign day. We were able to retrieve investment data for 26,456 investments belong-
ing to the entire 36 campaigns on Companisto. We also retrieved daily investment data for 12,580
investments and 35 campaigns on Seedmatch. Seedmatch removes all investment data from the
website once the funding has been completed and hence the amounts invested by individual
backers are no longer publicly available. Due to this limited availability of data we could not
include all campaigns run on Seedmatch in the investment data set. Importantly, during the
funding period only 57 campaigns include updates, which were also considered in the updates
data set. We also obtain investor data for 14 campaigns that refrained from posting any updates
during the funding period. Overall, eight start-ups ran multiple equity crowdfunding campaigns;
thus the 71 campaigns belong to 63 unique start-ups. In a ﬁnal step, as in Kuppuswamy and
Bayus (2017) and Hornuf and Schwienbacher (2017), we construct a panel data set in which
the time dimension is equal to the days of the campaign and the cross-sectional dimension is
represented by the campaigns. The investment data set contains 5,176 campaign days and 314
updates posted on these days.
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5.3.2 Dependent variables and key explanatory variables
To test our hypotheses, we deﬁne different dependent variables. For each day of the funding
period, we identify whether the start-up posted an update or not (Update). Furthermore, we
consider all updates posted during and after the funding period and examine the content and the
language of these updates. We apply a coding process to examine the information contained in
the updates. Following Block et al. (2018a), we use nine categories to describe the content of the
updates: Team, BusinessModel, Certiﬁcation, Product, Cooperation, Campaign, NewFunding,
Business, and Promotions. A detailed description of all the categories is included in Table
5.1. The categories are not mutually exclusive; different categories can apply to one update.
Furthermore, updates without relevant content are not included in any of the categories.
Table 5.1 List and Deﬁnition of all Variables.
The data is retrieved from the German equity crowdfunding portals Seedmatch and Companisto.
Variable Description
Updates and Update Categories
Update Dummy variable equal to 1 if the start-up publishes an update on day t, and 0
otherwise.
Business Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information about the
customers or ﬁnancials (e.g. number of customers, amount of sales), and 0 otherwise.
BusinessModel Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information about the
business model, the relevant market or future plans and strategies, and 0 otherwise.
Campaign Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information on the funding
of the campaign (e.g. number of investors, archived funding amount, change of
funding limit), and 0 otherwise.
Certiﬁcation Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information on external
certiﬁcation of the company or product (e.g. press coverings, awards, patents), and 0
otherwise.
Cooperation Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information on cooperation
projects or collaborations of the start-up, and 0 otherwise.
Emotional Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t contains emotional language, and 0
otherwise.
NewFunding Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information on additional
funding sources of the start-up such as business angels, venture capitals or government
grants, and 0 otherwise.
Product Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information on the product
or the product development, and 0 otherwise.
Promotions Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information about promo-
tions for the crowd (discounts, rewards), invites the crowd to participate on events or
appeals to the crowd to support the start-up (e.g. recommendations and network), and
0 otherwise.
Team Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update on day t discloses information about the
entrepreneurial team (e.g. work experience, age and education), and 0 otherwise.
Sentiment and Language of Updates
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Table 5.1 continued.
Variable Description
Negative Percentage of words that evoke negative emotions within the update text (e.g. hurt,
ugly and nasty). Obtained by the software LIWC.
Past Percentage of words that refer to the past within update text (e.g. went, had and ran).
Obtained by the software LIWC.
Positive Percentage of words that evoke positive emotions within the update text (e.g. love,
nice and sweet). Obtained by the software LIWC.
WC The total number of words that appear in the update text.
We Percentage of words that refer to ﬁrst person plural within the update text (e.g. we, us
and our). Obtained by the software LIWC.
Timing of Updates and Competitive Environment
Alarm Dummy variable equal to 1 if the funding goal is not reached and more than three
quarters of the funding period have passed or three quarters of the extended funding
period, and 0 otherwise.
FIN Dummy variable equal to 1 if the update is published during the funding period, and
0 otherwise.
Interval Time interval between the publications of updates in a particular campaign, in days.
#Investments Total number of all investments made on day t across all campaigns on three ma-
jor and one minor German equity crowdfunding portal (Companisto, Seedmatch,
Innovestment, and United Equity).
Time Total number of days passed from the start of the campaign before publishing the ﬁrst
update. Updates on the ﬁrst campaign day are either considered (subsample 2) or not
(subsample 1).
Update1Day Dummy variable equal to 1 if an update is published on the ﬁrst day of the campaign,
and 0 otherwise.
Controls
Amount Total amount of money invested by the crowd until day t in a particular campaign, in
Euro.
FundingGoal The minimum funding goal as deﬁned by the start-up and the portal on day 0, in Euro.
EquityShare Funding Goal over pre-money valuation.
Industry Dummy variables for the industry in which the start-up operates in, either information
& communication; wholesale & retail; manufacturing; professional, scientiﬁc &
technical activities; ﬁnancial & insurance activities or accommodation & food service
activities.
%Invested Amount over funding goal at day t in a particular campaign.
PostFunded Dummy variable equal to 1 if the invested sum of money of the campaign has exceeded
the funding goal on day t in a particular campaign, and 0 otherwise.
Portal Dummy variable equal to 1 if the campaign is run on the portal Companisto, and 0
otherwise.
VDAX Volatility index on the German stock index DAX on day t. Source: Datastream.
To ensure the reliability of our coding scheme, a second, independent researcher rated the
updates. At ﬁrst, we provide the second researcher with a coding manual containing a detailed
description of each category. The researcher rated approximately 20% of the updates. In a
following discussion, we adapt our coding scheme and come up with the ﬁnal description of the
ten categories. Thereafter, both raters coded all updates again (Reis and Judd, 2014). To measure
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the inter-rater agreement, we calculate the Cohen’s Kappa coefﬁcient (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss et al.,
2003). Over all categories we have a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.85. Depending on the category, the
inter-rater reliability ranges from 0.77 to 0.94 indicating excellent agreement2 between the two
raters (Landis and Koch, 1977).
To further evaluate the sentiment and the language of the updates, we use the text analysis
software Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker et al., 2001; Wolf et al.,
2008). LIWC counts the words in the updates and compares them with dictionaries of different
linguistic and psychological categories (for example positive or negative emotions). The software
calculates the percentage of total words for each category. Thus we can measure the sentiment
of the updates (Positive and Negative) and the usage of the past tense (Past) as well as the usage
of ﬁrst person plural (We).
In general, the start-ups have 60 days to gain enough investments to reach their funding goals
(funding period) subsequent to the publication of the campaign on the crowdfunding platform.
However, for each campaign the start-ups can extend the funding period one time only for
another 60 days (Klo¨hn and Hornuf, 2012). To investigate changes in the communication
behavior, we derive the variable FIN.
By using daily investment data, we deﬁne several key explanatory variables. We measure the
success of a campaign using two different proxies. On the one hand, we create the dummy
Alarm. Alarm accounts for the start-ups that urgently require further investments, in the sense
that the hitherto invested amount has not yet reached the funding goal and the remaining time
of the funding period is short. On the other hand, we use the variable Amount. Moreover, we
measure the competitive environment of a campaign (#Investments).
We also include several further control variables based on prior research. Hornuf and Schwien-
bacher (2017) show that investments in equity crowdfunding decrease under a ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-
served mechanism once the funding goal has been surpassed. Therefore, we include a dummy
variable PostFunded. In another paper, Hornuf and Neuenkirch (2017) demonstrate that a high
level of stock market volatility is associated with higher premia for the equity crowdfunding
portal Innovestment. The authors conclude that equity crowdfunding is a substitutional, as
opposed to a supplementary asset class, when stock markets are volatile. Thus we also include
the German VDax (VDAX) as a control variable. To capture portal-speciﬁc effects, we include a
dummy variable for the equity crowdfunding portal Companisto (Portal). Finally, we control for
the industry of the start-up, the year, and the day of the week (see, for example, Vismara (2016);
2According to Landis and Koch (1977) a Cohen’s Kappa between 0.61 and 0.8 indicate substantial agreement, values
above 0.81 indicate almost perfect agreement.
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Block et al. (2018a); Hornuf and Neuenkirch (2017)). A description of all variables is presented
in Table 5.1.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for the updates data set. The majority of the 751 updates
is published during the funding period. However, we also consider 299 updates that are subse-
quently posted.3 The bulk of the updates discloses information on promotions of the start-ups
and / or describes the business model. By contrast, only few updates contain emotional language
and disclose information either about the entrepreneurial team or new funding sources. Some
start-ups use updates extensively to communicate with their investors. In total, the start-up
Riboxx posted 29 updates since its campaign start in July 2014. On average, 33 days pass before
a subsequent update is posted in a particular campaign. However, the length of this interval
differs between the two portals. On Companisto an average of 28 days pass between the posting
of an update. On Seedmatch though, this interval is, on average, 39 days. The length of the
updates varies considerably as well. The shortest update only consists of one word (“Danke”,
meaning thanks) while the longest contains 1,293 words. Furthermore, the updates employ a
relatively positive tone. Approximately 3.9% of the words are positive and, by contrast, only
around 0.3% are negative.
Summary statistics for the investment data set are shown in Table 5.3. More than 80% of the
campaigns have at least one update during the funding period. On average, a start-up posts
4 updates during this time. However, the number of updates differs between the campaigns.
Some start-ups refrain from posting a single update while others use this tool for communication
extensively. For example, the start-up MyParfume posted 14 updates during the funding period.
Yet, the campaign length of MyParfume is above the average of 72 days (123 days).
As soon as the campaign becomes active and backers have the possibility to invest, start-ups are
able to communicate with their investors via updates. Most of the start-ups post their ﬁrst update
at the beginning of the funding period (see Figure 5.1). Several start-ups even post updates
on the very ﬁrst day of the campaign. These updates are rarely linked to the progress of the
3In our data set, the average funding period is with 72 days considerably shorter than the average period following
successful funding (573 days).
99
Chapter 5 Dynamics of investor communication in equity crowdfunding
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics Updates Data Set.
97 campaigns. All variables are deﬁned in Table 5.1. Corr denotes the pairwise Bravais-Pearson
Correlation Coefﬁcients with FIN.
UPDATES DATA SET
Binary Variables Yes Mean Median SD # Obs. Corr
FIN 452 0.602 1 0.4898 751
Business 184 0.245 0 0.4303 751 0.1597
BusinessModel 345 0.155 0 0.3629 751 0.0292
Campaign 143 0.190 0 0.3928 751 0.2420
Certiﬁcation 283 0.376 0 0.4849 751 −0.1141
Cooperation 170 0.226 0 0.4187 751 0.0174
Emotional 117 0.156 0 0.3629 751 0.1019
NewFunding 51 0.067 0 0.2517 751 0.0574
Product 292 0.388 0 0.4878 751 0.4878
Promotions 347 0.462 0 0.4988 751 −0.1247
Team 87 0.116 0 0.3203 751 −0.0201
Metric Variables Mean Median SD Min. Max. # Obs. Corr
Positive (in %) 3.981 3.54 4.0948 0.00 100.00 751 0.0094
Negative (in %) 0.262 0 0.4700 0.00 4.26 751 −0.0153
We (in %) 3.988 3.87 2.4807 0.00 26.67 751 0.0643
Past (in %) 1.524 1.34 1.2019 0.00 8.00 751 −0.0910
Interval 32.882 16 67.8472 0.00 662.00 650 −0.3532
WC 256.163 222 176.9025 1.00 1,293.00 751 −0.0272
campaign. As described in Mollick (2014), start-ups may strategically post updates soon after
the campaign commencement to show that they are well prepared for the campaign and thus
indicate a high campaign quality.
The majority of the equity crowdfunding campaigns managed to reach their funding goal quickly,
but, 6 campaigns were not able to achieve the funding goal before three quarters of the funding
period had elapsed. Overall, 47 investments were made on an average campaign day. By
comparison, an average of 7.56 investments were made each day in a particular campaign.
5.4.2 Univariate Analysis: Changes in communication behavior after the funding
period
To investigate modiﬁcations in the communication behavior during and after the funding period,
we apply a univariate analysis. As we observe several updates per campaign, we have to consider
the correlation between updates within the same campaign. For the continuous dependent
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Table 5.3 Summary Statistics Investment Data Set.
71 campaigns. All variables are deﬁned in Table 5.1. Corr denotes the pairwise Bravais-Pearson
Correlation Coefﬁcients with Update and Time, respectively.
INVESTMENT DATA SET
Binary Variables Yes Mean Median SD # Obs.
Update 314 0.061 0 0.2387 5,176
Business 94 0.018 0 0.1335 5,176
BusinessModel 156 0.030 0 0.1709 5,176
Campaign 83 0.016 0 0.1256 5,176
Certiﬁcation 106 0.020 0 0.1416 5,176
Cooperation 82 0.015 0 0.1248 5,176
Emotional 62 0.012 0 0.1088 5,176
NewFunding 23 0.004 0 0.0665 5,176
Product 136 0.026 0 0.1599 5,167
Promotions 146 0.028 0 0.1655 5,176
Team 45 0.009 0 0.0928 5,176
Metric Variables Mean Median SD Min. Max. # Obs. Corr
Alarm 0.02 0 0.1349 0 1 5,176 −0.0049
#Investments 47 30 72.1444 0 1160 5,176 0.0586
Amount 497,352 141,500 1,254,637 1,260 7,497,250 5,176 −0.0557
FundingGoal 112,459 50,000 211,229 25,000 1,000,000 5,176 −0.0643
VDAX 18.20 17.63 3.2100 12.70 32.08 5,176 −0.0120
Portal 0.55 1 0.4977 0 1 5,176 0.0272
PostFunded 0.86 1 0.3489 0 1 5,176 0.0059
EquityShare 0.02 0.02 0.0246 0.0045 0.23 5,176 0.0040
%Invested 4.51 2.99 4.1910 0.0075 20 5,176 −0.0010
%Invested1Day 1.5876 0.7987 2.3098 0.0075 14.9975 71 −0.1948
Update1Day 0.2535 0 0.4381 0 1 71 −0.3133
variables, we use a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation. According to
Cameron and Miller (2015), a FGLS estimator can lead to efﬁciency gains compared with OLS
when accounting for dependencies within groups. We perform a modiﬁed Hausman test and, in
case the Hausman test leads us to dismiss the random effects estimator, we apply ﬁxed effects.
Otherwise we retain random effects. For binary dependent variables (i.e. the update categories),
we use a probit regression with standard errors clustered at campaign level. To test whether
there are differences between the funding period and the subsequent time, we use a dummy
for the funding period (FIN) as an explanatory variable. In case the coefﬁcient of this dummy
is signiﬁcantly different from zero with a positive (negative) value, signiﬁcantly more (less)
updates of this category are posted within the funding period. Table 5.4 and 5.5 present the
results.
We ﬁnd several signiﬁcant changes in the communication behavior of start-ups over time. To
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Table 5.4 Regression Results Funding Period, FGLS-Estimation.
This table reports upon regression results using the Updates Data Set and random-effects model (dependent variables: Positive,
Negative, Interval, WC) and ﬁxed-effects model (dependent variables: We, Past). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses. For regression models with random-effects the overall-R2 and for those with ﬁxed-effects the Within-R2 are shown. **
and *** denote signiﬁcance at a 5%- and 1%-level.
Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Additional
Positive Negative We Past Interval WC
FIN 0.0784 −0.0635 0.8012*** −0.3879** −55.8470*** −5.7234
(0.3662) (0.0535) (0.2519) (0.1518) (8.7571) (14.6006)
Constant 3.9339*** 0.3250*** 3.5056*** 1.7572*** 75.8570*** 250.3666***
(0.2440) (0.0552) (0.1516) (0.0913) (9.7145) (15.2357)
# Obs. 751 751 751 751 650 751
R2 0.0001 0.0002 0.0187 0.0163 0.1248 0.0007
1
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Table 5.5 Marginal Effects Funding Period, Probit-Estimation.
This table reports upon average marginal effects using the Updates Data Set and probit regressions. Cluster- and heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at a 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
Emotional Cooperation NewFunding Business Promotions
FIN 0.0782** 0.0150 0.0307 0.1442*** −0.1256**
(0.0342) (0.0421) (0.0233) (0.0484) (0.0520)
# Obs. 751 751 751 751 751
Pseudo−R2 0.0124 0.0003 0.0069 0.0238 0.0113
Additional
Team BusinessModel Certiﬁcation Product Campaign
FIN −0.0130 0.0298 −0.1112** 0.0237 0.2105***
(0.0295) (0.0442) (0.0565) (0.0480) (0.0341)
# Obs. 751 751 751 751 751
Pseudo−R2 0.0006 0.0006 0.0098 0.0004 0.0668
1
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Figure 5.1 Time to ﬁrst Update
Number of days until the ﬁrst update is published. Investment Data Set.
begin with, the frequency of updates differs signiﬁcantly between the funding period and the
period thereafter. During the funding period on average 56 days less go by than after the funding
period until a subsequent update is published. This result indicates that for many start-ups,
obtaining funding is indeed the primary goal of an equity crowdfunding campaign. Yet since
entrepreneurs continue to communicate with investors after the successful funding, non-monetary
motivations play a role in equity crowdfunding as well.
The sentiment of the updates is not signiﬁcantly different between the funding period and the
period thereafter. The updates contain neither less positive nor more negative words once the
funding has been completed. Hence we ﬁnd no evidence to support our ﬁrst hypothesis that
start-ups use a positive tone in updates during the funding period in order to encourage investors.
However, the results suggest that start-ups use different devices to the sentiment of the update
to reach out to the crowd. We observe a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the funding
period and updates that use emotional language (Emotional). Furthermore, the updates during
the funding period contain signiﬁcantly more ﬁrst person plural and less past tenses than updates
subsequent to the funding period. The latter relationship may exist due to the fact that most
start-ups run equity crowdfunding campaigns to obtain seed ﬁnance. Many of these start-ups
started their businesses recently and may not have had past events to report upon in the equity
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crowdfunding campaign. Overall, the results support our second hypothesis, which is that
updates during the funding period contain more linguistic devices evoking a feeling of group
cohesion and improving group identity than updates posted after the end of the campaign.
We also investigate whether the usage of updates with a speciﬁc content differs between the
funding period and the period thereafter. Since the latter period is, on average, longer than the
funding period, overall more disclosable information should be available in the later period.
However, two update categories, namely Business and Campaign have a signiﬁcant positive
relationship with FIN. The fact that signiﬁcantly more updates containing information about
the development of the businesses are published during the funding period represents evidence
in favor of our third hypothesis, being that entrepreneurs strategically use updates about new
developments of the start-up. The positive relationship between FIN and Campaign is not
surprising, either. This effect is driven by the fact that start-ups post more information about the
campaign progress, such as the achieved funding amount or the number of backers on a particular
day, during the funding period than after the successful funding. The two other categories that we
hypothesize are posted more often during the funding period, NewFunding and Cooperation, are
not signiﬁcantly associated with FIN in our analysis. This is possibly due to the fact that start-ups
indeed require relevant hard information to be able to publish updates in these categories. It is
less difﬁcult, for example, to publish easily obtainable sales ﬁgures (Business) in the funding
period than information about a new strategic cooperation that may simply not exist.
Overall, we ﬁnd some evidence in favor for our third hypothesis. One out of three categories,
namely Business, shows the expected correlation with the funding period. Therefore, the data
weakly supports our third hypothesis. Indeed the different results for Business, NewFunding and
Cooperation indicate that start-ups strategically change the content of updates during the funding
period and thereafter.
We also ﬁnd that start-ups post signiﬁcantly fewer updates about external certiﬁcation and
promotions during the funding period than thereafter. In many cases, the start-ups do not have
a fully developed product at the time of the equity crowdfunding campaign. Therefore, many
start-ups are not able to post updates about external certiﬁcation during the funding period.
Furthermore, the funding period is shorter than the following period. Due to this extended time
period, the probability of a disclosable hard information rises.
Block et al. (2018a) point out that the length of the update text is not signiﬁcantly associated
with investments. In line with this result, we do not ﬁnd any evidence to suggest that updates
during the funding period contain more words than subsequent updates.
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5.4.3 Multivariate Analysis: Communication dynamics during the funding period
Why do entrepreneurs post an update on a speciﬁc campaign day? To answer this question,
we estimate several statistical models. Our dependent variables are binary and equal to one if
an update or an update of a speciﬁc category is posted on a particular campaign day and zero
otherwise. We begin with panel models and apply a Hausman test. We have to dismiss the
random-effects model as it is inconsistent for our data. However, the ﬁxed-effects logit model
only uses variation within the campaign and therefore implies heavy losses of observations
depending on the update category. Furthermore, coefﬁcients for time-invariant regressors cannot
be estimated. Thus we use a pooled probit regression as a main model and include the ﬁxed-
effects model as a robustness check. Table 5.6 presents the results for the pooled probit with
’posting of an update’ and ’posting of an update with a speciﬁc content’ as dependent variables,
respectively.
In a ﬁrst step, we examine whether start-ups are more likely to post updates when they have
not reached the funding goal and the remaining funding period is short. We ﬁnd that effects
differ for the update categories. While we observe a signiﬁcant positive relationship between
the Alarm dummy and emotional updates as well as those updates which disclose information
about the business and campaign development, all other categories are insigniﬁcant. We cannot
estimate average marginal effects for updates about new funding sources and the entrepreneurial
team as these updates are never posted when the Alarm dummy equals one. The probability
of an update increases for the signiﬁcant categories, Campaign, Business, and Emotional, by
between 1.7% and 2.8% when the Alarm dummy equals one. On the one hand, the signiﬁcant
positive effect of the Alarm dummy on emotional updates and those disclosing information on
the business development suggest strategic communication behavior of start-ups. Since the
availability of disclosable information should not change over the course of the campaign, a
signiﬁcant change in the communication behavior indicates a strategic posting of updates. On
the other hand, NewFunding and Cooperation, the two other categories that increase investments
according to Block et al. (2018a) are not signiﬁcant in our data. However, this may again be
due to the fact that start-ups need disclosable information in order to publish updates within
these categories. Overall, we only ﬁnd weak evidence to support our forth hypothesis which is
that start-ups are more likely to post an update when the funding goal is not reached and the
remaining funding period is short.
In a second step, we focus on the competitive environment of equity crowdfunding campaigns.
We observe a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the total number of investments in equity
crowdfunding campaigns on the overall market during the previous day and the probability
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Table 5.6 Probability of Updates, Pooled Probit Estimation.
This table reports upon average marginal effects of the pooled probit regression using the investment data set. The natural logarithm of
Amount is used and #Investments is displayed in 1,000. Cluster- and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at a 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively.
Update Team BusinessModel Certiﬁcation Product Cooperation Campaign NewFunding Business Promotions Emotional
Alarm 0.0160 0.0207 0.0096 −0.0168 0.0065 0.0166* 0.0280*** 0.0151 0.0275*
(0.0220) (0.0190) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0060) (0.0100) (0.0075) (0.0132) (0.0149)
#Investmentst−1 0.1147*** 0.0285*** 0.0378* −0.0020 0.0534*** 0.0320** 0.0219 0.0092 0.0271 0.0663*** 0.0306**
(0.0335) (0.0094) (0.0227) (0.0268) (0.0186) (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0059) (0.0197) (0.0221) (0.0125)
lnAmountt−1 −0.0011 −0.0020 −0.0016 0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0000 0.0010 −0.0001 0.0009 −0.0007 −0.0006
(0.0032) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0013)
VDAX 0.0009 −0.0006 −0.0013 0.0002 0.0003 −0.0001 0.0007 −0.0004 −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0004
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007)
PostFunded −0.0017 −0.0103** −0.0054 0.0180** −0.0036 −0.0120*** 0.0093 0.0012 0.0005 0.0031 0.0220**
(0.0094) (0.0049) (0.0071) (0.0090) (0.0071) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0032) (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0098)
Portal 0.0041 0.0168*** 0.0072 0.0072 −0.0023 0.0161*** −0.0148*** −0.0005 0.0036 0.0024 −0.0055
(0.0121) (0.0055) (0.0075) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.0062) (0.0050) (0.0023) (0.0055) (0.0066) (0.0051)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-of-Week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174 5,174
Pseudo−R2 0.0597 0.1362 0.0527 0.0673 0.0618 0.0834 0.0678 0.0769 0.0346 0.0757 0.1013
1
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of an update in the focal campaign. An increase in the total number of investments by 1,000
is associated with an 11.47% increase in the probability of an update. In times of a highly
competitive environment, start-ups therefore attempt to draw attention to their campaigns
by posting updates, thereby attracting backers. This relationship also holds for most of the
update categories. Updates of the categories Team, BusinessModel, Product, Cooperation,
Promotions and Emotional are signiﬁcantly positively associated with the total number of
investments on the market. Overall, the results therefore support our ﬁfth hypothesis which is
that the likelihood of an update increases along with market competition.
Our second proxy for the campaign success, the amount invested prior to the previous day, is not
signiﬁcantly related to the probability of an update. With respect to the other control variables,
we observe a signiﬁcant relationship between the probability of an update and the ability to reach
the funding goal (PostFunded) as well as the VDAX for some categories. The portal on which
the equity crowdfunding campaign is run also plays a role for some of the update categories.
The sign, however, differs between the categories under consideration. While signiﬁcantly
more updates about the entrepreneurial team and collaborations of the start-up are posted on
Companisto, signiﬁcantly less updates are disclosed concerning the campaign development.
To consider endogeneity on a campaign level, we perform a ﬁxed-effects logit regression. The
results are presented in Table 5.9. They show a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the
probability of an update of the Business category and the Alarm dummy. Furthermore, we can
conﬁrm the previous results regarding the signiﬁcant positive impact of competing investments
on updates in general and on those that disclose information about Team, Product, Cooperation,
Business, Promotions, and Emotional in particular. In this way, we show that our main results
are not driven by unobserved time-invariant variables.
As an alternative model, we apply survival analysis and perform a Cox proportional hazard
model with the number of days before the update is posted as a dependent variable. By using
this model we are able to analyze the duration, i.e. the time that elapses before an update (or an
update with a particular content) is published considering various covariates. The Cox model
applies a semi-parametric method to estimate the impact of the covariates on the hazard rate. In
this context, the hazard rate represents the chance of an update being published on the next day
when taking into consideration the time period that has already passed. As we have so-called
multiple-failure data, i.e. each campaign can exhibit more than one update, we cluster the
standard errors at campaign level. The results are shown in Table 5.7. In this analysis we report
on hazard ratios, which can be interpreted as semi-elasticity or multiplicative effect.
The results are similar to those of the pooled-probit model. We can conﬁrm the positive
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Table 5.7 Probability of Updates, Cox Proportional Hazard Model.
The table reports upon hazard rates of the Cox Proportional Hazard Model using the investment data set. Dependent variable is deﬁned
by the duration to an update (or update category) in days. lnAmount·t and #Investments·t are interaction terms between the explanatory
variables lnAmount and #Investments and the time passed. The natural logarithm of Amount is used and #Investments is denoted in
100. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at a 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
Update Team BusinessModel Certiﬁcation Product Cooperation Campaign NewFunding Business Promotions Emotional
Alarm 0.7371 1.4153 1.0272 0.3588 0.6588 1.6056 2.4031* 1.0877 9.9387*
(0.1773) (0.6158) (1.0164) (0.2407) (0.4654) (0.7668) (1.1077) (0.4623) (12.4366)
#Investments 1.5872*** 2.4810*** 1.8896*** 1.0648 1.9002*** 1.1273 1.1086 1.3210 2.1069*** 0.9903 1.7229***
(0.1703) (0.4206) (0.1965) (0.2222) (0.1979) (0.2592) (0.2548) (0.3412) (0.2833) (0.1664) (0.2084)
#Investments·t 0.9975*** 0.9965*** 0.9976*** 0.9967*** 0.9968*** 0.9958***
(0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012)
lnAmount 0.6112* 0.1543*** 0.3343*** 0.2029*** 0.2794*** 0.2269*** 0.7969 0.2829 0.2522*** 0.4341*** 0.9095
(0.1636) (0.0567) (0.0732) (0.0461) (0.0627) (0.0583) (0.1721) (0.2463) (0.0889) (0.0866) (0.2529)
lnAmount·t 0.9956**
(0.0019)
PostFunded 0.4278*** 0.7108 0.5201 1.6949 0.6052 0.2565** 0.3364*** 1.0156 0.7186 0.5493 2.0761
(0.1239) (0.3700) (0.2118) (1.2275) (0.2436) (0.1509) (0.1337) (1.1181) (0.4672) (0.2142) (2.1669)
VDAX 1.0075 0.9891 0.9488 1.0018 0.9681 0.9890 0.9895 0.9556 0.9969 0.9697 0.9681
(0.0294) (0.0836) (0.0376) (0.0485) (0.0357) (0.0672) (0.0535) (0.1356) (0.0441) (0.0392) (0.0651)
Portal 1.7839** 20.9530*** 1.6994 4.0142*** 1.8455** 5.6336*** 0.4938** 0.8727 1.9614 1.5112 0.8261
(0.4483) (13.8625) (0.5835) (1.8277) (0.4619) (2.0697) (0.1626) (1.4189) (1.1101) (0.4483) (0.3156)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-of-Week Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380 380
1
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relationship between updates which disclose information about the business development as
well as emotional updates and the Alarm dummy. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a positive relationship
between the total number of investments and the probability of an update being posted for
most of the update categories. We test the proportionality assumption of the Cox model for
all explanatory variables. In case the assumption is violated, we include an interaction term
of the explanatory variable with time (t). The interaction term #Investments·t indicates that
the effect of competition of contemporary equity crowdfunding campaigns is not constant but
decreases over time both for updates in general and for those that disclose information about
the entrepreneurial team, the business model, the product, the business development, as well as
emotional updates.
Using the Cox proportional hazard model, our second proxy for the success of the campaign,
Amount, is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with the probability of an update. Start-ups with a
lower amount of funding are more likely to post an update. This result provides further evidence
of the strategic communication behavior of start-ups. Again, the interaction term between
Amount and the time period suggests a decreasing effect of Amount on the probability of an
update over time.
5.4.4 Further Analysis
Colombo et al. (2015), Kuppuswamy and Bayus (2017), and Vulkan et al. (2016) highlight
the fact that collective attention at the beginning of the campaign is crucial: crowdfunding
campaigns that attract investors in the early phase of the funding period are signiﬁcantly more
successful. Our descriptive analysis of the data has also shown that start-ups tend to post updates
soon after the campaign starts. In order to analyze the communication behavior of the ﬁrst stage
of the funding period in more detail, we consider the duration before the ﬁrst update is posted.
As a main model, we use a Cox proportional hazard model. An advantage of the survival analysis
in this context is that we deal with right censoring. We do not only consider the campaigns with
a ﬁrst update but also those campaigns that did not post an update during the funding period.
The results are presented in column 1 and 3 of Table 5.8. Furthermore, we apply a negative
binomial model to investigate the number of days before the ﬁrst update is published. Columns
2 and 4 in Table 5.8 show the results for the negative binomial estimations.
The updates posted on the very ﬁrst day of a campaign are not usually linked to the progress of
the campaign. Hence we use two different subsamples: one in which we omit updates posted on
the ﬁrst day (model 1 and 2) and one in which we include these updates (model 3 and 4).
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Table 5.8 Time to ﬁrst Update.
This table reports upon hazard rates of a Cox Proportional Hazard Model and marginal effects of
a negative binomial regression using the investment data set. The dependent variable constitutes
the time elapsed before the ﬁrst update is published (Time). Model 1 and 2 do not consider
updates posted on the very ﬁrst day of campaign, models 3 and 4 include updates posted on the
ﬁrst day. In models 1 and 3 we estimate a Cox Proportional Hazard Model in models 3 and 4 a
negative binomial regression. FundingGoal is denoted in 10,000 EUR. *, **, and *** denote
signiﬁcance at a 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
#Investmentst=1 1.0019 −0.0270
(0.0031) (0.0223)
%Investedt=1 0.8957 −0.6231
(0.1824) (1.4694)
Update1Day 2.3052* −1.2878
(1.0285) (2.9089)
Portal 1.1230 −4.1340 2.2760** −10.2619***
(0.5329) (3.1047) (0.9069) (3.6149)
EquityShare 224.4835 −24.4252 886.9319 −62.9241
(1335.9686) (47.3784) (5361.6060) (56.9074)
FundingGoal 224.4835 0.1046 0.9704 0.4514
(1335.9686) (0.3569) (0.0436) (0.4271)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs. 71 57 71 57
Pseudo−R2 0.0850 0.072 0.0832 0.0786
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In the ﬁrst two models we do not only consider explanatory variables that are determined before
the commencement of the campaign but also two variables indicating the success of the campaign
and the competitive environment on the ﬁrst day of the campaign. However, the results suggest
that neither the number of competing investments on the ﬁrst day nor the portion of the funding
goal reached on the ﬁrst day are signiﬁcantly associated with the time until the update is posted.
This indicates that the competitive environment and the success of a campaign are less important
for the posting of the ﬁrst update. In models 1 and 2 we also include a dummy variable indicating
whether or not an update has been posted on the ﬁrst campaign day. Interestingly, by using
the Cox proportional hazard model we ﬁnd that start-ups which post an update on the ﬁrst day
of a campaign make subsequent updates signiﬁcantly quicker. Hence start-ups which start to
communicate with investors early on appear to communicate more frequently later as well.
When also considering updates posted on the ﬁrst campaign day (model 3 and 4), we ﬁnd that
the portal is signiﬁcantly associated with the time before the ﬁrst update is posted. In particular,
for campaigns run on the platform Companisto, the time before the ﬁrst update is published
is signiﬁcantly shorter. This ﬁnding can be considered as evidence of the fact that portals are
critical concerning the promotion of entrepreneurs who run successful equity crowdfunding
campaigns.
5.5 Conclusion
Entrepreneurship literature has extensively analyzed the interactions between venture capitalists
or angel investors and entrepreneurs as well as the strategic behavior of each party (for example
Sahlman, 1990; Schwienbacher, 2007; Mohamed and Schwienbacher, 2016). However, up to
now, little has been known about the strategic behavior of entrepreneurs in crowdfunding. In
this paper, we investigate the communication behavior of start-ups during and after an equity
crowdfunding campaign. Such an investigation is important because, in contrast to venture
capitalists, crowd investors neither obtain information from an insider from the board of directors
nor do they receive news through contractual obligations such as speciﬁc covenants. Furthermore,
in crowdfunding, the form and the content of voluntary disclosure is not speciﬁcally regulated
through ad hoc disclosure requirements. Platforms often do not verify the disclosed information
and thus entrepreneurs can strategically publish information through updates.
We use a data set of German equity crowdfunding campaigns in order to examine ﬁve hypothesis
related to our research questions. The empirical evidence from our ﬁrst hypothesis shows
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that the probability of an update increases along with stronger competition from parallel equity
crowdfunding campaigns. There is only weak evidence in favor of a higher probability of updates
when the campaign comes to an end and the reaching the funding goal becomes increasingly
difﬁcult. While the latter can be regarded as a sign of regular communication, the ﬁrst ﬁnding
indicates that start-ups indeed place their updates in such a way as to attract more attention.
Regarding the question to what extent and how the communication behavior changes after the
funding has been granted, we consider three hypotheses. While the hypothesis being that the
tone of the updates is more positive during funding periods than thereafter, cannot be conﬁrmed,
we ﬁnd evidence that during the funding period start-ups use a language that evokes warm-glow
effects among potential investors and a feeling of group cohesion. Furthermore, we ﬁnd some
evidence to support the hypothesis that start-ups strategically post updates about the business
development during the funding period. Moreover, they clearly post fewer updates after the
funding has been ensured. All in all, this evidence indicates that during the funding period, the
start-ups strategically place their updates with respect to frequency, content and the purpose to
evoke emotions.
From these ﬁndings, we deduce the following implications for actors in the ﬁeld. Given that
equity crowdfunding often falls outside traditional securities regulation and, in particular, outside
the securities prospectus regime as well as the market abuse regulation, securities regulators
and platform providers should be wary about the content that start-ups post during an equity
crowdfunding campaign. If equity crowdfunding further increases in importance, rules for
investor communication may become necessary. For investors who primarily seek to maximize
their return and who are not attracted by non-monetary motives, the strategic communication
behavior may lead to sub-optimal investment decisions. This could be due possibly to blurred
informational content of some updates which may be targeted at receiving funds and which do not
accurately reveal real information. Whether a speciﬁc type of communication behavior of start-
ups indeed leads to lower returns for investors should be investigated once the respective data
becomes available. This is particularly relevant, given that little is know about the truthfulness of
the information communicated by the start-ups. If start-ups systematically and strategically post
fraudulent updates with the aim to increase investments, regulators have to consider enhancing
investor protection in the context of equity crowdfunding. Our research suggests that companies
that seek funding through an equity crowdfunding campaign should not rely too heavily on their
strategic behavior as it can be revealed through systematic investigation.
Our paper also has clear limitations. With 97 campaigns (updates data set) and 71 campaigns
(investment data set), our samples barely allow us to conduct extensive subsample analyses
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for different industries or founder teams. For example, larger founder teams may have better
capacities and could be more creative in strategically posting updates. At the same time, they
might also provide better checks and balances when it comes to the content of information
disclosure. We use solely data from German platforms. Yet major international equity crowd-
funding platforms such as Crowdcube and Seedrs have similar business models and also allow
for updates both during and after the funding period. Therefore, the ﬁndings from our German
data set can in principle be applied to many equity crowdfunding platforms worldwide, at least
in the sense of an anticipated behavior.
Future research may focus on the learning process of entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs with experi-
ence from multiple crowdfunding campaigns could apply a more sophisticated communication
strategy than ﬁrst-timers. Furthermore, the effects of mandatory disclosure in equity crowd-
funding could also be of interest. In the context of venture capital, Cumming and Knill (2012)
ﬁnd evidence for a positive effect of strict disclosure requirements on both the supply and the
performance of venture capital.
5.6 Appendix
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Table 5.9 Probability of Updates, Fixed-Effects Logit Estimation.
The table reports upon odd’s ratios of the ﬁxed-effects logit estimation using the investment data set. The natural logarithm of Amount is
used and #Investments is denoted in 1,000. *, **, and *** denote signiﬁcance at a 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level.
Update Team BusinessModel Certiﬁcation Product Cooperation Campaign NewFunding Business Promotions Emotional
Alarm 1.0796 0.0000 1.6330 1.2615 0.4786 0.9925 1.9731 0.0000 4.6661** 2.1227 1.156 ·107
(0.5572) (0.0040) (1.1140) (1.4469) (0.5096) (0.7899) (1.7112) (0.0062) (2.8930) (1.8249) (1.0813 ·1010)
#Investmentst−1 6.1381*** 39.2974*** 3.0519 2.3047 7.3930*** 7.1817** 2.2531 4.0563 5.6256* 7.9231*** 6.7288*
(3.4624) (45.0491) (2.7057) (2.8926) (5.4082) (6.0548) (2.9512) (6.1292) (5.4165) (5.2887) (6.8310)
lnAmountt−1 0.9674 0.8000 0.9574 0.9991 0.9353 0.9878 1.0819 1.0592 1.0713 0.9269 0.9108
(0.0552) (0.1424) (0.0803) (0.0931) (0.0800) (0.0987) (0.1183) (0.1927) (0.1026) (0.0815) (0.1306)
VDAX 1.0271 0.9175 0.9874 1.0404 1.0084 0.9895 0.9958 1.0040 1.0111 1.0307 0.9246
(0.0291) (0.0758) (0.0415) (0.0519) (0.0413) (0.0540) (0.0553) (0.0982) (0.0496) (0.0446) (0.0694)
PostFunded 0.7614 0.1115*** 0.6288 2.6651* 0.7796 1.0560 0.7010 1.1589 1.4739 0.6132 1.9475
(0.1839) (0.0802) (0.2177) (1.4163) (0.2633) (0.4815) (0.3667) (1.4006) (0.6196) (0.2231) (2.2276)
# Obs. 4,387 1,963 3,923 3,318 3,675 2,810 2,918 1,388 3,278 3,662 2,160
Pseudo−R2 0.0056 0.0578 0.0038 0.0069 0.0072 0.0064 0.0036 0.0053 0.0120 0.0108 0.0201
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Chapter 6
Paralyzed by shock and confused by glut: The portfolio
formation behavior of peer-to-business lending investors
This research project is joint work with Gregor Dorﬂeitner and Lars Hornuf and corresponds to
a working paper with the same name.
Abstract We study the investor behavior on a leading peer-to-business lending platform and
ﬁnd evidence of two new investment biases—a default shock bias and a deep market bias. First,
we ﬁnd investors to stop investing in new loans and to cease from diversifying their portfolio
after experiencing a loan default. This default shock signiﬁcantly worsens the risk-return proﬁle
of investors’ loan portfolios. Second, investors are unable to cope with a glut of loan campaigns.
Similar to the default shock bias, investors cease from investing in new loans and consequently
underdiversify their portfolios as more loans become available on the platform. Deeper markets
also result in a deterioration of investors’ risk-return proﬁles. Third, investment experience on
the platform reduces the effect of the deep market bias.
Keywords Behavioral Finance, Investment Bias, Peer-to-business lending, crowdlending,
RAROC, Diversiﬁcation
JEL Classification G11, G41, G40
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6.1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze two new investment mistakes: a default shock bias and a deep market
bias. We refer to a default shock bias when investors cease to diversify their portfolio after
experiencing a default in their existing portfolio. A deep market bias refers to an investment bias
that causes investors to underinvest in their portfolios because too many investment opportunities
are currently available on the market. Our research aptly provides two novel explanations
concerning why investors underdiversify their portfolios. By using data from peer-to-business
lending, we study whether experience of a loan default and the availability of many investment
opportunities affects the investment behavior of retail investors and consequently deteriorates
the risk-return proﬁle of their investment portfolios.
A natural benchmark for the two investment mistakes under scrutiny constitutes sophisticated
lenders such as banks. The literature on credit risk modeling and bank management evidences
that banks build portfolios based on the principle of diversiﬁcation and that they use quantitative
credit risk models to steer their loan portfolios (Hull, 2015). Such models explicitly consider
default probabilities and losses given default of loans as well as their contribution to the portfolio
risk and their proﬁtability. Moreover, banks do not usually adopt their investment strategies
at all after experiencing a loan default, as defaults are a well-anticipated part of their business
model.
Although in sum retail investors behave in line with what has been referred to as ’the wisdom of
the crowd’ (Kelley and Tetlock, 2013), on an individual level they have been shown to make
several investment mistakes (Calvet et al., 2009). In addition, their returns are often driven
by sentiments (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Bollen et al., 2011). Furthermore, the evidence shows
that retail investors, among others, underdiversify their portfolios (Goetzmann and Kumar,
2008; Calvet et al., 2009), adhere to a local bias (Seasholes and Zhu, 2010) and the disposition
effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 2002). Because retail investors are more prone to
exhibiting all sorts of biases, they may also be more likely than professional investors to suffer
from a default shock bias and a deep market bias. The digitalization of ﬁnancial services and
the recent advent of new ﬁnancial technologies (ﬁntechs) could principally render investment
mistakes less likely. Digital innovations have the potential to support retail investors in their
investment decisions. However, up to now, many new investment tools still had to prove their
value. Through investigating a robo-advice tool from India, D’Acunto et al. (2018) show that ex
ante well-diversiﬁed investors possess smaller portfolios, once they use the robo-advicing tool.
In crowdfunding markets, evidence on the performance of retail investors is mixed. While in the
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peer-to-peer lending context Lin and Viswanathan (2016) evidence that investors suffer from
a home bias, investors in equity crowdfunding appear to generate comparatively high returns
(Signori and Vismara, 2017). By analyzing data from the crowdlending platform Funding
Circle, Mohammadi and Shaﬁ (2017) show that institutional investors perform much better than
individual lenders in using the observable information on the platform website.
Peer-to-business lending is peculiar in many respects. First, unlike in peer-to-peer lending,
where borrowers seek to reﬁnance their personal debt or capital needs for consumption purposes,
peer-to-business lending involves the ﬁnancing of corporations. In order to make this type
of business model sustainable, borrowers must provide sophisticated information upon their
current ﬁnancial situation. While anyone can provide capital for these loan projects, it requires
at least some degree of ﬁnancial literacy to understand the projects that seek funding. Second,
investments in peer-to-business lending are possible with sums as small as 100 EUR. This makes
losses relatively easy to digest. Consequently, investors should continue making investments
and improve the diversiﬁcation of their portfolio independent of a default in their portfolio and
the number of available investment opportunities.
Furthermore, we address the question of whether the default shock bias and the deep market bias
are reduced by the experience of the investors. Through the use of Swedish data, Calvet et al.
(2007, 2009) have shown that ﬁnancially more sophisticated and better educated investors are
less likely to underdiversify their portfolios of stocks and mutual funds as well as to suffer from
risky share inertia and the disposition effect. Given that peer-to-business lending is an activity
that does not rely on ﬁnancial advice and that investors themselves have to actively identify and
choose investment projects on these markets, we expect more experienced investors to have a
better risk-return proﬁle and suffer from both biases to a lesser extent.
We start with deriving our three hypotheses concerning why investors may suffer from the
investment biases outlined above and why more experienced investors may suffer less from them.
Thereafter, we describe our data and outline the methods we apply. We then commence with a
series of tests of whether the default shock bias and a deep market bias exist. Our ﬁndings are
robust to different model speciﬁcations and dependent variables. In particular, we test whether
the loan defaults and a glut of investment opportunities reduce the probability of an investment
taking place at all, the number of new investments, the amount of new investments, and the
amount of new investments relative to the investor’s existing portfolio. If investors indeed suffer
from a default shock bias and a deep market bias, we expect all of these measures to decrease
and the risk-return relationship of the overall portfolio to worsen if a loan in the portfolio is
defaulted or the available investment opportunities are comparatively large. This is conﬁrmed by
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various tests. To measure the risk-return proﬁle, we construct Value at Risk (VaR) measures and
determine the risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). We then further examine whether the
risk-return proﬁles improve as investors gain more experience and suffer less from these biases.
Our data supports the conjecture that experienced investors are less prone to the deep market
bias. Our results are robust to different RAROCs based on different VaR estimates.
Our paper is among the ﬁrst to investigate investor behavior in peer-to-business lending. It
attempts to identify some of the mistakes especially less experienced investors make. Given that
the market leader Funding Circle has recently passed the mark of 5 bn USD lent worldwide, this
is a relevant market segment of crowdlending that is largely underresearched. Our paper does
not only help to understand existing investment biases better, but also informs policy makers and
regulatory initiatives like the ’FinTech Action plan’ that was recently proposed by the European
Commission (2018).
6.2 Theory and hypotheses
Peer-to-business lending represents a new asset class for retail investors. Before the rise of
peer-to-business lending platforms, investing in small corporate loans was almost exclusively
available to institutional investors. Investors on online lending platforms cannot immediately
obtain a diversiﬁed portfolio. They have to invest continuously in new loan projects over time
in order to beneﬁt from diversiﬁcation. Furthermore, many retail investors have no experience
in corporate loan investments and do not receive professional investment advice. Before we
outline our hypotheses on possible behavioral biases, we provide a theory on how investors
should rationally build a loan portfolio in peer-to-business lending.
6.2.1 A short theory of rational loan portfolio formation
Due to the nature of their business, banks can be regarded as being professional investors in
loan portfolios. They use credit risk models and further tools based on these models to control
risks and the risk-return relationship in their loan portfolios (Hull, 2015). Besides the purely
regulatory requirements, which instruct them how to calculate the VaR, they typically run their
own internal credit risk models for portfolio steering decisions (Hull, 2015).
The risk capital of ﬁnancial institutions is a scarce resource that is meant to cover the losses from
lending activities. Because the risk capital should be used efﬁciently, it has become a standard
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approach to consider the RAROC, which measures the portfolio return over the risk capital
employed, when it comes to the optimal portfolio formations of ﬁnancial institutions (Hull,
2015).1 While the numerator of the RAROC is based on the expected proﬁt of the portfolio, that
is the interest charged minus the reﬁnancing costs and expected loan losses, the denominator
is essentially based on the VaR.2 It can also be employed for the decision on expanding or
reducing certain lines of business (Buch et al., 2011). Investors make investments that increase
the RAROC and refrain from making those that reduce the RAROC. The literature on risk
capital allocation is concerned with the question of how to allocate the overall risk capital to the
existing business lines in order to calculate a RAROC for every line of business (Perold, 2005).
However, in our setting retail investors only invest in peer-to-business loans, so that the risk
capital allocation to several business lines is not required.
Banks hold large loan portfolios, which are generally well-diversiﬁed (Casu et al., 2006). From
a RAROC perspective this is perfectly rational. While the numerator (as quantity relative to the
portfolio size) remains roughly the same if we were to add or remove average proﬁtable loans,
the denominator decreases with an increasing number of loans at least as long as the portfolio is
not well-diversiﬁed. If a bank holds only a small portfolio, it is therefore advisable to diversify
into new loans, as the expected return does not change if the loan has an average interest margin,
but the RAROC will increase due to a smaller VaR.
For banks, loan losses—even if the vast majority of loans reveals no defaults—are everyday
business and are considered ex ante in the numerator and the denominator of the RAROC. It
is also part of their regular business to extend new loans independent of whether old loans are
paid back or default (Roy, 2016). If the number of defaults is higher than anticipated in the
calculations leading to the RAROC, the bank will not usually cease to extend loans but instead
update its credit risk model.
6.2.2 Hypotheses
Personal experience affects future investment decisions and helps to explain the heterogeneity in
portfolio choices. Consistent with reinforcement learning theory (see e.g. Cross, 1973; Kaustia
and Knu¨pfer, 2008), investors tend to repeat investment strategies that have resulted in favorable
1It should be noted that the concept exists in several variants, some of which are also called RORAC (return on
risk-adjusted capital).
2Typically, the unexpected loss is used, which is deﬁned as the portfolio VaR at a 99.5 % or a 99.9 % level minus the
expected loss.
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outcomes and tend to avoid investment strategies that have resulted in less favorable outcomes.
Investment decisions can be affected by both the personal investment experience (see e.g. Kaustia
and Knu¨pfer, 2008; Choi et al., 2009; Chiang et al., 2011; Andersen et al., 2018) and broader
economic circumstances an investor has experienced such as a recession or particular labor
market conditions (see e.g. Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Knu¨pfer et al., 2017; Laudenbach
et al., 2017). Andersen et al. (2018) highlight that stock investors who have suffered losses from
defaults in the ﬁnancial crisis subsequently change their risk-taking behavior. We conjecture
that even in comparatively good economic conditions a default in the crowdlending portfolio
may be a reason to alter the investment behavior. Investors, who experience a loan default may
draw the conclusion from this event that they have made a mistake in trusting the platform
and the lender. Consequently, they may reduce their exposure or stop participating in the new
crowdlending market altogether. As diversiﬁcation has to be achieved over time in this new
asset class, investors tend to have small portfolios and may therefore be more greatly affected
by a default in their loan portfolio compared with investors of well diversiﬁed stock portfolios.
However, such behavior may well be irrational and constitute a bias if refraining from investing
deteriorates the risk-return proﬁle of the crowdlending portfolio. We therefore conjecture:
Hypothesis 1: Investors suffer from a default shock bias that decreases their readiness to further
diversify their portfolio and thereby deteriorates their risk-return proﬁle.
It has often been shown that human decision making capacity deteriorates if individuals receive
too much information. This phenomenon has been referred to as information overload and
has been found in various domains such as organization science, marketing, accounting, and
management information systems (see Eppler and Mengis (2004) for an excellent review of the
literature). By using an experimental setting, Tuttle and Burton (1999) show that information
overload also exists if individuals analyze investments. In particular, they show that the human
capacity to process information limits on the amount of information that can be processed per
unit of time. Moreover, there is also extensive evidence of the fact that consumers suffer from
choice overload (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Iyengar et al., 2004; Dhar, 1997; Shaﬁr et al., 1993),
which results in a type of behavior in which individuals either choose the default option or no
option at all if confronted with too many prospects.
In the realm of crowdfunding, investors can inform themselves about active projects on the
respective Internet platform. Being aware of the fact that investors may be overstrained in
searching the entirety of active projects that suit their portfolio, many platforms have imple-
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mented ﬁlters that enable them to search, for example, for speciﬁc business segments or project
volumes. Nevertheless, investors still confront the task to identify the relevant ﬁlters to place
and which projects to look for. Empirical research on crowdfunding evidences that the number
of projects that is active on a particular day impacts crowd support. This result has been shown
to be relatively robust and holds for reward-based crowdfunding (Kuppuswamy and Bayus,
2017), equity-crowdfunding (Hornuf and Schwienbacher, 2017), and peer-to-business lending
(Cumming and Hornuf, 2018). Crowd support can deteriorate for two reasons—either because
potentially new investors do not join the community or existing investors amend their investment
behavior. In our empirical analysis, we test whether changes in the behavior of existing investors
affect crowd support and conjecture that the more loan campaigns become available, the less
likely it is that investors invest in a loan. We refer to markets with many investment opportunities
as deep markets and hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Investors suffer from a deep market bias that decreases their readiness to further
diversify their portfolio and thereby deteriorates their risk-return proﬁle.
Investors tend to make better investment decisions as they gain more experience (Korniotis
and Kumar, 2011; Nicolosi et al., 2009). Moreover, experienced investors are less prone to
behavioral biases. Feng and Seasholes (2005) and Dhar and Zhu (2006) show that the disposition
effect, which describes the tendency of investors not to realize losses, decreases with investor
experience and sophistication. Calvet et al. (2009) ﬁnd that more experienced investors are less
likely to suffer from the disposition effect and to underdiversify their portfolios. Moreover, in
an earlier paper, Calvet et al. (2007) evidence that more sophisticated households incur higher
returns because they invest more efﬁciently and more aggressively. We study whether experience
affects the investment performance in general, as well as the magnitude of the default shock bias
and the deep market bias in particular. We thus hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3a: Investors with more experience tend to improve their risk-return proﬁle.
Hypothesis 3b: Investors with more experience suffer less from the default shock bias and the
deep market bias.
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6.3 Data
6.3.1 Summary statistics of loan data
For the following analysis, we use data from Zencap, which is the ﬁrst and the largest German
peer-to-business lending platform. We obtain data from the time of the inception of the platform
in March 2014 until the merger of Zencap with the platform Funding Circle in November
2015. Since the merger, Funding Circle has been the world’s leading crowdlending platform for
corporate loans.
The platform facilitates loans for small and medium-sized corporations. These corporations post
their loan projects with the requested principal amount as well as several ﬁrm characteristics
and ﬁnancial information on the platform. Corresponding to the estimated default risk, the
platform assigns a rating ranging from A (best) to E (worst) as well as a corresponding interest
rate. The investors can invest in the loan campaign within a pre-deﬁned funding period.3 If the
invested amount reaches the principal amount at the end of the funding period, a loan campaign
is successful and the loan is funded. After receiving the funds, the borrowers re-pay their loans
in the form of ﬁxed monthly annuities, due at the middle of each month.
In the observation period, 414 borrowers applied for a loan via the platform. Tables 6.2 and 6.3
show the descriptive statistics of these corporations and of the investors backing the loans. On
average, the platform assigned a nominal interest rate of 7.38 % to these corporations. Not all
of the corporations were proﬁtable. The net income ranges between a minimum of −346,300
EUR and a maximum of over 1 m EUR. In total, 367 loan applications were successful. The
platform does not provide any particular information on the repayment status of the loans but
states that within the observation period only a handful of loans defaulted. We made use of the
forum P2P-kredite.com (http://www.p2p-kredite.com) to research which loans defaulted within
the observation period. We observe ﬁve borrowers who declared insolvency before November
2015, equaling 1.36 % of all successfully funded corporations. However, we do not consider
the defaults of successfully funded corporations which declared insolvency after the end of the
observation period. In total, 2,129 investors backed the loans on the platform. Overall, 89 % of
the investors are male. Moreover, the average investor is 41 years old.
3In general, the funding period lasts 21 days. However, corporations can extend the funding period to a maximum of
61 days.
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Table 6.1 Deﬁnition of variables.
Borrower Variables
EBIT EBIT of the corporation running the loan project, in EUR.
Employees Number of employees in the corporation running the loan project.
Equity Equity of the corporation running the loan project, in EUR.
Foundation Year Foundation year of the corporation running the loan project.
Lenders Total number of lenders backing a loan project.
Loan Duration Duration of the loan in month.
Net Income Net income of the corporation running the loan campaign.
Rating Class Rating class of the campaign as assigned by the platform. Ranging from A+
to C−.
Investor Variables
Age Age of the investor.
Gender Gender of the investor (1 = female).
Portfolio Variables
#Campaigns Number of simultaneously active loan projects on the platform on each
valuation date.
Distance Mean distance of all the active loan projects on the valuation date and the
investor in km.
ExpReturn Expected Return of the portfolio calculated as the weighed average of the
expected returns of the loan projects the investor invested in on each
valuation date. The expected return for each loan is calculated as the nominal
yield times the invested amount minus the expected loss as described by the
rating class.
Experience Experience of the investor on the platform in months. Calculated as the date
on valuation date minus the account creation date.
InsolvDummy Dummy Variable indicating whether the borrower declared insolvency
previous to the valuation date (1 = insolvency).
#Inv Total number of investments and investor invested in until the valuation date.
Min Distance Minimal distance of all the active loan projects on the valuation date and the
investor in km.
NewInvAmount Amount the investor newly invested on each valuation date, in EUR.
NewInvDummy Dummy variable indicating whether the investor made at least one new
investment on the valuation date.
#NewInv Number of investments an investor newly invested on the valuation date.
NewInvRel Amount newly invested over the portfolio value of the previous valuation
date.
Nominal Yield Nominal yield of the loan project as assigned by the platform.
Principal Amount Principal amount of the loan, in EUR.
RAROC Risk-adjusted return on capital (RAROC). Calculated as the expected return
of the portfolio divided by the value at risk of the portfolio.
Success Dummy Dummy Variable indicating whether the campaign was successful
(1 = successful).
VaR Value at Risk (VaR) of the portfolio. The VaR is a relative measure and is
calculated as the risk capital over the total invested amount on each valuation
date. The 99.5 % VaR is used if not stated otherwise. For a detailed
calculation of the VaR, see the Appendix.
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Table 6.2 Descriptive statistics of the metric variables of the corporations and the investors. The variables
are deﬁned in Table 6.1.
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Borrower Characteristics
Nominal Yield 414 0.0738 0.0188 0.0408 0.1564
Principal Amount 414 72,183.57 46,889.03 10,000 250,000
Loan Duration 414 34.01 13.80 6 60
Success Dummy 414 0.89 0.31 0 1
Foundation Year 414 2001 17.19 1784 2014
Equity 414 160,649.70 519,186.70 −1,214,900 7,492,967
EBIT 414 93,367.33 127,433.80 −379,600 1,291,700
Net Income 414 66,744.35 101,940.60 −346,300 1,112,533
Employees 414 17.55 28.51 1 300
Lenders 414 84.70 47.28 4 302
Investor Characteristics
Age 2,129 40.89 12.57 18.44 107.16
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics of the categorical variables of the corporations and the investors. In general,
borrower variables have 414 observations. For InsolvDummy, only the 367 successfully funded
corporations are considered. Investor variables have 2,129 observations. The variables are
deﬁned in Table 6.1.
Borrower Characteristics
Rating Class A+ A B C C−
Absolute frequency 86 21 196 96 15
Relative frequency 20.77 % 5.07% 47.34% 23.19% 3.62%
Success Dummy 1 (Yes) 0
Absolute frequency 367 47
Relative frequency 88.65 % 11.35%
InsolvDummy 1 (Yes) 0
Absolute frequency 5 362
Relative frequency 1.36 % 98.63%
Investor Characteristics
Gender 1 (Yes) 0
Absolute frequency 239 1,890
Relative frequency 11.23 % 88.77%
125
Chapter 6 The portfolio formation behavior of peer-to-business lending investors
6.3.2 Construction and summary statistics of portfolio data
Because we are interested in investor speciﬁc VaRs and RAROCs and loan repayments only take
place once per month, we create 20 valuation dates in the middle of each month starting from
15th April 2014 and ending 15th November 2015. We set the valuation dates immediately after
the repayment dates. In a ﬁrst step, we determine how much investors have invested in each loan
at each valuation date, also considering the payback from the monthly annuities. Thus, we derive
a loan portfolio for each investor on each valuation date and construct a monthly panel data set
with valuation dates forming the time dimension and the investor as a cross-sectional dimension.
In a next step, we use this monthly panel data to calculate aggregated portfolio variables. All
portfolio variables are weighted with the amount invested in each loan on each valuation date.
Furthermore, we observe the new investment decisions the investors make on each valuation
date.
Table 6.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the portfolio variables. The investment behavior
varies greatly within the group of investors and the valuation dates. On 36 % of the valuation
dates, investors decide to invest in at least one new project. The mean amount the investors
invest equals 559 EUR and is well above the minimum investment of 100 EUR even though
we have many observations with zero investments. The number of new investments in loan
projects ranges from 0 to 41. On average, investors hold portfolios consisting of 10 different
loans. Within the observation period, 99 % of all investors hold 78 loans or less. However, in
order to achieve a well-diversiﬁed portfolio, that is one in which the portfolio risk scales linearly
with portfolio size, a portfolio of several hundred loans would be necessary.4
We measure the effect of the investment decisions on the risk and the return of the portfolio
through several variables. The VaR, at a 99.5 % conﬁdence level, measures the relative loss
risk of the portfolio. The descriptive analysis of VaR shows that, on average, 99.5 % of the
losses will not exceed 42 % of the portfolio value. The average expected return of the portfolios
equals 6 %. To measure the risk-return proﬁle we combine the mentioned two measures and
obtain the RAROC. The RAROC is calculated as the expected return of a portfolio over the
VaR. A detailed explanation of the VaR determination of the portfolios and the calculation of the
RAROC can be found in the Appendix. To analyze the risk-return proﬁle over time, we observe
changes in the RAROC (∆RAROC). An increase of the RAROC indicates an improvement of the
risk-return proﬁle. By contrast, a decrease implies a deterioration of the risk-return proﬁle.
4Dorﬂeitner and Pﬁster (2014) show that in order to have constant per unit risk, which can be interpreted as having
a well diversiﬁed portfolio, the minimum number of loans ranges from roughly 200 (VaR at 95 % level and loan
default probability of 0,5 %) to more than 500 (VaR at 99.9 % level and loan default probability of 10 %).
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics of the portfolios. Monthly panel data for 2,219 investors and 20 valuation
dates. The variables are deﬁned in Table 6.1. As many investors created their accounts after the
beginning observation period, several portfolio variables are not available for all investors on
all valuation dates.
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
#Campaigns 42,580 34.75 16.63 6 61
Distance 42,580 320.32 260.84 149.22 7972.41
Min Distance 42,580 55.31 259.53 0 7703.35
Experience 22,087 6.7015 4.82 0 19.87
NewInvAmount 22,087 558.50 2014.29 0 130,000
NewInvDummy 22,087 0.36 0.48 0 1
#NewInv 22,087 1.31 2.99 0 41
NewInvRel 18,405 0.22 1.31 0 74.00
#Inv 20,398 10.32 17.18 1 315
ExpReturn 20,398 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.13
VaR 20,398 0.42 0.32 0.04 1
RAROC 20,398 0.23 0.17 0.03 1.24
∆RAROC 18,265 0.02 0.05 −0.27 0.43
InsolvDummy 20,398 0.01 0.04 0 1
As described in Table 6.8, the change of the RAROC is, on average, positive when investors
choose new investments, yet, in approximately 17 % of the cases new investments result in a
negative change of the RAROC. Not investing in new loans can also have a positive, negative or
zero effect on the risk-return proﬁle.
Table 6.5 Descriptive statistics of the change of the RAROC.
Variable N Mean SD Min 10th Pctile Median 90th Pctile Max
NewInvDummy = 1
∆RAROC 6,422 0.0461 0.0714 −0.2676 −0.0465 0.0453 0.1305 0.4257
NewInvDummy = 0
∆RAROC 11,843 −0.0007 0.0115 −0.1928 −0.0033 0 0.0004 0.2254
Furthermore, we determine the experience of each investor on the platform on each valuation
date. Therefore, we calculate the difference between the valuation date and the date of the
account creation for each investor. Moreover, the descriptive analysis suggests that on 1 % of
the valuation dates, an investor has already experienced at least one of the ﬁve insolvencies that
occurred on the platform. We also investigate the competitive environment of the campaigns.
On average, 34 loan campaigns were active on a given day. While the average distance between
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these active loan projects and an investor amounts to more than 300 km, the distance between
the closest active loan campaign and an investor is, on average, only 55 km.
6.4 Methodology
To examine which factors impact on the investment behavior, we estimate the effects of several
covariates on the investment decision of each investor i at each valuation date t. We specify the
following regression equation:
InvestmentDecisioni,t =α +β1 · InsolvDummyi,t +β2 ·#Campaignsi,t +β3 ·Distancei,t
+β4 ·Experiencei,t +β5 · (Experiencei,t)2+β6 ·#Invi,t−1
+β7 ·Genderi+β8 ·Agei,t +β9 ·TimeFE+ εi,t
(6.1)
where Investment Decision represents one of four different dependent variables, namely NewIn-
vDummy, log(NewInvAmount), #NewInv and NewInvRel. NewInvDummy is a binary variable
equaling one if the investor makes at least one new investment by the next valuation date.
Therefore, we apply a logit regression for this speciﬁcation. For the natural logarithm of the
newly invested capital (NewInvAmount) as well as the newly invested capital related to the total
portfolio value of the previous valuation date (NewInvRel), we estimate OLS regressions. Finally,
since the number of new investments is a count variable and our data suffers from overdispersion,
we use a negative binomial model to examine the effect of the covariates on #NewInv.
To test our hypotheses we include the explanatory variables InsolvDummyi,t , #Campaignsi,t , as
well as Experiencei,t . To account for potential non-linear effects of experience, we also add the
squared term of experience. Prior research indicates that crowdfunding investors suffer from a
local bias (Lin and Viswanathan, 2016). Therefore, we include the average distance between the
investors and the active loan campaigns at each valuation date (Distancei,t) as a control variable.
Furthermore, the size of the portfolio is shown to be related to the investment behavior (Kaustia
and Knu¨pfer, 2008; Goetzmann et al., 2015; Laudenbach et al., 2017). We thus add the number
of loans in the portfolio at the last valuation date (#Invi,t−1). Moreover, we control for the age
and the gender of the investor, who have been shown to inﬂuence risk taking and the investment
behavior (see e.g. Barber and Odean, 2001; Agnew et al., 2003; Bajtelsmit et al., 1999). In all
models, we cluster the standard errors at investor level. Furthermore, we include time ﬁxed
effects (Time FE).
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In a next step, we analyze the determinants of changes of the risk-return proﬁle of the portfolios.
We use our monthly panel data to investigate the changes of the RAROC for the investor i on
the valuation date t. To address potential endogeneity concerns resulting from the simultaneous
determination of the investment decision and the change of the RAROC, we implement an
instrumental variable approach. We estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model. In
the ﬁrst stage, we predict the Investment Decision using equation (6.1). In this context, the
hypothesis-related variables InsolvDummy, #Campaigns, and the control variable Distance serve
as instruments. In the second stage, we use the predicted value of the investment decision
( ̂InvestmentDecisioni,t) instead of the investment decision and estimate the following regression
equation:
∆RAROCi,t =α +β1 · ̂InvestmentDecisioni,t +β2 ·Experiencei,t +β3 · (Experiencei,t)2
+β4 ·#Invi,t−1+β5 ·Genderi+β6 ·Agei,t +β7 ·TimeFE+ εi,t
(6.2)
We control for the relevance of our instruments by ensuring that the F-statistic of the ﬁrst
stage is above a value of 10 (Bascle, 2008; Staiger and Stock, 1997). Furthermore, we test the
exogeneity condition of the instruments with the use of a test of overidentifying restrictions
(Bascle, 2008).
6.5 Results
6.5.1 What are the determinants of new investment decisions?
In the ﬁrst part of our analysis, we investigate which factors drive investors towards making
new investment decisions. Table 6.6 displays the results. Moreover, we test for the inﬂuence of
experience in more detail in Table 6.7.
For the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd that InsolvDummy is signiﬁcantly negatively related
to new investment decisions. This suggests that investors indeed tend to recoil from new
investments after experiencing a default. The economic signiﬁcance is large as well. All else
equal, the second speciﬁcation suggests that investors who have experienced a default invest
approximately 93 % less5 than investors who have never encountered such a negative event.
5Calculated as e−2.71−1=−93.35%.
129
Chapter 6 The portfolio formation behavior of peer-to-business lending investors
This result provides strong evidence in favor of our ﬁrst hypothesis, being that investors inherit a
default shock bias and tend to stop investing in an asset class after experiencing a default within
this asset class. Unlike banks, investors appear to be surprised that loans can default and thus,
they irrationally change their investment behavior after experiencing such an insolvency.
Table 6.6 Regression Results for the Investment behavior using logit (dep. variable: NewInvDummy.),
ordinary least squares (dep. variable: log(NewInvAmount), and NewInvRel) and negative
binomial model (dep. variable: #NewInv). Standard errors are clustered on investor level
and shown in parentheses. For the logit and the negative binomial model, marginal effects at
means are displayed instead of coefﬁcients. In the last speciﬁcation, we additionally include an
interaction term between #Campaigns and the experience (Exp·#Camp). The symbols *, **,
and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are
deﬁned in Table 6.1.
Dependent
Variable
NewInvDummy log(NewInvAmount) #NewInv NewInvRel log(NewInvAmount)
InsolvDummy −3.4795*** −2.7129*** −7.4936*** −0.0394 −1.114***
(0.6550) (0.6898) (1.3640) (0.0405) (0.1336)
#Campaigns −0.0400*** −0.2721*** −0.0808*** −0.2135*** −0.2474***
(0.0077) (0.0614) (0.0157) (0.0751) (0.0623)
log(Distance) −0.0199 −0.0908 −0.0135 0.0018 −0.1091
(0.0267) (0.1803) (0.0676) (0.0371) (0.1784)
Experience −0.0457*** −0.2736*** −0.1776*** −0.1477*** −0.3321***
(0.0046) (0.0285) (0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0405)
(Experience)2 0.0012*** 0.0084*** 0.0056*** 0.0066*** 0.0099***
(0.0003) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0016)
#Invt−1 0.0154*** 0.0671*** 0.0413*** −0.0006** 0.0724***
(0.0009) (0.0056) (0.0018) (0.0003) (0.0061)
Gender −0.0899*** −0.5629*** −0.2327*** −0.0508 −0.5654***
(0.0207) (0.1042) (0.0614) (0.0362) (0.1036)
Age 0.0031*** 0.0272*** 0.0076*** 0.0025*** 0.0278***
(0.0005) (0.0033) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0033)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Exp·#Camp 0.0099***
(0.0016)
Constant 6.6454*** 4.6493*** 6.5136***
(1.5027) (1.4550) (1.4953)
N 18,315 18,315 18,315 18,315 18,315
Pseudo-/
Adj. R2
0.1606 0.1754 0.0820 0.0370 0.1816
Furthermore, our results show that the number of simultaneously active loan campaigns is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to new investment decisions in all four speciﬁcations. This
indicates that investors invest less when they have a great number of investment possibilities. In
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the data, one additional active loan project decreases the invested capital by almost 24 %.6 This
result is consistent with our second hypothesis.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the effect of experience is U-shaped. Initially, experience is negatively
associated with new investment decisions in all four speciﬁcations. In particular, investors appear
to invest more when they are relatively new on the platform, which contradicts the hypothesis
3a. However, the squared term of experience indicates a reversal point, given the signiﬁcantly
positive coefﬁcient of the squared term. This result suggests that experience has a negative
inﬂuence on new investment decisions but the effect diminishes with more experience. At a
certain tipping point the relationship reverses. As the squared terms in non-linear models cannot
intuitively be interpreted, we plot the predictive margins for different levels of experience for the
logit and the negative binomial models and ﬁnd that the negative effect of experience weakens for
more experienced investors. There are several plausible explanations for this type of investment
behavior. On the one hand, investors could start using the platform by investing a certain amount
of capital in several loan projects. Subsequently, they observe how their investments develop
without investing further capital. If they are satisﬁed with their investments, they start investing
again. This point could mark the reversal point in our analysis. On the other hand, the investment
behavior could be driven by liquidity. Again, investors commence by investing a certain amount
of capital. Then they wait until they receive sufﬁcient repayments from their loan investments
before they invest again. However, we test for the inﬂuence of the aggregated cash repayments
and do not ﬁnd evidence of a relationship between aggregated liquidity and the investment
behavior.7
Turning to control variables, we ﬁnd several interesting effects as well. The number of previously
invested loan projects is signiﬁcantly positively related to new investment decisions for the ﬁrst
three speciﬁcations, suggesting that investors who already have invested in more loans are more
likely to invest again. Furthermore, the data suggests that women and young people have a
lower propensity to undertake new investments. The ﬁrst relationship could be explained by the
fact that women generally tend to trade less and are more risk averse than men (see e.g. Barber
and Odean, 2001; Agnew et al., 2003; Dwyer et al., 2002). That younger people have a lower
propensity to invest is in line with the literature, which shows that older people tend to trade
more (see e.g. Agnew et al., 2003). Additionally, age may serve as a proxy for wealth, indicating
that wealthier individuals invest more (see e.g. Bajtelsmit et al., 1999). The coefﬁcient of the
mean distance of the active loan projects, however, is not signiﬁcantly different to zero. This
6Calculated as e−0.27−1=−23.82%.
7Results can be provided upon request.
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holds true for all four dependent variables. Thus, we do not ﬁnd evidence of the fact that the
geographical distance plays a role in peer-to-business lending.
To test hypothesis 3b, we divide our data set into two subsamples based on the mean experience
of the investors: the ﬁrst subsample contains all observations of investors with little experience
on the platform (experience of less than 200 days), and the second subsample includes all
observations with experienced investors (experience of 200 days or more). Table 6.7 provides
the results. In the section concerning robustness checks, we repeat the analysis using different
levels of experience to create our subsamles.
We ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of the default shock bias persists not only for new investors but also
for investors with longer experience. The coefﬁcient of InsolvDummy is negative and highly sig-
niﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Moreover, the results show a different impact of the simultaneously
active loan campaigns on the investment decision depending on the level of experience. While
new investors tend to invest less when they have more investment opportunities, experienced
investors appear to act more rationally and invest more when they have greater investment
choices. To examine the effect of experience on the deep market bias in more detail, we include
an interaction term between the number of active campaigns and experience in our main model.
Results are shown in the last column of Table 6.6. The signiﬁcant positive sign of the coefﬁcient
of the interaction term suggests that experienced investors suffer from the deep market bias to a
lesser extent. Overall, the results provide evidence for hypothesis 3b.
6.5.2 What drives changes in the risk-return profile of the portfolios?
In addition to the analysis of the investment behavior, we examine how these investment
decisions, as well as experience and further controls, impact the risk-return proﬁle of the
investors. Note that new investment decisions also include the decision not to make a new
investment on a valuation date. We estimate three different models. The ﬁrst model includes
all hypothesis-related variables, but not the new investment decision. In the second model, we
add the investment decision. In the third model, which we regard as being our main model,
we estimate a 2SLS model, considering potential endogeneity concerns due to simultaneous
determination of the investment decision and the change in the RAROC. Table 6.8 provides the
results.
The ﬁrst model indicates that InsolvDummy and #Campaigns have a signiﬁcant negative impact
on the change of the RAROC. However, this effect vanishes if we include the new investment
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Table 6.7 Subsample-Regression Results for the investment behavior using logit (dep. variable: NewInvDummy.), ordinary least squares (dep.
variable: log(NewInvAmount), and NewInvRel) and negative binomial model (dep. variable: #NewInv). Standard errors are clustered on
investor level and shown in parentheses. For the logit and the negative binomial model, marginal effects at means are displayed instead
of coefﬁcients. The symbols *, **, and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are deﬁned
in Table 6.1.
Experience < 200 days Experience ≥ 200 days
NewInvDummy log(NewInvAmount) #NewInv NewInvRel NewInvDummy log(NewInvAmount) #NewInv NewInvRel
InsolvDummy −3.4298*** −3.4769*** −20.0320*** −0.9532*** −2.7082*** −2.6925*** −5.4842*** −0.1879***
(0.8596) (1.1408) (7.6326) (0.1398) (0.5020) (0.6788) (0.9784) (0.0452)
#Campaigns −0.0468*** −0.3531*** −0.1844*** −0.2422*** 0.0172*** 0.0242*** 0.0458*** 0.0013***
(0.0089) (0.0618) (0.0288) (0.0742) (0.0048) (0.0025) (0.0118) (0.0004)
log(Distance) 0.0074 0.1267 0.1328 0.0309 −0.0331 −0.2795 −0.0691 −0.0558
(0.0360) (0.2551) (0.1681) (0.0601) (0.0366) (0.2215) (0.0847) (0.0399)
#Invt−1 0.0562*** 0.4960*** 0.3562*** −0.1550*** 0.0108*** 0.0559*** 0.0248*** −0.0003
(0.0056) (0.0361) (0.0286) (0.0191) (0.0008) (0.0048) (0.0015) (0.0002)
Gender −0.1190*** −0.7121*** −0.5198*** −0.0705 −0.0864*** −0.4957*** −0.1708** −0.0404***
(0.0265) (0.1390) (0.1380) (0.0701) (0.0300) (0.1396) (0.0772) (0.0123)
Age 0.0024*** 0.0202*** 0.0109*** 0.0099*** 0.0026*** 0.0223*** 0.0048*** 0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0043) (0.0014) (0.0005)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 3.4067* 5.2040*** 0.4696 0.3406
(1.8247) (1.4906) (1.2900) (0.2461)
N 9094 9094 9094 9094 9221 9221 9221 9221
Pseudo-/ Adj. R2 0.0396 0.0821 0.023 0.0299 0.1926 0.2049 0.0950 0.0041
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decision in the second and the third model. Therefore, we conclude that the ﬁrst model suffers
from an omitted variable bias and #Campaigns as well as InsolvDummy only capture the
signiﬁcant effect of the investment behavior in the ﬁrst model. In both the second and the third
model, the investment behavior is highly signiﬁcantly associated with the change of the RAROC.
In particular, the 2SLS model, indicates that InsolvDummy and #Campaigns signiﬁcantly affect
the investment decision. The investment decision, in turn, is signiﬁcantly related to the change
of the RAROC. The evidence suggests a positive relationship between a high amount of newly
invested capital and improvements of the risk-return proﬁle of the investors.
Table 6.8 Regression Results for the change of the RAROC. Standard errors are clustered on investor level
and shown in parentheses. The last two columns show a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) esti-
mation with log(NewInvAmount) being the dependent variable of the ﬁrst stage and ∆RAROC
the dependent variable of the second stage. The symbols *, **, and *** express signiﬁcance at
the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are deﬁned in Table 6.1.
2 SLS
Dependent Variable ∆RAROC ∆RAROC log(NewInvAmount) ∆RAROC
log(NewInvAmount) 0.0067*** 0.0084***
(0.0001) (0.0017)
InsolvDummy −0.0197*** −0.0005 −2.8556***
(0.0069) (0.0036) (0.7578)
#Campaigns −0.0028*** −0.0010 −0.2725***
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0614)
log(Distance) −0.0007 −0.0001 −0.0909
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.1806)
Experience −0.0085*** −0.0066*** −0.2720*** −0.0062***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0286) (0.0006)
(Experience)2 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0084*** 0.0003***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0000)
#Invt−1 0.0003*** −0.0001*** 0.0671*** −0.0002*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0056) (0.0001)
Gender −0.0044*** −0.0006 −0.5652*** 0.0004
(0.0010) (0.0007) (0.1046) (0.0012)
Age 0.0002*** −0.0000 0.0272*** −0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0033) (0.0001)
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.0938*** 0.0492*** 6.6492*** 0.0291***
(0.0206) (0.0181) (1.5036) (0.0024)
N 18,265 18,265 18,265 18,265
Adj.R2 0.0809 0.2279 0.1747 0.2183
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of Experience is signiﬁcantly negative indicating that
experience deteriorates the risk-return proﬁle. However, the coefﬁcient of the squared experience
is signiﬁcantly different to zero with a positive sign. Together with the effect of experience
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throughout the ﬁrst stage, this indicates a reversal point subsequent to approximately 340 days,
after which more experience is associated with an improvement of the RAROC.8
With subsample regressions, we examine the effect of covariates on the change of the RAROC
depending on the level of experience. Similar to the analysis of the investment behavior, we
separate the observations with respect to less experienced investors (experience less than 200
days) and experienced investors (experience of 200 days or more). Table 6.9 shows the results
for the 2SLS estimation.
Table 6.9 Subsample-Regression Results for the change of the RAROC. Standard errors are clustered on
investor level and shown in parentheses. We apply two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimation
with log(NewInvAmount) being the dependent variable of the ﬁrst stage and ∆RAROC the
dependent variable of the second stage. The symbols *, **, and *** express signiﬁcance at the
10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are deﬁned in Table 6.1.
Experience < 200 days Experience ≥ 200 days
Dependent Variable log(NewInvAmount) ∆RAROC log(NewInvAmount) ∆RAROC
log(NewInvAmount) 0.0142*** 0.0047***
(0.0024) (0.0009)
InsolvDummy −3.6777*** −2.8923***
(0.9218) (0.7786)
#Campaigns −0.3759*** 0.0453***
(0.0608) (0.0041)
log(Distance) 0.0274 −0.2789
(0.1887) (0.2221)
#Invt−1 0.1208*** −0.0012*** 0.0558*** −0.0000
(0.0059) (0.0003) (0.0048) (0.0001)
Gender −0.5302*** 0.0005 −0.4992*** 0.0018*
(0.1222) (0.0018) (0.1406) (0.0010)
Age 0.0312*** −0.0002** 0.0222*** −0.0000
(0.0038) (0.0001) (0.0043) (0.0000)
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Constant 6.5068*** 0.0072*** 0.0767 −0.0003
(1.5346) (0.0025) (1.2957) (0.0012)
N 9,094 9,094 9,171 9,171
Adj.R2 0.144 0.151 0.204 0.139
In both subsamples, the investment decision is signiﬁcantly positively associated with a change
in the RAROC. This is consistent with the results from our main models. However, we ﬁnd
interesting effects regarding gender and age. The data suggest that experienced women tend to
enhance their risk-return proﬁle compared with experienced men. Moreover, for inexperienced
investors we ﬁnd a negative association between age and the change of the RAROC.
8A value of x = 340 marks the minimum of the term (βExp.;2ndStage + βExp.1stStage · βNewInvAmount) · x +
(βExp.2;2ndStage+βExp.2;1ndStage ·βNewInvAmount) · x2, where x represents the experience in days.
135
Chapter 6 The portfolio formation behavior of peer-to-business lending investors
Overall, we ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of our ﬁrst two hypotheses. Analyzing both the
investment behavior and changes in the risk-return proﬁle suggests that investors suffer from a
default shock bias. Investors tend to recoil from new investments after having experienced a
loan default in their portfolio. This behavior, in turn, is associated with a deterioration of the
risk-return proﬁle of the portfolio. Moreover, investors appear to suffer from a deep market bias
and invest less when they have a broad selection of loan campaigns in which to invest. Again,
this investment behavior appears to be irrational as it is related to a worsening of the risk-return
proﬁle.
In order to examine hypotheses 3a and b, we investigate the effect of experience on both
the investment behavior and the risk-return proﬁle. Our results suggest that the association
between the investment behavior and experience is U-shaped. Investors appear to invest less
with increasing experience up to a certain tipping point. After this, the relationship reverses.
We observe the same pattern for the relationship between experience and the risk-return proﬁle.
Regarding hypothesis 3b, we obtain some evidence suggesting that the effects of the biases are
weakened with increased experience. Experienced investors invest signiﬁcantly more when they
have greater investment choices. This investment behavior is related to an improvement of the
risk-return proﬁle.
6.5.3 Robustness Checks
We perform several tests and estimate further speciﬁcations in order to ensure the robustness of
our results. To this end, we repeat all subsample regressions with different levels of experience
for both the analysis of the investment behavior and the change within the risk-return proﬁle.
The results remain largely unchanged, deﬁning less experienced investors as being investors
with less than 250 days and less than 180 days of experience, respectively.9 In the analysis
of the investment behavior, we note small differences for experienced investors in the last
speciﬁcation. In particular, the signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient of #Campaigns decreases from a
1% signiﬁcance level in our main model to a 5% level for investors with more than 250 days
experience. Furthermore, the coefﬁcient of #Invi,t−1 is negatively signiﬁcant at a 10 % level for
investors with more than 180 days experience. With regard to the investigation of changes in the
RAROC, we ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of age, which is not signiﬁcant in our main model, becomes
negatively signiﬁcant at a 10 % level when deﬁning experienced investors as being investors
with more than 250 days of experience.
9Results can be provided upon request.
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Moreover, we calculate the change of the RAROC based on different VaR levels. Table 6.10
presents the results using a 95 %, a 97 % and a 99 % VaR, respectively. As the probability
of default for A-rated bonds equals 0.6 % according to the platform, the VaR of an investor’s
portfolio can amount to zero for these VaRs. As we cannot calculate the RAROC for a VaR of
zero, the number of observations decreases with a lower probability threshold of the VaRs. We
ﬁnd that the results remain robust when using the different RAROCs. In particular, we ﬁnd a
positive inﬂuence of new investment decisions in all speciﬁcations. Additionally, experience
retains its previously exhibited relationship with the change of the RAROC.
As another robustness check for the results of the 2SLS model, we use other measures for the
investment behavior as dependent variables in the ﬁrst stage. The results of the second stage
are displayed in Table 6.11. Our ﬁndings hardly change when we use different endogenous
variables to measure the investment behavior. The predicted values of NewInvDummy, #NewInv
and NewInvRel are all signiﬁcantly positively related to the ∆RAROC. Moreover, the effect of
experience is similar to the effect found in the main model. We ﬁnd evidence that the change of
the RAROC ﬁrst decreases with longer experience, but this relationship reverses after a tipping
point is reached. However, the exogeneity condition is not valid for the instruments in the case
of NewInvRel. Hence, the estimator could be inconsistent using this endogenous variable.
Furthermore, we use different instruments for our 2SLS model. First, we reduce the number
of instruments and only use one of the variables InsolvDummy, #Campaigns and Distance as
an instrument. The results remain robust. The hypothesis-related variables are signiﬁcantly
related to the investment decision in the ﬁrst stage, but not signiﬁcantly related to the change
of the RAROC in the second stage. Second, we use the age and the gender as instruments and
include all previous instruments in the second stage. Again, InsolvDummy, #Campaigns and
Distance are not signiﬁcantly associated with the ∆RAROC in the second stage. The effect of
the other variables remains unchanged as well. In particular, both the impact of experience and
the squared term of experience remain largely unchanged in all models.
6.6 Conclusion
We ﬁnd evidence to support the fact that investors suffer from two new investment biases—the
default shock bias and the deep market bias. Furthermore, we show that experienced investors
are less prone to making these investment mistakes. We use data from a peer-to-business
lending platform, which allows retail investors to invest in corporate loans. Before the rise of
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Table 6.10 Robustness Test for RAROC. The RAROC is calculated on the basis of different VaRs (95 %, 97 % and 99 %). Standard errors are
clustered on investor level and shown in parentheses. We apply two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimation with log(NewInvAmount)
being the dependent variable of the ﬁrst stage and ∆RAROC the dependent variable of the second stage. The symbols *, **, and ***
express signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. The variables are deﬁned in Table 6.1.
RAROC with 95 % VaR RAROC with 97 % VaR RAROC with 99 % VaR
log(NewInvAmount) ∆RAROC log(NewInvAmount) ∆RAROC log(NewInvAmount) ∆RAROC
log(NewInvAmount) 0.0098*** 0.0096*** 0.0102***
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0018)
InsolvDummy −8.5361*** −6.6425*** −3.1251***
(0.9055) (0.8637) (0.8737)
#Campaigns −0.2849*** −0.2876*** −0.3244***
(0.0688) (0.0686) (0.0680)
log(Distance) −0.0015 0.0335 −0.0859
(0.2415) (0.2119) (0.1873)
Experience −0.2564*** −0.0158*** −0.2856*** −0.0124*** −0.2830*** −0.0081***
(0.0380) (0.0010) (0.0349) (0.0008) (0.0299) (0.0007)
(Experience)2 0.0068*** 0.0007*** 0.0081*** 0.0005*** 0.0087*** 0.0004***
(0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0000)
#Invt−1 0.0554*** −0.0004*** 0.0587*** −0.0003*** 0.0654*** −0.0003***
(0.0048) (0.0001) (0.0050) (0.0001) (0.0055) (0.0001)
Gender −0.5312*** −0.0007 −0.5213*** 0.0015 −0.5619*** −0.0000
(0.1511) (0.0023) (0.1395) (0.0018) (0.1125) (0.0013)
Age 0.0309*** −0.0000 0.0298*** −0.0000 0.0274*** −0.0001**
(0.0044) (0.0001) (0.0040) (0.0001) (0.0035) (0.0001)
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 6.6353*** 0.0805*** 6.5440*** 0.0625*** 7.7218*** 0.0407***
(1.8416) (0.0049) (1.7133) (0.0040) (1.6197) (0.0029)
N 11,673 11,673 13,397 13,397 16,981 16,981
Adj.R2 0.1678 0.1679 0.1688 0.1743 0.1734 0.1949
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Table 6.11 Robustness Test for RAROC. The ﬁrst stage is estimated using different measures of the
investment behavior as depended variable. The endogenous variables are NewInvDummy in
speciﬁcation (1), NewInvRel in speciﬁcation (2), and #NewInv in speciﬁcation (3). Standard
errors are clustered on investor level and shown in parentheses. We apply two-stage-least-
squares (2SLS) estimation with ∆RAROC as the dependent variable of the second stage. The
symbols *, **, and *** express signiﬁcance at the 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. The
variables are deﬁned in Table 6.1.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ∆RAROC ∆RAROC ∆RAROC
Investment Behavior 0.0557*** 0.0133** 0.0118***
(0.0107) (0.0056) (0.0038)
Experience −0.0062*** −0.0065*** −0.0054***
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0011)
(Experience)2 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
#Invt−1 −0.0002* 0.0003*** −0.0006**
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Gender 0.0002 −0.0037*** −0.0014
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Age −0.0000 0.0001*** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time FE yes yes yes
Constant 0.0250*** 0.0288*** 0.0302***
(0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0031)
N 18,265 18,265 18,265
Adj.R2 0.1978 0.1241 0.1840
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crowdfunding, this asset class was virtually exclusively available to banks and other institutional
investors. Hence, the retail investors who are active on such platforms can be assumed to have
only limited experience concerning this asset class.
Rational investors should strive to diversify their loan portfolio as much as possible in order to
achieve the best possible risk-return proﬁle of their portfolio. In contrast to the stock market, on
which investors can invest in exchange traded funds and have a huge universe of stocks to choose
from, it is not possible to immediately obtain a diversiﬁed loan portfolio in peer-to-business
lending. Investors have to invest continuously in several subsequent loan campaigns that are
posted on the platform over time. We show that investors are paralyzed by the shock they
appear to suffer from experiencing a default of a loan in their portfolio. Thereafter they invest
in less new loans and thus stop to diversify their portfolio. This default shock bias results in
a deterioration of the risk-return proﬁle of their portfolio. Moreover, a glut of simultaneously
active loan campaigns is negatively related to new loan investments. Investors appear to be
unable to cope with the information provided if many campaigns are simultaneously active
and tend to invest less. The deep market bias also results in a worsening of the risk-return
proﬁle of the portfolio. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that experienced investors suffer from the deep
market bias to a lesser extent. However, increased experience is not directly associated with
improvements in the risk-return proﬁle. By contrast, our results suggest that this relationship is
U-shaped. Investors deteriorate their risk-return proﬁle up to a certain level of experience until
this relationship reverses.
One could argue that the default shock bias could also represent a rational investor behavior. In
the case that investors gain additional information through experiencing a loan default, the new
investment behavior could well be rational. In particular, investors might realize that the true
default probability is higher than the expected default probability. Alternatively, investors may
suspect that the borrower or the platform are engaging in fraudulent behavior. However, we see
no reason to conclude that investors indeed gain such superior information through experiencing
a loan default. Analyzing the rating classes of the loans and the average default probability
provided from the platform indicates that approximately eight defaults can be expected from the
367 successfully funded loans, while only as few as ﬁve were observed during our investigation
period. Furthermore, we do not ﬁnd any indication of fraudulent behavior.
In the stock market, investors are confronted with a huge universe of different stocks. However,
there is only little evidence to suggest that investors suffer from a deep market bias in this
context. In fact, to the contrary, stocks are a common and popular asset class. Solely Iyengar
et al. (2004) show that the participation rate in 401(k) retirement plans tends to decrease along
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with a high number of investment possibilities. A potential explanation why investors generally
remain unfazed by the great amount stocks could be the wide range of investment advice for
stock investments. Both the information and the choice overload could be reduced, for example,
with the aid of either investment advisers or investment journals. Furthermore, the investment
opportunities are less dynamic in a stock market and, therefore, investors usually have no time
pressure under which to decide which stocks to buy. In peer-to-business lending, investors can
only invest within the funding period. Thereafter the investment opportunity typically ceases to
exist.
Both the default shock bias and the deep market bias result in fewer investments in peer-to-
business lending. In particular, the platforms providing this form of investment should be
concerned with trying to diminish the effects of these investment biases. A credit risk tool
provided by the platform could help investors to better understand risk of defaults and also to
ﬁlter relevant information in order to decrease the information load for investors. Furthermore,
such a tool could help investors to invest in a way that optimizes the risk-return proﬁle of their
portfolio.
Our paper has several limitations. First, our observation period is rather short. A longer period
would lead to more loan observations and enable a greater insight into the learning effects over
time. Furthermore, more demographic information on the investors such as the income could
help to examine the effect of the behavioral biases and experience in more detail. Moreover, an
analysis of the question of whether investors suffer from these investment biases when investing
in other asset classes that are predominated by institutional investors appears to be promising.
Equity crowdfunding, which enables retail investors to have the opportunity to provide equity to
start-ups, could be a relevant setting in this context.
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6.7 Appendix
Calculation of the RAROC
In order to measure the risk-return proﬁle of investors in peer-to-business lending, we derive the
RAROC. Therefore, we divide the expected return of the portfolio by the risk capital. Due to the
low interest rates for retail investors within the observation period, reﬁnancing costs should be
negligible in this context. Hence, we calculate the expected portfolio return as interest charged
minus the expected loan losses (ExpReturn). Moreover, the VaR is a common proxy for the risk
capital (see, e.g. Prokopczuk et al., 2004). Thus, we estimate the RAROC as follows:
RAROC =
Expected Portfolio Return
Risk Capital
=
ExpReturn
VaR
. (6.3)
To estimate the RAROC, we calculate the value at risk of each portfolio. In a ﬁrst step, we obtain
the average default correlation between the borrowers in a portfolio. Du¨llmann and Scheule
(2003) use data on German SMEs and empirically estimate their asset correlation depending on
the size of the corporation and the probability of default (PD). By using a Maximum-Likelihood-
Estimator, they obtain asset correlations for small corporations between 0.009 and 0.04. Our data
set mainly contains small corporations. Therefore, we generally assume an asset correlation of
0.025 for corporations in different industries. As the asset correlation of corporations within the
same industry tends to be higher, we choose a higher value of 0.04 for interindustry correlation.
Furthermore, the platform provides an estimate of the average PD for each rating class (see
Table 6.12).
Table 6.12 Probability of Default of the loans. The values of the average expected PD are derived from
the peer-to-business lending platform. Note: The platform did not provide an average PD for
rating class C−. Therefore, we interpolate with the average PDs of rating classes C and D.
Rating Class A+ A B C C−
Expected PD in % 0.6 1.5 2.3 3 4
With the asset correlation and the PD of the corporations, we next determine the probability of
two borrowers defaulting simultaneously. This probability is given by the joint probability of
default (JPD). Assuming a bivariate Gaussian distribution, the JPD is calculated as follows:
JPDi, j = Φ(ci,c j,ρ
asset
i, j ) (6.4)
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with ci being the Φ
−1(PDi). We follow Frye (2008) and calculate the default correlation between
two borrowers as
De f ault correlation= ρi, j =
JPD−PDi ·PD j√
PDi · (1−PDi) ·PD j · (1−PD j)
(6.5)
where PDi and PD j are the default probabilities of each loan, according to their rating classes.
As most portfolios comprise several loans, we estimate an average default correlation using the
following formula:
ρav =
2
(∑ni=1 vi)
2−∑ni=1 v2i
·∑
i< j
ρi j · vi · v j (6.6)
where vi and v j represent the invested amounts in the loans i and j.
In a second step, we follow Ieda et al. (2000) and ﬁrst calculate the 99.5 % VaR for a homoge-
neous portfolio. Therefore, we examine the probability that n out of N borrowers will default
and calculate the smallest m such that
m
∑
n=0
∫ ∞
−∞
{
Φ
(
c−√ρu√
1−ρ
)}n{
1−Φ
(
c−√ρu√
1−ρ
)}N−n
φ(u)du
(
N
n
)
≥ 0.995. (6.7)
In this context we calculate the c on basis of the average PD of each portfolio. We obtain the
value at risk of a homogenous portfolio by multiplying m with the average invested amount in a
loan.
In a ﬁnal step, as suggested by Ieda et al. (2000), we obtain the VaR of a heterogeneous portfolio
by multiplying the VaR of a homogenous portfolio with
√
ρ +
(√
∑v2i
∑vi
)2
(1−ρ)√
ρ + 1−ρ
N
. (6.8)
In this way, we correct for the fact that investors hold heterogeneous portfolios and for beneﬁts
through diversiﬁcation. We divide the VaR of the portfolio by the total amount invested at each
valuation date in order to measure the portfolio risk relative to the portfolio value.
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Conclusion
This thesis provides several contributions to the literature on alternative forms of ﬁnance. The
ﬁve research papers deal with different aspects of both the ﬁnancing instruments and the players
on the market for alternative ﬁnance.
In the ﬁrst study, we provide new insights into drivers of the funding success and the probability
of default in P2P lending. Soft factors derived from the description text of loan applications help
to predict the funding success if no hard information is available on the crowdlending platform.
We conclude that investors do indeed take soft factors into consideration when deciding which
loans to fund. However, the importance of soft factors depends on the platform design. By
contrast, the probability of default is hardly related to soft factors.
The second research paper investigates the yield spread of Mittelstand bonds. We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant positive relationship between illiquidity and the yield spread, which persists after
controlling for the default risk as well as ﬁrm and bond characteristics. The size of the liquidity
premium equals approximately twice the size of the liquidity premium of speculative grade US
corporate bonds. This results has important implications for Mittelstand ﬁrms issuing the bonds.
They can reduce the observed yield spread of their bonds by decreasing sources of illiquidity.
The third article reveals several predictors of the probability of default and the loss rate in online
invoice trading. Our results suggest that the interest rate plays a key role in explaining defaults.
Additionally, the duration and the percentage funded are also signiﬁcantly associated with the
probability of default. We ﬁnd that even though the probability of default is higher within the
auction period, investors gained higher net returns during this pricing regime.
In the fourth study, we empirically analyze the communication behavior of entrepreneurs in
equity crowdfunding. We ﬁnd evidence for strategic communication behavior. Entrepreneurs
post updates more frequently during the funding period and use more linguistic devices that
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enhance the feeling of group cohesion and group identity within the funding period. Moreover,
our results suggest that during the funding period the probability of an update increases with the
strength of the competition from other contemporary crowdfunding campaigns. Such strategic
communication behavior of entrepreneurs may result in sub-optimal investment decisions by
the investors as some updates only target receiving further funds rather than revealing real
informational content. Since equity crowdfunding falls outside traditional securities regulation,
the need for stricter regulation may arise.
In the last research paper, we examine two new investment biases—the default shock bias and
the deep market bias. Using data from a peer-to-business lending platform we show that retail
investors invest in less new loans and thereby underdiversify their portfolio after experiencing a
loan default. Furthermore, investors appear not to be able to cope with a glut of simultaneous
active loan campaigns. They cease to further diversify their portfolios. Both the default shock
bias and the deep market bias result in a worsening of the risk-return proﬁle of the portfolio. We
show that experienced investors suffer from the deep market bias to a lesser extent.
This dissertation empirically investigates different sources of alternative ﬁnance for SMEs. Since
many SMEs fail to obtain sufﬁcient ﬁnancing, the need for a complement to the traditional
ﬁnancing sources arises. While SMEs are drivers of employment and GDP growth all over the
world (Ayyagari et al., 2007), the ﬁnancing gap is especially pronounced in developing countries.
Every year, the unmet ﬁnancing needs in emerging countries equal approximately 5.2 trillion
USD (IFC, 2017). Governments all over the world have already stepped in and introduced a
range of policies to close the ﬁnancing gap for SMEs. In this context, many countries have
adopted initiatives in order to promote alternative ﬁnance and thereby to foster the access to
ﬁnance for small businesses (OECD, 2018). This development is likely to boost further growth
in sources of alternative ﬁnance.
Whether alternative ﬁnance indeed helps to signiﬁcantly reduce the ﬁnancing gap remains to be
seen. Future research should evaluate the success of the new ﬁnancing instruments for providing
SMEs with sufﬁcient ﬁnancing. Moreover, most of the providers of alternative ﬁnance build
up their business models on new technologies and claim increased transparency compared to
traditional providers of ﬁnancing. Thus, many of them make their data publicly available. This
new data provides several promising avenues of research. On several platforms the investor and
the entrepreneurial behavior constitutes a natural experiment and may also allow one to draw
conclusions about causal relationships.
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